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ABSTRACT 
 
Global climate change is easily identified as one of the most pressing and 
contentious policy problems facing not only the United States, but the human race.  In a 
democratic society such as our own, understanding the public’s capacities and 
tendencies in processing information and forming opinions about climate change has 
serious and far-reaching policy implications.  Historically quite low, public knowledge 
about climate change is now on the rise, as is the importance of the issue on the public 
agenda (Leiserowitz, 2005).  Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect the public, 
for better or worse, to play a larger role in future climate policy melees. In light of the 
prospect of an increasingly important public role in shaping policy contours, this 
dissertation seeks to test how and why individuals form opinions and assessments of 
risk about climate change.  In order to address these questions, two theories that 
account for both individual internal factors and external stimuli in opinion formation 
and change are merged to create a Cultural Narrative Model (CNM).   
The first, Cultural Theory (CT), argues that there are four exclusive value 
orientations to which individuals subscribe based upon preferred levels of group 
interaction and the degree that these groups are expected to constrain the individual’s 
beliefs and behavior.  These value orientations are always present and influence how 
incoming information is processed (Wildavsky, 1987; Thompson et al., 1990).  CT has a 
proven history of explaining variation in opinion and risk perceptions (Wildavsky & Dake, 
1990); however, the influence of message structures in CT scholarship is lacking.  This 
xi 
 
research operationalizes narrative theory to address this gap.  Seeking to determine if 
cultural narratives help explain variations in climate change opinion related dependent 
variables, two research questions are addressed:  
RQ1:  Narrative Structure:  Does narrative structure influence opinions related 
to climate change? 
RQ2:  Cultural Narrative Content: Does cultural narrative content explain 
variation in opinions related to climate change?   
Specific hypotheses derived from the above research questions are tested using 
an online internet survey with a built in experimental design.   Four experimental tracks 
are employed, including a control list and three cultural narrative treatments. Several 
statistical tools, including analysis of variance and OLS regression analysis are used to 
assess each hypothesis.  The survey sample consists of roughly fifteen-hundred 
nationally representative respondents surveyed from within the United States. 
 Findings indicate that while cultural content does not appear to influence 
opinions about climate change, narrative structure plays a powerful role in shaping 
opinion.  Specifically, findings show that the vehicle through which narrative structure 
persuades is the hero character.   Examining eleven climate change opinion related 
variables, as positive affect for the hero increases so too do respondent preferences and 
beliefs in direction specified by the cultural narrative treatments.   
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CHAPTER 1: MASS OPINIONS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
  
Most Americans, including the majority of the scientific community (IPCC, 2007), 
believe climate change is real and are concerned about the potential consequences 
(Leiserowitz, 2005).  Nevertheless, despite near-consensus on the reality of climate 
change and high levels of overall public concern, the causes, consequences and 
solutions for climate change continue to be hotly debated.    While most scientists 
accept human produced greenhouse gases (GHG’s) as a principal cause of climate 
change (IPCC, 2007), a nontrivial fraction of the public in the United States have resisted 
such arguments (Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1440).  Why?  Certainly potential consequences 
here in the United States provide motivation to at least consider a reduction in GHG’s:   
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed to 
coastal erosion.  
• In polar regions such as Alaska, infrastructure and native ways of life are 80% 
likely to suffer significant harm from the effects of climate change.  
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in number, 
intensity, and duration during the course of the century.  
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe summer 
droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime flooding will damage 
crop yields.    
• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to decreased 
snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, which would 
increase competition for water in many western states. 
 
—IPCC Report, 2007 
 
However, reactions to these predictions vary.  Some find them alarming; some 
may find them terrifying; others will find the predictions unsettling; some reject them as 
alarmist or will simply not care; yet others think they are deliberately deceptive.  It is 
2 
 
within this diversity of opinions that we can begin to explain how an extraordinary 
problem like climate change, adorned with large-scale consequences and scientific 
consensus, has encountered such varied responses. In part, the historical effectiveness 
of the resistance can be attributed to the issue’s historically low salience, which may be 
attributable to the public’s beliefs and perceptions.  Therefore, this research seeks to 
explain how and why individuals believe what they do in relation to this highly charged 
issue.  
The following sections proceed as follows: first, the reasoning behind why we 
should be concerned about the general relationship between public opinion and public 
policy is addressed.  Next, a brief history of the development of climate change policy 
and the science that accompanies it is summarized.  Emphasis in these sections targets 
the contestable nature of these developments and how public opinion fits into and even 
helps shape the controversies about climate change.  Following an overview of the 
policy and science of climate change, the next section catalogs the various explanations 
preceding this research for how and why mass opinions diverge from the high levels of 
scientific consensus on climate change.  The conclusions offered by previous scholarship 
suggest that divergent public opinion is best explained by climate change knowledge 
deficits (e.g., Kellstadt et al., 2008) and directed by misrepresented scientific 
controversy in primary media outlets (e.g., Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007).  That is, if people 
simply knew more and the media were more responsible, previous scholars conclude, 
the public would display similar levels of consensus to that of the scientific community.  
Arguing that there is room for improvement in our scientific understanding of the 
3 
 
public’s opinions about climate change, this chapter concludes by summarizing recent 
narrative scholarship that may provide valuable insights about how and why people 
hold the opinions they do.  The discussion of climate change narratives concludes by 
drawing special attention to the cognitive interactions that take place in the human 
mind, where one’s cultural priors are theorized to heavily bias the processing of 
information and how the mass public may be susceptible to narratively structured 
messages (i.e., stories).   
 
1.1 Public Opinion and Public Policy: Why Should We Care? 
Public opinion is critical because it is a key component of the socio-political 
context within which policy makers operate. Public opinion can fundamentally 
compel or constrain political, economic and social action to address particular 
risks. For example, public support or opposition to climate policies (e.g., treaties, 
regulations, taxes, subsidies, etc.) will be greatly influenced by public perceptions 
of the risks and dangers of climate change. Further, successfully mitigating or 
adapting to climate change will require changes in the behavior of billions of 
human beings, who each day make individual choices that collectively have 
enormous impacts on the Earth’s climate.  
 
–Anthony Leiserowitz, Public Opinion and Climate Change Scholar 
(2007,  p. 3). 
 
 
Social scientists disagree on the essential nature of public opinion and how said 
opinion influences governmental institutions and public policy.  Succinctly summarizing 
these disagreements, Herron and Jenkins-Smith (2006) characterize public opinion 
scholarship engaging in these debates as consistent with one of two accounts: 
traditionalist and revisionist.  The traditionalist account produces findings consistent 
with the notion that the public is hapless and whimsical, where public opinion is 
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directed by elites.  On the other hand, revisionist findings suggest that although the 
public may come up short in substantive knowledge in most policy areas, through 
intellectual heuristics and cognitive short cuts, the public does consistently organize its 
opinions around belief systems and, at least in the aggregate, is “smart enough” to 
guide public policy.   
Walter Lippman (1922; 1925; 1955) is the modern era intellectual grandfather of 
the traditionalist account.  In Lippman’s earlier and broadly recognized work, titled 
Public Opinion (1922), he expresses severe doubts regarding the public’s capacities, 
arguing that elites must direct an apathetic and ill-informed public.  Lippman later 
extends this pessimistic notion of the public, referring to the masses as a “bewildered 
herd” (1925, p. 155), by arguing that the public is prone to manipulation by special 
interests and likely to be mobilized for only short periods of time (1925).  By 1955, 
Lippman’s case against public opinion extends specifically to complex policy areas, 
especially national security.  He eloquently argues that the involvement of the public in 
these complex areas overwhelms governmental capacities and, in many cases, disrupts 
any meaningful action on the part of political institutions (1955).   
Whereas Walter Lippman may be characterized as providing the modern 
impetus to view public opinion with distrust through elegant argumentation and 
qualitative research techniques, Phillip Converse’s early work can be viewed as 
providing the empirical ammunition to give the traditional view substantive traction 
(1962; 1964). Employing survey data coupled with the advanced statistical techniques of 
the time, Converse (1964) found that ideology, measured in terms of liberalism and 
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conservatism, does not structure both elite and mass opinions.  Rather, elites, with their 
higher levels of education, employ abstract political beliefs such as ideology while the 
public varies in its capacity to do so, dependent upon several constraints—especially 
education.  The disturbing conclusion of Converse’s study indicated that the vast 
majority of the public cannot link the abstract concept of ideology to political parties 
and, consequently, changes in preferences among the mass public are at worst near-
random, or at best quite prone to elite manipulation.  If one takes these findings 
seriously, which many have, the consequences for representative government are 
severe. Converse’s findings call into question the very possibility of representation.  The 
normative conclusions surfacing from Converse’s findings were straightforward, which 
either implored political elites to act as stewards of opinion, or more cynically sought to 
engage in wholesale manipulation of the public.  In short, Converse’s finding, building as 
it were on Lippman’s persuasive case, affirmed earlier fears of the masses and solidified 
the view in political science that pluralistic government, where group interests are 
represented by elite leadership, is best.  Subsequent findings affirm Converse’s 1964 
finding.   
 Studies demonstrating public ignorance are plentiful as one need not dig very 
deep to find that the public lacks both detailed policy knowledge and general knowledge 
of the American political process (see, for example, Gilens, 2001), which Converse found 
to be a very strong indicator of whether or not an individual displayed a coherent 
political belief system (i.e. ideology).  Further buttressing the ominous 1964 finding, 
Zaller’s classic study, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992), finds that 
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individual opinions are largely formed on the spot by survey respondents.  Modeled off 
of Converse’s 1962 and 1964 studies, Zaller find’s that individuals respond to survey 
questions based upon current considerations, or information and attitudes that have 
been recently evaluated by the survey respondent.  As a result, individuals are 
susceptible to manipulation through elite communications.1  Zaller, like Converse, finds 
these effects are most pronounced in individuals with lower levels of policy knowledge 
and education (1992).  Zaller’s foundational study is held up as a paragon of public 
opinion scholarship, cited over 2,500 times since 1992.2
 Dubbed the revisionist approach to public opinion (Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 
2006), this collection of research generally finds that opinions do cohere around central 
organizing belief systems (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, & Herron, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 
1987) and that even if the public’s knowledge is wanting, low-information rationality is 
sufficient to form durable (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Shapiro & Page, 1988; 1994)  and 
consistent views about public policy (e.g.,  Lupia & McCubbins, 1998) through organizing 
devices such and simplifying heuristics (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991).   Revisionist 
research finds that individual opinion coheres around organizing principles such as 
  Building upon the foundational 
findings of Lippman, Converse, and Zaller, a plethora of studies have been produced 
affirming the traditional view of public opinion (for an overview of this literature, see 
Converse, 2000).  Despite the massive popularity of the traditionalist approach, a 
collection of recent findings challenge the traditional understanding of public opinion. 
                                                          
1 Indeed, much of the subsequent framing research following Zaller’s work supports this 
assertion.  See Druckman (2001) for a prescient discussion of framing research as it may 
relate to traditional and revisionist conceptions of public opinion.   
2 Google Scholar search performed March 24, 2009.   
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culture (e.g., Kahan & Braman, 2006) or public mood (Erikson, MacKuen, & Simsom, 
2002), while also finding that the seemingly random individual opinion variation 
reported by Converse and Zaller is cancelled out in the aggregate (Stimson, MacKuen, & 
Erikson, 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002).  Contra traditionalist findings, 
revisionists demonstrate a cogent public that structures political beliefs and opinions 
around consistent and identifiable organizing principles.  However, whether one 
subscribes to the traditionalist or revisionist schools of public opinion, an important 
question remains:  does public opinion matter for public policy?  If the traditionalists are 
correct, then a consistent relationship between public opinion and public policy would 
be disastrous, while a consistent relationship between public opinion and public policy 
for the revisionists speaks to what many would see as a normatively preferable 
manifestation of democratic governance.   
A recent study examines our macro-understanding of the relationship between 
public policy and public opinion.  Burstein (2003), performing a meta-analysis of thirty of 
the most notable and cited works in public opinion and public policy scholarship, finds 
that “public opinion affects public policy three-quarters of the time” (2003, p. 36).  
Furthermore, governmental institutions are most responsive to public opinion on issues 
with high salience (Burstein, 2003), while low salience policies favor special interests 
(Burstein, 2006).  Importantly, in these high-salience policy areas, public opinion 
remains important even when controlling for elite behavior (Burstein, 2003).3
                                                          
3 Burstein does, however, illuminate several deficiencies in our understanding of the 
relationship between public opinion and public policy.  In general, the studies examined 
by Burstein (2003; 2006) are too often cross-sectional and driven by researcher interest.  
  Clearly 
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then, whether traditionalist or revisionist, public opinion influences public policy.   
Importantly, that influence is likely to be largest when the issue is salient.   
Is climate change a high salience issue? Recent survey data provides insight on 
the issue of salience as it relates to climate change in the United States. Observing 
trends in numerous public opinion polls in the United States, Leiserowitz  (2003; 2006) 
finds that since the year 2000: 
• 92% of Americans are aware of climate change. 
• 74% believe that climate change is real and underway. 
• 61% believe that there is scientific consensus on the reality of climate 
change 
• 76% view climate change as a somewhat to very serious problem (2006, 
p. 46).   
However, the issue of salience is not as straight forward as one might infer from 
the above data.  Historically the issue of climate change, when ranked comparatively to 
other issues such as taxes, has rated quite low with the American public.  Annual Gallup 
polls ask respondents to state which problem facing the nation is the most important.  
Between the years 1970 and 2005, relevant polls report less than 4% of respondents 
citing climate change in each year.4  For example, in a 2000 “…Gallup Poll, the 
environment ranked 16th
                                                                                                                                                                             
As a consequence, Burstein argues that generalization is suspect as research 
overwhelmingly focuses on salient issues and lacks the time-series analysis necessary to 
state with any definitive authority that these relationships hold over time. 
 on Americans’ list of most important problems facing the 
4 The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. 
Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant number SBR 9320922, and 
were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at 
Austin and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State University. Neither NSF 
nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported 
here  
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country” (Leiserowitz, 2006, p. 46).  Importantly, within the broad category of 
environmental issues (almost always rated lower than economic and security issues), 
climate change is on the rise.  In 2000, climate change was rated by Americans a paltry 
12th of 13 possible environmental issues (Dunlap & Saad, 2001, cited in Leiserowitz, 
2005). A more recent poll conducted July 2008, finds 25% of Americans citing climate 
change as the number one environmental problem.5
Buttressing the identified trends in polling data, highly visible entertainment 
events may also be contributing to public concern and awareness about climate change, 
pushing the issue ever closer to where past research on public opinion and public policy 
would predict some level of public opinion influence.  For example, research finds that 
the Hollywood film depicting catastrophic climate change, The Day After Tomorrow 
(2004), raised viewers efficacy, knowledge, and general concern in the United Kingdom 
(Lowe et al., 2006), and one might easily infer similar results here in the United States.  
More recently, former Vice President Al Gore’s popularized and highly successful film in 
2006, An Inconvenient Truth, grossed close to 25 million
  In sum, it appears that recent 
polling data point to a trend in climate change salience that indicate both an increasing 
public awareness and sense of public importance, despite the fact that climate change is 
not generally considered one of the more pressing national problems.   
6
                                                          
5 ABC News/Planet Green/Stanford University Poll.  July 23-28, 2008. N=1000 adults 
nationwide.  MoE +/- 3.  Fieldwork by TNS: 
 dollars and helped Gore 
http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm. 
Accessed March 24, 2009. 
6 http://boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=documentary.htm. Accessed March 24, 
2009. 
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achieve a Grammy, an Academy Award, and a joint Nobel Peace Prize7
Previous research indicates that it is under conditions of high salience that we 
can expect public opinion to matter most to policy design and outcomes.  Climate 
change, at the very least, approaches this threshold and thus examining how the public 
forms and maintains opinions about climate change is warranted as we can expect 
public opinion to play some role in shaping climate change policy.  Moving from the 
claim that understanding the relationship between public opinion and climate change is 
one worth making, the following section elaborates this point by summarizing the 
historical evolution of climate change policy and the current scientific understanding, 
both as they relate to public opinion.   
 in 2007 with the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  Although there is insufficient 
empirical data and analysis to link these high profile events directly to climate change 
salience in the United States, one may reasonably conjecture that high profile 
entertainment dealing with the issue of climate change contributes to raising the issue’s 
salience.     
 
1.2 Climate Change and the Downsian Issue Attention Cycle 
The Downsian Issue Attention Cycle (IAC) is a common organizing framework or 
heuristic to discuss the evolution of issues and their relevant policies (Downs, 1972), 
especially as that evolution relates to public opinion. Observing that the American 
public’s attention is finite and is captured by different domestic issues in varied 
                                                          
7 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/. Accessed March 24, 2009.   
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contexts, Downs defined issues as developing along a cycle of attention, where the issue 
occupies one of five stages (1972, p. 38-39). Downs defined these sequential stages 
(1972, pp. 39-41): 
1. The Pre-problem stage:  Downs argued that during the pre-problem stage 
some highly undesirable social condition exists, but has yet to capture the 
public’s attention (p. 39). 
  
2. Alarmed Discovery and Euphoric Enthusiasm:   The public suddenly becomes 
aware of the issue through some focusing event or other means.  This 
increased awareness is coupled with a sense of optimism that the problem 
can be solved, if only the proper amount of resources are allocated.   
 
3. Realizing the Cost of Significant Progress: The public becomes aware of the 
costs associated with the potential solutions.  These costs usually expand 
beyond monetary and detail sacrifices that will have to be made.  The 
optimism of the earlier phase begins to fade.  
  
4. Gradual decline of Intense Public Interest: As the costs become clear, public 
interest declines as individuals act in one of three ways: “some people just 
get discouraged; others feel positively threatened by thinking about the 
problem…others simply become bored” (Downs, 1972 p. 40).  At this time 
some other issue is entering stage two and displacing this issue. 
 
5. The Post-Problem Stage: The issue has been displaced by other issues.  
However, it is likely that public institutions and programs have been 
developed to address perceived threats and problems.  These institutions 
endure, allowing the issue to gain more attention than others in the pre-
problem stage (e.g., the War on Poverty).  The success of these policies and 
programs is sporadic, often contingent on catching the public’s attention 
again.   
 The IAC has been employed to detail both the general evolution of environmental 
policy (Downs, 1972; also see Parsons, 1995, p.116) and, more specifically, climate 
change (Hempel, 2003; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Trumbo, 1996).  As this research is 
concerned with linkages between climate change public opinion and climate change 
public policy, the IAC is an appropriate heuristic for detailing the history of climate  
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Figure 1.1 Climate Change and the IAC. Source: Modeled from Hempel, 2003. 
 
 
 
change policy and science as the IAC “…focuses largely on the level and nature of public 
attention rather than on the responses of government” (Peters & Hogwood, 1985, 
p.239) The following interpretation of the historical development of climate change 
policy and science in the United States employs an IAC framework, leaning primarily on 
the work of Hempel (2003), supplemented by other authors.8
 
  Figure 1.1 illustrates a 
slightly modified version of Hempel’s (2003) adaptation of the IAC framework to the 
issue evolution of climate change as that evolution relates to public attention. 
                                                          
8 General climate change knowledge, detailing historical findings and policy 
developments, is summarized based on a number of sources: (Weart 2003; 2008a; 
2008b; Hempel, 2003; Leiserowitz 2003; 2005; 2006; 2007; and Kraft, 2007).  Direct 
citations are used when author insights or findings are used directly.  However, 
commonly known facts related to the development of climate change are not cited as 
they are widely available to the general public.   
Stage II: Agenda 
Setting 
1988-1992
Stage III: Policy 
Frameworks
1992-1997 
Stage IV: National 
Targets and 
Timetables
1997-2012 
Stage V:  Contingent 
Implementation
Early to Mid-Twenty-
First Century
Stage I: Scientific 
Assessment
1827-1988
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1.2.1 Stage I: Scientific Assessment, 1827-1988 
Typical of the IAC pre-problem phase, stage I (1827-1988) is characterized by an 
incremental progression of the scientific understanding of the various inputs to the 
climate system that facilitate climate change, and much later in stage I, a feel for what 
the consequences of climate change might entail.  The warming effect of increased 
greenhouse gasses on the planet was first identified by Jean-Baptiste Fourier in 1827 
(Leiserowitz, 2007).  Linking this effect to human activity, the first calculations indicating 
that man made CO2 would facilitate global warming were produced in 1896 by a 
Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius (Dessler & Parson, 2006; Weart, 2008a; Leiserowitz, 
2007).  Arrhenius, similar to present day predictions, predicted that doubling the 
amount of CO2
Some fifty years later and working out of Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii in 
1957, Charles Keeling found that there were empirically verifiable increases in 
atmospheric CO
 in the atmosphere would lead to temperature increases of 5-6 degrees 
centigrade (Leiserowitz, 2007).  However unlike today, Arrhenius predicted the changes 
would take place thousands of years in the future and looked forward to these changes, 
as he equated warming with prosperity—producing more abundant crops and more 
livable conditions (Weart, 2008a).   
2 (Leiserowitz, 2007, p. 2).  In that same year, an oceanographer named 
Charles Revelle found that the additional CO2 produced by human beings could not be 
adequately absorbed by the world’s oceans (Weart, 2008a). Both findings provided 
valuable insights into what human induced increases in CO2 may entail for the global 
climate. Shortly thereafter in 1958 an astronomy finding related to our neighboring 
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planet Venus provided an ominous picture of what a runaway greenhouse effect could 
do to a planet.  Data demonstrated that the greenhouse effect on Venus had raised the 
planet’s surface to temperatures exceeding 800 degrees Fahrenheit, temperatures that 
far exceed conditions necessary for life.  Further forecasting the potential consequences 
of climate change, subsequent studies in 1968 of the Antarctic suggested that the 
melting of polar ice sheets would result in a rise in sea levels (Weart, 2008a).  Given that 
a large percentage of the world’s population live in areas in close proximity to 
coastlines, these findings began to generate concern in the scientific community that 
even a modest increase in global temperatures could generate significant problems for a 
substantial percentage of the human race.  These findings converged in the assessment 
years to provide the impetus to identify climate change as a problem.   
Indeed, some have suggested that the rise of climate change as a potential 
problem, among many more salient environmental issues, contributed to the 
inauguration of an era of bi-partisan cooperation between Republicans and Democrats 
in American politics concerning environmental issues during the late 60’s and 
throughout the 70’s (Dunlap et al. 2001; also see Webber, 2008). Correlated to the 
increased bipartisanship, nongovernmental actors, buttressed by very high levels of 
public support, became increasingly involved in environmental policy in the United 
States.  During this same time period, environmental groups such as Greenpeace (est. 
1971) and environmental research groups such as the Worldwatch Institute (est. 1974) 
established themselves as fixtures in American politics (Gough & Shackley, 2001).  
Increasingly, many of these groups were able to market themselves as “representing a 
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portion of public opinion that is not adequately represented elsewhere in the policy 
process” (Gough & Shackley, 2001, p. 329).   
Events in the mid to late 70’s contributed to both a better understanding of 
climate change processes and an increasing sense within the general public that climate 
change was a problem worth dealing with.  Contributing to a better understanding of 
climate change inputs, during the 1970’s chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s)(1975), ozone 
(1976), and deforestation were all identified as contributing factors to the greenhouse 
effect (Weart, 2008a).  In 1979 the oil embargo by OPEC and the subsequent crisis that 
forced many Americans to pass their days in lengthy lines for gasoline began to merge 
discussions of energy and environmentalism, drawing positive attention to renewable 
energy while simultaneously generating negative attention for nuclear energy (Weart, 
2008a). By 1979, institutional actions parallel public sentiment as the UN Environmental 
Program formally established the World Climate Program and sponsored the first World 
Climate Conference (Hempel, 2003).   However, as the United States entered the 1980’s, 
shifts in the political landscape would inhibit climate change’s rise on the public agenda.   
Brown (1994) finds that partisan shifts in government have substantial influence 
over the substance and frequency of environmental policies.  In the case of climate 
change, Brown’s findings hold true.    The election of Republican Ronald Regan in 1980 
illustrates Brown’s point.  Reagan’s administration was openly hostile to environmental 
regulation, effectively associating conservative ideology with anti-environmentalism and 
much of the goodwill and cooperation of the 1970’s began to dissipate.  That is, the  
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Table 1.1. Important Events in the Evolution of Climate Policy. Source: Hempel, 2003, 
pp. 304-306. 
Stage I 
1979 
 
Stage II 
World Meteorological Organization and UN Environmental Program Establish World Climate Program and 
sponsor first World Climate Conference. 
1988 Summer weather disasters are linked by news media to climate change; NASA scientist James Hansen 
testifies about climate threats before the US Senate (July); United Nations establishes Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
1989 Leaders participating in the G-7 Summit endorse proposal for an international climate protection treaty. 
1990 IPCC First Assessment released, projecting mean global temperature increases of 3.5-8 C by the year 
2050; Second World Climate Conference convened; UN establishes International Negotiating Committee 
to draft Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
1992 
 
Stage III 
Framework Convention on Climate Change signed by more than 150 nations meeting at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro.   
1993 Clinton proposes energy consumption tax—the “BTU tax”—which is opposed by a majority in Congress; 
Clinton observes Earth Day with pledge to stabilize U.S. greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 
(April); United States announces Climate Change Action Program based on voluntary actions (October).  
1995 First Conference of the Parties (COP-1) is held in Berlin (March-April) resulting in Berlin mandate, which 
exempts developing countries from any limits on emissions adopted in the near future. 
1996 Parties attending COP-2 in Geneva (May) endorse second IPCC Assessment, which includes projections of 
mean global temperature increases of 1.8-6.3 C by 2100 and a statement that “discernable human 
influence” on climate systems was now evident.  The U.S. in a reversal of position, endorses idea of 
binding emissions reduction targets.   
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage IV 
Clinton addresses special session of the United Nations, calling for “realistic and binding limits” on 
emissions, but offering no specific targets for the U.S. (June). Senate Resolution passed 95-0 instructing 
the Clinton administration to refrain from signing any forthcoming protocol that does not include 
measures to be undertaken by developing countries (July).  Clinton announces that the U.S. will commit 
to reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2012 and then pursue further reductions (October).  COP-3 is held 
in Kyoto, Japan (December), leading to agreements in concept on a protocol for binding emissions targets 
and timetables. 
1998 The Kyoto Protocol is signed by the U.S. at COP-4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina (November).  Parties develop 
rules for achieving legally binding emissions reductions, averaging 6-8 percent below 1990 levels, by 
sometime between the years 2008-2012. 
1999 COP-5 takes place in Bonn, Germany, (October-November).  Parties consider technical and political 
mechanisms needed to implement the Kyoto Protocol.   
2000 Talks collapse at COP-6 in the Hague, Netherlands (November) because of disagreements between the 
U.S. and the European Union over “flexibility mechanisms.”   
2001 President George W. Bush rejects the Kyoto Protocol but pledges unspecified support for climate 
research and future action.  U.S. National Research Council releases report (June) indicating climate 
change impacts may become severe by the end of the century.  Talks resume in Bonn (July), with most 
parties agreeing to proceed without U.S. support.  The IPCC’s Third Assessment is released, providing new 
and stronger evidence of climate risks.  COP—7 in Marrakech Morocco, ends with late-hour agreement 
on rules to implement Kyoto protocol.   
2002 Bush administration announces voluntary climate change plan to achieve modest improvements in U.S. 
emissions intensity (ratio of greenhouse gas emissions t total gross domestic product) 
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consensus approach to environmental policy begins to rapidly fade as Reagan’s 
administration made party lines more distinct at the elite level which quickly translated 
to the public writ large (Dunlap et al., 2001). 
Despite the steady partisan politicization of climate change and other 
environmental issues, a 1983 report by the US National Academy of Sciences and the 
Environmental Protection Agency continued to help elevate the issue of climate change 
in the public eye.  However, and relative to future media coverage of climate change, 
overall media attention directed at climate change remained low (Trumbo, 1996).  
Ultimately, the incremental discoveries revealing the various inputs on climate change 
and the role of human actions in facilitating those inputs during this first stage inspired 
an increasingly alarmed reaction in the scientific community.  However, due to the 
increasing partisan division over climate change, the public as a whole was slow to 
embrace the scientific community’s assessment and it wasn’t until 1988 that climate 
change would come to be considered a genuine threat by a sizable portion of the 
American public.   
 
1.2.2 Stage II: Agenda Setting, 1988-1992 
Both climate change scholars (e.g., Trumbo, 1996; Hempel, 2003) and historians (e.g, 
Weart, 2003; 2008a) agree that several events of 1988 converged to catapult climate 
change from its status of relative obscurity to one of truly contending for public and 
institutional attention.  In 1988 we begin to see climate change legitimately competing 
amongst a host of other more perennial episodic issues such as the Contras of Nicaragua 
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and more stable issue concerns such as the economy (Weart, 2008a).    Many natural 
events primed the public to pay attention to the issue of climate change in the US as 
1988 was a year characterized by record droughts and record heat (Weart, 2008a). At 
the time, 1988 was the hottest year on record since the mid-1800s (Leiserowitz, 2007).   
These localized weather conditions had a tendency to prompt news outlets to cover 
climate change (Shanahan & Good, 2000). Indeed, the droughts and heat waves (Weart, 
2008a) and catalytic events such as the fires that raged through Yellowstone National 
Park September that year (Trumbo, 1996) were all linked by media outlets to climate 
change.   In the case of the Yellowstone fires, the linkages were erroneous (or at the 
very least, spurious), but nevertheless they were made and climate change was 
increasingly pushed to the forefront of American discourse.   
If any one event can be characterized as the moment climate change manifested 
officially on the national agenda, it occurred in July 1988. James Hansen, director of the 
NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies, testified to Congress that the greenhouse 
effect was in fact a reality and that its effects were occurring now (Hempel, 2003; 
Leiserowitz, 2007, p. 3; Weart, 2003; 2008a).  This testimony became front page news 
across not only the United States, but the globe (Leiserowitz, 2007, p.3).  This testimony, 
primed as it was by the various events of that year, provided a clear point of 
demarcation where media attention given to climate change was far greater than any 
previous coverage (Trumbo, 1996).  Climate change was officially on the public’s radar, 
and now vying for governmental attention.  In terms of the Downsian IAC, 1988 
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epitomizes a period of alarmed discovery, where the following few years can be viewed 
as a brief period of euphoric optimism.    
Institutional responses, at least internationally, followed the sentiments set forth by 
the scientific community and increasingly embraced by international constituencies. In 
1988 the United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (Hempel, 2003).  Nearly a year later, in 1989, government leaders from around 
the world endorsed a proposal for an international climate protection treaty at the G-7 
summit (Hempel, 2003).  However, as public opinion became increasingly important in 
climate change debates, forces opposing change quickly mobilized.  In 1989 the Global 
Climate Coalition was formed.  This group, “…a hard line group of multinationals, 
aggressively resisted moves to restrict fossil fuel use…” (Gough & Shackley, 2001, p.334).  
This opposition tended to manifest itself as attacks on science, focusing on the 
uncertainty of findings and “recklessly” cost-prohibitive solutions (Weart, 2008a).  For 
example, one of arguments that received some traction advanced in 1991 argued that 
climate change was caused by solar influences (Weart, 2008a).  Despite efforts by this 
group and others, the institutional infrastructure to deal with climate change continued 
to grow, yet, and as the Downsian IAC would predict, the cost of progress was 
increasingly a focus—especially by forces opposed to taking action.     
In 1990, the IPCC issued its First Assessment.  Projections from the first assessment 
predicted mean global temperature increases of 3.5-8 degrees centigrade (Hempel, 
2003).  During that same year the Second World Climate Conference took place, and a 
committee was established to draft the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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(Hempel, 2003).  In 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change took place at 
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Hempel, 2003).  One-hundred and fifty 
nations signed the treaty (Hempel, 2003), including the United States (Dolsak, 2001).   
Overall the agenda-setting phase of the climate change issue is characterized by 
increased institutional response capabilities for climate change issues, coupled with 
increasing discussion of the possible policy solutions in the United States.  However, 
concurrent with these specified characterizations, the issue of climate change also 
became increasingly politicized, with anti-climate change forces in the United States 
increasingly associated with conservatism and the Republican Party.  In short, the 
agenda-setting period is characterized by increased media attention (McComas & 
Shanahan, 1999; Trumbo, 1996), moving away from the consequences centered 
coverage of the late 80’s and steadily moving toward a more politicized discourse, 
centering on scientific uncertainty and economic considerations (McComas & Shanahan, 
1999). 
 
1.2.3 Stage III: Policy Frameworks, 1992-1997  
Relative to the previous era, the third stage of the Downsian Issue Attention 
Cycle is characterized by a sharp decline in media attention from 1992 to 1994 (Trumbo, 
1996).  It is also worth mentioning that environmental issues as a whole did not take 
center stage during the early 1990’s.  McComas et al. (2001) find that between 1991 and 
1997, fictional and non-news environmental programming peaked in 1993, and 
stabilized at relatively low levels in the late 1990’s.  However, in relation to other 
21 
 
programming, the overall environmental content was quite low, leading McComas et al. 
(2001) to conclude that by 1997, “environmental issues are not a frequent source 
material for US television narratives” (p.539).  Moreover, of the top six environmental 
issues receiving the publicity of television narratives, climate change was not one of 
them (McComas et al., 2001).   Despite the relatively low salience of environmental 
issues and climate change with the public (relative to the previous era), policy makers 
were increasingly taking advantage of the institutional infrastructure created since 
1988. 
In 1993 the Clinton administration proposed a BTU tax designed to tax energy 
consumption (Hempel, 2003).  During that same year, President Clinton pledged to 
stabilize greenhouse gasses to their 1990 levels by 2010—on Earth Day no less (Hempel, 
2003).  Towards the end of that year, the US announced the Climate Change Action 
program, relying primarily on voluntary as opposed to coercive measures (Hempel, 
2003).  However, and contrary to the trend in the US to accommodate industry 
interests, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) took effect as 
international law in 1994 (Bodansky, 1995, p. 426).  Seen by many as the world’s 
primary institutional response to climate change, the FCCC’s approach was to produce 
legally-binding (i.e., coercive) policies that would resist carbon emissions (Brunner, 
2001).   
Organized interests in United States, such as the Global Climate Coalition 
vehemently resisted any attempt at coercive measures or policies.  The organized 
presence of such powerful anti-climate change forces produced a discourse in the US 
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that was markedly different from that of other Western countries (see McCright & 
Dunlap, 2003), where the reality of global climate change was rarely questioned 
(Leiserowitz, 2007).  By 1994, the issue of climate change had become sufficiently 
politicized in the United States that scientists were being cited less frequently than 
interest group and political sources by various outlets, and the dimension of the debate 
had shifted from “a presentation of the issue in terms of its causes and problematic 
nature and toward a presentation more grounded in political debate and the proposal 
of solutions” (Trumbo, 1996, p. 281).  Perhaps fortuitously for the anti-climate change 
regulation forces, the Republicans took congress in 1994.  Climate change had become a 
full-fledged and contested political issue in the US. 
While anti-climate change forces were gaining traction, the scientific community, 
working through existing institutional structures, inched closer to a more precise 
understanding of climate change.  In 1995, the IPCC produced a second report indicating 
that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 was likely to take place around the middle of the 
21st century, and that these changes are likely related to human activity (Weart, 2008).  
Concurrently, scientific findings and media reports of the breakup of Arctic ice sheets 
begin shaping the public’s opinion about the potential consequences of warming to 
coastal areas (Weart, 2008a).  Deliberative processes inched along as well.  During 
March and April of that same year, the First Conference of Parties (COP-1) is held in 
Berlin, resulting in a mandate that exempted developing countries from soon to be 
adopted emissions limits (Hempel, 2003).  In 1996, the second conference of Parties 
(COP-2) endorses the second IPCC assessment and the notion that humans are causing 
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global climate change (Hempel, 2003).  The US, moving policy prescriptions away from 
simple voluntary solutions, agrees to legally-binding emissions targets (Hempel, 2003).  
This move by the US is clearly a move away from the conservative position that had 
recently dominated U.S. policy.  However, along with exemptions for developing 
countries, what many in the U.S. perceived to be coercive policy measures provided 
powerful argumentative ammunition against climate change regulations that anti-
regulation forces were able to capitalize on.   
In December, 1997, the third Conference of Parties (COP-3) was held in Kyoto, 
Japan.  Prior to the conference, President Bill Clinton, speaking at a special session of 
the UN, called for “realistic and binding limits” on greenhouse gas emissions (Hempel, 
2003, p. 305).  July of that year and prior to the Kyoto meeting, the U.S. Senate 
performed an unprecedented action and passed the Hagel-Byrd resolution (95-0) 
instructing the Clinton administration to not sign any agreement that does not bind 
developing nations as well (Hempel, 2003; McCright & Dunlap, 2003). The negotiations 
in Kyoto nearly broke down; however, the United States, under the guidance of a pro-
emissions regulation Clinton Administration, did eventually agree to exempt poorer 
countries from the emissions standards, at least temporarily (Weart, 2008a).  The treaty 
still needed to be ratified by a conservative Senate. 
 In the fall of 1997, the Clinton administration launched a public relations 
campaign designed to garner support for the Kyoto treaty. Despite large levels of 
preexisting public support for the values imbedded in the Kyoto protocol, the 
conservative non-regulation movement, having developed considerable inertia since 
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1990, was able to effectively rely on its hardened partisan base and considerable 
resources to sell an effective counter message (McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  The message 
of the anti-regulatory forces was three-fold:  
1. The evidence for climate change was weak and uncertain;  
2. even if the weak evidence were accurate, the effects of climate change 
would likely be beneficial; and  
3. any solution to a evidentiary weak problem, that may be beneficial to 
boot, would simply be too costly in terms of both resources and sacrifices 
to our way of life (McCright & Dunlap, 2003 p. 354).   
Stage III is characterized by increased institutional capacities in both an 
international and a domestic sense for action on climate change.  Through these 
institutions various policy responses were formulated and attempted, but little policy 
was actually implemented in the U.S.  Much of this failure can be attributed to anti-
regulatory interests.  Although certainly stunting meaningful action on the scientific 
understanding of climate change as a problem, the anti-regulation interests were able 
to muster sufficient resources to refocus attention on the costs of potential solutions 
and, ultimately, moderate the initial enthusiasm expressed by the American public.   In 
short, policy frameworks were in place, but both media and public attention had 
declined and, to some extent, policy makers were less willing to endorse coercive 
regulatory approaches to the perceived problem.   
 
1.2.4. Stage IV: National Targets and Timetables, 1998-2012  
Foreshadowing to many the fruits climate change might yield, 1998 produced a 
rare El Nino event, which in turn was critically linked to potent weather disasters and 
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produced the hottest year ever recorded  (Weart, 2008a).  Perhaps facilitated by this 
rare climate setting and despite objections from a Republican dominated legislature, the 
Clinton administration signed the Kyoto Protocol at COP-4 in Buenos Aires in November, 
1998 (Kraft, 2007, p.261), signifying a new phase of the IAC, where climate change 
solutions manifest in national targets and timetables (Hempel, 2003).  Indicative of this 
phase is a more focused response by pro-regulation forces, arguing more forcefully for 
coercive regulatory measures.  For example, by signing the Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton 
Administration parts ways with past approaches and agrees to coercive legally-binding 
regulations for emissions standards and  also agrees to a reduction of GHG’s that is 6-8 
percent below the greenhouse gas levels of 1990 by a tentative timetable falling 
somewhere between  2008 and 2012 (Hempel, 2003).  Attempting to circumvent the 
obvious resistance such a treaty would invoke from conservative forces in the United 
States, however, the plan endorsed by the Clinton Administration embraced extensive 
opportunity for emissions trading between U.S. companies and developing nations 
(Kraft, 2007, pp.  261-262). The process, however, of forming a Kyoto treaty that is 
enforceable proves a difficult task.  In 1999, COP-5 in Bonn, Germany provides some 
headway into providing such a treaty as technical and political mechanisms for enforcing 
Kyoto are discussed; however, in 2000 talks break down at COP-6 over disagreements 
about these mechanisms (Hempel, 2003).  At the end of the Clinton Administration in 
2000 the Kyoto protocol had still not been ratified by the U.S. Senate.   
 Despite what might be labeled as systemic or institutional resistance to climate 
change regulation (i.e., a Republican Congress), several developments suggest that anti-
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regulation forces were steadily losing ground.   In 2000, the same year Georg W. Bush 
was elected to the Presidency, the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) dissolves as many 
companies defect in the face of more compelling scientific evidence and a groundswell 
of support emanating from the American public convinced of the reality of climate 
change begins to emerge (Weart, 2008a).  The insurance industry, for example, found it 
increasingly difficult to ally itself with the GCC as the insurance companies have an 
inherent interest in understanding the types of disasters climate change is likely to 
produce (Weart, 2008a).   
Notwithstanding pro-regulation support, conservative institutional obstacles 
thwarted attempts to effectively both acknowledge climate change and take meaningful 
action in the United States.  Most notably, in 2001 the new Bush Administration openly 
rejects Kyoto, arguing that: 
…the agreement would weaken the U.S. economy and create inequities 
by exempting developing nations from the treaty’s requirements.  In its 
place, the administration called for additional scientific research and 
urged U.S. companies to set voluntary targets for reduction in GHG’s 
(Kraft, 2007, p. 262). 
 
Offering ambiguous commitments to support climate change research and 
unenthusiastic commitments to future action (Hempel, 2003), the administration quietly 
aligned itself with the fossil fuel industry by promoting policies that increased the use of 
fossil fuels (Kraft, 2007, p. 262).   While the Bush Administration is ratcheting up policies 
that increase fossil fuel consumption, potential climate change consequences are 
forecasted by the U.S. National Research Council, which issues reports strongly 
indicating that climate change effects may become severe by the end of the 21st century 
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(Hempel, 2003).  Internationally and moving forward despite institutional resistance in 
the U.S., talks continue in Bonn, Germany, and the IPCC releases its third assessment 
(Hempel, 2003).   
 In 2002 the political winds seemingly shift in favor of the pro-regulation forces as 
the Bush administration publicly acquiesces to pressure and openly acknowledge 
climate change may be a problem worth consideration; perhaps symbolically, the 
administration announces a voluntary plan for U.S. industries to reduce emissions 
(Hempel, 2003).  In spite of public acknowledgements such as the aforementioned 
voluntary plan, the administration was still quite hostile to emissions regulation and 
sought to discipline administrative and bureaucratic subordinates who disagreed 
publicly with the administration’s position on regulation.  Kraft (2007) describes the 
plight of one subordinate who deviated from message: 
…the Bush administration sought to replace Dr. Robert T. Watson, who 
for six years had served as the chair of the UN-sponsored 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Responding to pleas 
from energy and automobile industry lobbyists, the White House and 
State Department pressed for someone who was less outspoken on 
climate change issues (Kraft, 2007, p. 262).   
 
To many observers the half-hearted acknowledgements of the Bush 
Administration were largely symbolic, but by 2003 it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
resist the pressures put on the administration by pro-regulation forces.  First, scientific 
data was piling up indicating that the collapse of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland 
could raise sea levels significantly and rapidly in some scenarios (Weart, 2008a).  Second 
and indicative of each of the IAC phases, catalytic weather and climate events continued 
to elevate the salience of climate change. For example, a scorching summer heat wave 
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in 2003 engulfed Europe.  The European heat wave had the effect of exacerbating 
differences between U.S. and European policy stances on climate change (Weart, 
2008a), as well as the public’s perceptions of the issue (Leiserowitz, 2007).  And third, by 
2004, climate change had migrated to entertainment in the form of books, art, and 
movies (Weart, 2008a).  For example, in May, 2004, the film the Day After Tomorrow 
was released.  The film depicts a rapid and very unlikely climate change event where the 
world is plummeted into an ice age in a matter of days.  The film has the duel effect of 
raising awareness levels and viewer’s expressed levels of interest in acting on climate 
change (Balmford et al., 2004; Lowe, et al. 2006).  However, due to the dramatizations 
within the film, individuals were no more knowledgeable about agreed upon scientific 
findings (actual changes in temperature, for example) (Balmford et al., 2004; Lowe et al., 
2006).   
By 2005, it is becoming incredibly difficult for individuals and groups to deny the 
scientific position that finds average global temperature increases and that humans 
have a role in those increases (Kraft, 2007, p. 262).  Evidencing this point, even 
previously ardent deniers begin to join the believers.  Kriz, (2005) describes this 
conversion for Pete Domenici, a Republican of New Mexico (July, 2005): 
I have come to accept that something is happening with the Earth's 
climate," Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., chairman of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee, declared at a July 21 hearing on climate 
change. "I am looking for a solution, but I am not going to join the crowd 
that thinks it will be simple, [or] that thinks Kyoto was the solution.… So, 
we've got to talk about something else (Kriz, 2005).   
 
In line with Domenici, the Senate Passes a non-binding resolution: “…saying to 
combat climate change the United States must turn to mandatory restrictions on 
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Greenhouse Gases” (Kraft, 2007, pp. 262-263). Although non-binding, the resolution’s 
symbolic nature is amplified by visible defections from the ranks of anti-regulatory 
forces as major corporations such as Dupont and GE begin to openly recognize the need 
to deal with climate change (Kraft, 2007, p. 263, citing Kriz, 2005), as do traditionally 
conservative groups, such as many Christian denominations (Kraft, 2007, p. 263).    
Individual states appear to be following suit as well as many begin to adopt and 
implement policies designed to deal with the perceived threat of climate change.  Kriz 
(2005) summarizes these policies: 
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia require their electricity 
providers to get part of their power from renewable or other low-
pollution sources of energy. In June, California Gov. Arnold 
Schwarzenegger issued an executive order calling on state officials to 
slash greenhouse-gas emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050; 
the California Legislature favors a less ambitious goal. Arizona, New 
Mexico, and North Carolina have proposed or are studying ways to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases within their borders (Kriz, 2005).   
 
Perhaps crystallizing the reality of climate change in the minds of both citizens and 
policy makers, yet again a rare weather event is linked by various outlets to climate 
change when hurricane Katrina tears through the states bordering the Gulf of Mexico in 
2005 (Weart, 2008a).  2005 was a defining year for those advocating policies that would 
deal with climate change.   
Building on the momentum of the previous couple of years, the fourth IPCC 
report was released in 2007 on the heels of yet another catalytic heat wave that swept 
across Europe in 2006.  The report, more so than ever before, linked the reality of mean 
global temperature increases to human generated greenhouse gasses.  More 
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importantly, the report also emphasized anticipated costs and benefits as it made clear 
the cost of doing something now about climate change would go a long way in offsetting 
the damage that doing nothing would cause in the future (IPCC, 2007; Weart, 2008a).  
The reality of an increase in global mean temperatures had set in and the belief that 
human beings were a significant cause of it, by 2007, had become the dominant opinion 
of the scientific community and resonated with much of the American public (discussed 
more in a subsequent section).  The policy solutions and options were also becoming 
increasingly clear.  Writing in 2007, Selin & Vandeever predicted that US climate change 
policy would take on the following characteristics: 
1. A national cap on GHG’s 
2. A national market based cap-and-trade GHG emissions trading scheme 
3. Mandatory renewable energy standards 
4. Increased national product standards for energy efficiency 
5. Increased vehicle fleet energy efficiency standards 
6. Increased federal incentives for research and development on energy 
efficiency issues and renewable energy development (Selin & Vandeever, 
2007 p. 18).   
Selin and Vandeever’s predictions were correct.  The newly elected Obama 
administration took office January, 2009. United under three themes including a pledge 
to eliminate U.S. dependence on foreign oil, the generation of jobs in a newly generated 
green sector of the economy, and a commitment to reduce greenhouse gasses, the 
Obama policy prescriptions for climate change mirror those predicted by Selin and 
Vandeever (2007).  Table 2 summarizes the Obama campaigns promises.  These 
campaign promoises reflect a newly invigorated effort on the part of the U.S. 
government to regulate carbon emissions.   
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Table 1.2. The Obama Campaign’s Climate Change Prescriptions, 2008. Source: Obama 
Campaign pledges, 
http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy_more#emissions (Accessed 
April 13, 2009) 
 
Eliminate Our Current Imports from the Middle East and Venezuela within 10 Years 
 
Increase Fuel Economy Standards. Obama and Biden will increase fuel economy standards 4 percent per year while providing 
$4 billion for domestic automakers to retool their manufacturing facilities in America to 
produce these vehicles. 
 
 
Create a New $7,000 Tax Credit for 
Purchasing Advanced Vehicles. 
 
Get 1 Million Plug-In Hybrid Cars on 
the Road by 2015. 
These vehicles can get up to 150 miles per gallon. Barack Obama and Joe Biden believe we 
should work to ensure these cars are built here in America, instead of factories overseas. 
 
Obama and Biden will establish a National Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) to reduce the 
carbon in our fuels 10 percent by 2020. Obama and Biden will also require 60 billion gallons 
of advanced biofuels to be phased into our fuel supply by 2030. 
Establish a National Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard. 
 
A “Use it or Lose It” Approach to 
Existing Oil and Gas Leases. 
Obama and Biden will require oil companies to develop the 68 million acres of land (over 40 
million of which are offshore) which they have already leased and are not drilling on. 
 
An Obama-Biden administration will establish a process for early identification of any 
infrastructure obstacles/shortages or possible federal permitting process delays to drilling in 
the Bakken Shale formation, the Barnett shale formation, and the National Petroleum 
Reserve-Alaska. 
Promote the Responsible Domestic 
Production of Oil and Natural Gas. 
 
Create Millions of New Green Jobs 
 
 
Ensure 10 percent of Our Electricity 
Comes from Renewable Sources by 
2012, and 25 percent by 2025. 
 
Deploy the Cheapest, Cleanest, 
Fastest Energy Source -- Energy 
Efficiency. 
Obama and Biden will set an aggressive energy efficiency goal -- to reduce electricity 
demand 15 percent from projected levels by 2020. 
 
Obama and Biden will make a national commitment to weatherize at least one million low-
income homes each year for the next decade, which can reduce energy usage across the 
economy and help moderate energy prices for all. 
Weatherize One Million Homes 
Annually. 
 
Develop and Deploy Clean Coal 
Technology. 
Obama’s Department of Energy will enter into public private partnerships to develop five 
“first-of-a-kind” commercial scale coal-fired plants with clean carbon capture and 
sequestration technology. 
 
As president, Obama will work with stakeholders to facilitate construction of the pipeline. 
Not only is this pipeline critical to our energy security, it will create thousands of new jobs. 
Prioritize the Construction of the 
Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline. 
 
Reduce our Greenhouse Gas Emissions 80 Percent by 2050 
 
The Obama-Biden cap-and-trade policy will require all pollution credits to be auctioned, and 
proceeds will go to investments in a clean energy future, habitat protections, and rebates 
and other transition relief for families. 
Implement an economy-wide cap-
and-trade program to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 80 
percent by 2050.  
Make the U.S. a Leader on Climate 
Change. 
Obama and Biden will re-engage with the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC) -- the main international forum dedicated to addressing the climate problem. They 
will also create a Global Energy Forum of the world’s largest emitters to focus exclusively on 
global energy and environmental issues. 
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While the governmental institutions, including the newly elected administration, 
have come to regard climate change and carbon emissions as a problem worthy of 
action, one might expect that the public would fall more in line with institutional 
responses and elite cues.  For the most part the public has, but the strong current of 
public support for anti-regulatory efforts generated in the 80’s and 90’s has left a 
substantial residue of skepticism, producing non-trivial public resistance to policies such 
as those proposed by the Obama Administration. It is this resistance, and how that 
resistance influences policy, that will shape the final phase of the IAC as specified by 
Hempel (2003). 
 The final phase of the IAC, Stage V, Hempel (2003) characterizes as taking shape 
subsequent to a full articulation of timetables and national targets.  Stage V (contingent 
implementation), Hempel suggests, will be an era of climate change policy development 
defined by the effectiveness of the remaining resistance (2003, p.315).  In a sense, the 
research offered in this dissertation attempts to help us understand how effective that 
resistance may continue to be.  To be sure, the remaining climate change deniers in the 
United States cannot be characterized as a majority, but the amount of individuals in the 
general public that do not agree with the scientific community’s assessment is not trivial 
either.  Importantly, many individual deniers carry significant public clout such as 
Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma and will most certainly present significant obstacles 
to regulatory efforts.     
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 The next several sections of chapter one attempt to better illuminate both the 
magnitude and substance of the differences between the scientific community and the 
American public.  Therefore, the next section briefly outlines what evidence science has 
come to accept as compelling in relation to climate change.  Emphasis in this section 
culminates in a discussion of what evidence has been contested and who and potentially 
why the evidence has been challenged.  It is not as straightforward as some might 
anticipate.  Next, the evolution of public opinion on several dimensions of climate 
change is discussed. Finally, the major social scientific explanations for the differences 
between scientific and public opinion are detailed, with a focus on why there may be 
room for improvement.   This final discussion focuses on cultural narratives and 
transitions to the thrust of the research offered in this dissertation, which endeavors to 
integrate the successes of previous social scientific models, while also adequately 
accounting for deficiencies.    
 
1.3 The Science of Climate Change 
 
Since the early 1980s a robust international consensus about the reality 
and seriousness of climate change has emerged, as evidenced by several 
comprehensive reports from the National Academy of Sciences (National 
Research Council 1983, 2001), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (1990, 1995, 2001), and World Climate Program (1985). By the 
early 1990s, the environmental community in the United States—
comprised of members of the environmental movement, sympathetic 
climate scientists, and environmental policy makers— successfully 
defined climate change, or anthropogenic (human-induced) climate 
change, as a legitimate social problem. 
 
—McCright & Dunlap, 2003, p. 348 
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“The Earth’s temperature is determined by the relationship between incoming radiation 
the Earth absorbs from sunlight and the radiation it emits back to space” (Dessler & 
Parson, 2006, p. 7).  Given the Earth’s distance from the sun, a warming effect is 
necessary to produce the comfortable conditions that allow for the prevalence of life on 
the planet.  Without a warming effect the Earth’s temperature would be approximately -
20 degrees Celsius (Dessler & Parsons, 2006, p. 8).  The Earth’s warming effect is caused 
by the cloak of greenhouse gasses constituting the atmosphere.   The greenhouse gasses 
trap or inhibit the reflection of solar radiation back into space. The current and (for the 
most part) historical balance of these greenhouse gasses with other gasses allows for a 
comfortable mean temperature around the globe of roughly 15 degrees Celsius.  Our 
two closest solar system neighbors evidence both the importance and power of the 
greenhouse effect.   Venus, enveloped in a dense shroud of greenhouse gasses has an 
atmosphere hot enough to melt lead (450 Celsius); Mars has a negligible veil of 
greenhouse gasses producing a mean surface temperature of -50 Celsius (Desser & 
Parsons, 2006, p. 8).  Common greenhouse gases include methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), halocarbons (CFC’s), and carbon dioxide (CO2).  CO2 is not the most powerful of 
these heat trapping gasses, but it is the gas that has earned much of the climate change 
attention.  The reason for CO2’s high profile is straightforward and compelling.9
From 1000 AD to 1800 AD, the parts-per-million (ppm) of CO
 
2
                                                          
9 That is not to say that other contributing greenhouse gasses are unimportant.  In fact, 
molecule for molecule, gasses such as methane are more powerful greenhouse gasses, 
trapping more heat.  However, these gasses have not been the primary public focus of 
efforts to deal with climate change.  Therefore, the focus here is on CO2.   
 in the atmosphere 
remained roughly static, hovering around 280 ppm.  Beginning with the industrial 
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revolution, the concentration of C02 in the atmosphere has steadily increased with the 
burning of fossil fuels, which produce C02.  The most recent IPCC (2007) report cites CO2 
at 379 ppm in 2005.  That is roughly a 35% increase in CO2
The summary categories of evidence for climate change presented in Table 1.3 
are the most direct methods of addressing questions regarding average temperature 
increases driving the climate change discourse.  A second category of evidence, titled 
climate proxies by Dessler and Parsons (2006, p. 56), provide a more indirect measure of 
climate change based upon “past climate variation imprinted on some long-lived 
physical, chemical, or biological system” (p.56).  These indirect measures, summarized in 
Table 1.4, support findings found by more direct scientific assessments presented in 
table 1.3.   
 in a 200 year span, which 
correlates with a 1.2 to 1.4 degree Fahrenheit increase in global average temperature in 
the last 100 years (EPA website).  Most importantly, this correlation has come to be 
interpreted as a causal relation with human activities post industrial revolution 
considered a primary, if not the primary, contributor to the climate change trend.  These 
are the established facts that the vast majority of scientists agree upon.  The next 
sections focus on what findings scientists have come to trust, relying primarily on a 
summary work provided by Dessler and Parson (Chapter 3, 2006).  These findings, in 
total, have influenced the major IPCC reports as well as overall scientific opinion.  Table 
1.3 summarizes Dessler and Parson’s (2006) review of the most direct methods of 
assessing the relationship between climate change and greenhouse gasses.  
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Table 1.3. Methods of Directly Assessing Climate Change. Source: Note: Table is a 
summary of Dessler and Parson (2006), presented in chapter 3. 
 
The Surface 
Thermometer 
Record 
Longitudinal data acquired through temperature readings at numerous 
locations around the globe provide one of the most direct means to track 
temperature variation.  Temperature readings are numerous and frequent 
and the technology is reliable.  The surface thermometer record indicates 
that mean global temperatures have increased by 1.2 to 1.4 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  However, temperatures taken in different contexts and 
variable methods for acquiring temperature data introduce error.   
The Glacier 
Record 
Glaciers cover roughly 10% of the Earth.  They expand when the 
temperature is cooler and contract when it is warmer.  Glacier expansions 
and contractions have been recorded for several centuries.  According to 
these records, glaciers have been receding since roughly 1800, and the rate 
of recession dramatically increased starting in 1850.  These data and 
observations suffer from being derived from a relatively small area of the 
globe under conditions that are cooler than conditions elsewhere.    
Sea Level When temperatures increase glaciers melt and water expands.  
Measurements of sea level have become both more reliable and more 
frequent in recent history.  However, the farther one goes back in time the 
less reliable are the data.  Both frequencies of historical measurements and 
less accurate measurement techniques are an issue the farther one goes 
back in human history.  Additionally, areas along coastlines (such as in 
Louisiana) where the land is actually sinking may inflate estimates of sea 
level rise, especially if not accounted for correctly.   
Sea Ice Frozen seawater found in the polar regions of the globe produce regular 
amounts of sea ice.  Since the 1970’s, longitudinal measurements of sea ice 
thickness indicate that the mean depth of this ice has decreased from 3 
meters to 2 meters.   During this same time period mean sea ice coverage 
has decreased by 2.8% per decade.  Data and findings, however, only apply 
to the arctic region of the globe.  This remains an issue as we simply do not 
know if the same trends are occurring in the Antarctic.    
Sub-Surface 
Ocean 
Temperatures 
Since the late 1940’s subsurface temperatures of the ocean have been 
regularly recorded in high frequencies around the globe.  Measuring the 
temperatures of the top 1000 feet or so of the ocean, these data indicate a 
warming trend of .037 degrees Celsius per decade.  The trends in sub-
surface ocean temperature increases are much smaller than the surface 
thermometer recorded.  However, water is incredibly effective at both 
storing and dissipating heat,  these increases are not slight.  Importantly, 
increases in sub-surface ocean temperatures are consistent with 
greenhouse-gas increases.    
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Table 1.4. Proxy Data and Climate Change.  Source: Note: Table is a summary of Dessler 
and Parson (2006), presented in chapter 3. 
 
Tree Rings Trees tend to grow more when warmer and less when cooler, producing historical 
records of that growth in the form of tree rings.  Linking tree growth via tree rings 
to local conditions produces data that can be used to assess macro-level climate 
variation.   However, these methods are without flaw.   Intervening variables such 
as rainfall certainly play a role and trees do not cover the entire surface of the 
planet, so areas without tree coverage are, by definition, omitted from analysis. 
Ice Cores Glaciers in the north and south poles date as far back as four hundred thousand 
years.  Air bubbles trapped in the glaciers preserve data about the composition of 
the Earth’s atmosphere when the air was initially trapped.  By extracting ice cores 
and measuring green house gas composition such as CO2 within the air bubbles, 
longitudinal data of how much of these gasses are found in the Earth’s 
atmosphere at a given point in time are obtained.  Although CO2 variation has 
been large in the past, these data show that CO2 increases since the beginning of 
the industrial revolution correspond with temperature increases.   
Corals Like ice cores, the chemical composition of corals give information dating back 
thousands of years.  The “chemical composition of these cores provide 
information about ocean temperatures, precipitation, salinity, sea level, storm 
incidence, and volume of nearby freshwater runoff “(Dessler &Parson, 2006,  p. 
59).   
Ocean 
Sediments 
Like both ice cores and corals, sediment at the bottom of the ocean provides 
strong historical data dating back thousands of years.  By sampling this sediment 
and measuring and recording chemical composition, skeletal compositions of 
marine life, variations in sizes of those species tell us water temperatures, salinity, 
dissolved oxygen, nearby continental precipitation, the predominant wind 
strength and direction, as well as the nutrient composition” (Dessler & Parson, 
2006, p. 59).   
Boreholes Different temperature measurements taken at different points under the Earth’s 
surface allow scientists to infer surface temperature variation in the past (Dessler 
& Parson, 2006, 59).  Borehole data, compiled from several hundred boreholes 
scattered about the planet, show ground temperatures that “has increased by 
about 0.5 degrees Celsius during the twentieth century, and about 1 degree 
Celsius since 1500, and that the twentieth century was the warmest of the past 
five centuries” (Dessler & Parson, 2006, p. 60). 
 
Taken one at a time, each climate proxy may generate significant skepticism as all of the 
proxies present various threats to both validity and generalization to other contexts.10
                                                          
10 Other proxy data not discussed here due to space considerations include satellite 
temperature measurements, orbital variations, tectonic activity, volcanoes, solar 
variability, and internal variability.  See Dessler and Parson 2006, chapter 3. 
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For example, coral reef measurements apply to the chemistry of tropical oceans and ice 
cores measure historical concentrations of gasses (or lack thereof) of GHG’s.  However, 
if climate proxies are taken in total, the direction and strength of these data all move in 
one direction toward the same conclusion. Global mean temperature has increased and 
carbon dioxide levels have increased substantially.  Both are significantly correlated with 
human activity.  Dessler and Parson (2006) summarize the combined proxy findings: 
From the year 1000 to 2000 in the Northern Hemisphere, the combined 
record shows a gradual cooling trend through most of the millennium, 
with an abrupt warming beginning around 1900.  These records suggest 
that the 1990’s were the warmest decade, and 1998 was the warmest 
year, not just over the past 150 years, but of the past 1000 years (p.61).   
 
Taken in total, direct temperature measurements and climate proxy data have 
compelled the vast majority of scientists to affirm that climate change is occurring and 
that human activity is a principal cause of that change.  The IPCC reports, summarizing 
climate change findings, have concluded the same.  The most recent 2007 report has 
had overwhelming scientific support.  Table 1.5 summarizes some of scientific groups 
and organizations, including estimated memberships of each where available, which 
have endorsed the IPCC summaries and reports.  
Research on scientific publications and scientific opinion further validate the 
position that there is a general level of consensus in the scientific community.  An oft-
cited demonstration of the scientific consensus of climate change, Oreskes (2004) 
examines 928 refereed scientific publications addressing climate change between 1993 
and 2003.  Of those 928, not a single paper rejected the consensus opinion.  Oreskes 
concludes that “politicians, economists, journalists, and others may have the impression  
39 
 
 
Table 1.5. Scientific Organizations Endorsing the IPCC (2007) Report. Source: List 
compiled from logicalscience.com and Orsekes (2004) and then independently verified 
by the author.  Group sizes were compiled by author from organizational websites and 
reflect organizational estimates of group size and/or readership.    
Organization Est. Membership URL 
American Association for the 
Advancement of Science 
>1 million readership http://www.aaas.org 
American Academy of Pediatrics unknown http://www.aap.org/ 
American Association of State 
Climatologists 
150 
American Association of Wildlife 
Veterinarians 
http://www.stateclimate.org/ 
unknown http://www.aawv.net/ 
American Astronomical Society 7022 
American Chemical Society 
http://aas.org/ 
160,000 http://portal.acs.org/portal/acs/corg/content 
American College of Preventive 
Medicine 
2,000 
American Geophysical Union 
http://www.acpm.org/ 
50,000 http://www.agu.org/ 
American Institute of Physics >100,000 
American Medical Association 
http://www.aip.org/ 
240,000 http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
American Meteorological Society 14,000 
American Physical Society 
http://www.ametsoc.org/ 
46,000 http://www.aps.org/ 
American Public Health Association 50,000 
American Quaternary Association 
http://www.apha.org/ 
unknown http://www.amqua.org/ 
American Society of Microbiology 43,000 
American Statistical Association 
http://www.asm.org/ 
18,000 http://www.amstat.org/ 
Arctic Council  unknown 
Environmental Protection Agency 
http://www.arctic-council.org/ 
NA http://www.epa.gov/ 
Federal Climate Change Science 
Program 
NA 
Geological Society of America 
http://www.climatescience.gov/ 
22,000 http://www.geosociety.org/ 
International Arctic Science Committee 19 member countries 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 
http://www.arcticportal.org/iasc/ 
>2000 http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies 
Unknown http://www.giss.nasa.gov/ 
National Center for Atmospheric 
Research 
Unknown http://www.ncar.ucar.edu/ 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
Unknown 
National Research Council 
http://www.noaa.gov/ 
6,000 http://sites.nationalacademies.org/nrc/index.htm 
Pew Center on Climate Change Unknown 
Society of American Foresters 
http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
Unknown http://www.safnet.org/ 
Union of Concerned Scientists >250,000 http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
US Geological Survey Unknown http://www.usgs.gov/ 
 
40 
 
of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but that impression is 
incorrect” (2004, p. 1686).  Assessing the opinion of the scientific community in a survey 
of over 3000 academics and scientists, Doran and Zimmerman (2009) find that over 90% 
concur with the findings that average global temperatures have increased and that 
human activity is a significant contributing factor to that rise.   Moreover, many 
academic studies document and chronicle the scientific community’s path to consensus 
on climate change (e.g., Dispensia & Brulle, 2003; Kellstedt et al. 2008) and it is 
increasingly common to treat the scientific consensus on climate change as a given, not 
bothering to detail what appears to so many as obvious.  However, that is not to say 
there is zero dissent.  Dissent is best characterized as small in number but gifted with a 
voice that carries.   
 
1.4 Scientific Dissent: A Vocal and Well Funded Opposition 
As discussed in a previous section detailing the evolution of climate change 
public policy, throughout the 1990’s conservative organizations and think tanks were 
successful in drawing attention to the uncertainties of climate change findings (McCright 
& Dunlap, 2003).  Table 1.6 lists the more prominent and prolific conservative think 
tanks identified in a 2003 study performed by McCright and Dunlap. These groups 
played a central role in effectively dissenting against the prevailing scientific opinion.     
At the national level, these conservative think tanks were identified to have 
significant influence over a powerful counter-narrative that attempted to usurp 
environmental arguments more broadly, but also brought specific attention to the  
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Table 1.6. Influential Conservative Think Tanks Addressing Climate change between 1990 and 
1997. Source: Table reproduced from McCright and Dunlap, 2003. 
 
Conservative Think Tank  Official Web Site  
 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI)  
Cato Institute 
Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation (CSEF)  
Claremont Institute Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) 
Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment 
(FREE)  
Heartland Institute  
Heritage Foundation  
Hoover Institution  
Marshall Institute  
National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA)  
National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR)  
Pacific Research Institute (PRI)  
Reason Public Policy Institute (RPPI)  
 
www.aei.org  
www.cato.org  
www.csef.org   
www.claremont.org  
www.cei.org  
www.free-eco.org  
www.heartland.org  
www.heritage.org  
www.hoover.stanford.edu  
www.marshall.org  
www.ncpa.org  
www.nationalcenter.org  
www.pacificresearch.org 
 www.reason.org 
 
 
weaknesses of the arguments for action against climate change (McCright & Dunlap 
2000; McCright &Dunlap, 2003, p. 353).  Analyzing some 224 documents generated by 
the above listed groups between 1990 and 1997, McCright and Dunlap (2003) found 
that the counter message produced by these groups centered around three major 
counterclaims: 
1. First, the conservative movement claimed that the evidentiary basis of 
climate change is weak, if not wrong.  
2. Second, conservatives argued that the net effect of climate change would be 
beneficial should it occur.  
3. Third, conservatives argued that the policies proposed to ameliorate the 
alleged problem of climate change would do more harm than good (McCright 
& Dunlap, 2003, p. 354). 
 
These three counterclaims were frequently made through expert point men, who 
helped generate and maintain the powerful counter message that climate change was 
42 
 
at best uncertain and, at worst, outright fraud.  McCright and Dunlap (2003), surveying 
the recent literature, further identify the five most visible climate change critics as:  
Sallie Baliunas, Robert Balling, Jr., Richard Lindzen, Patrick Michaels and S. Fred Singer 
(p. 359). Each has been affiliated with conservative think tanks in terms of position 
and/or funding.  Table 1.7 lists these major critics and their conservative affiliations: 
 
Table 1.7. Major Conservative Critics of Climate Change. Source: Table produced using 
information provided in McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 358-360. 
 
Name Position Conservative Think-tank Affiliation(s) 
 
Sallie Baliunas 
 
Astrophysicist at the Harvard-Smithsonian 
Center for Astrophysics 
 
 
Robert Wesson Fellow in Scientific 
Philosophy and Public Policy at the 
Hoover Institution  
 
Chair of the Science Advisory Board at 
the Marshall Institute 
Robert Balling Jr. Director of the Office of Climatology at 
Arizona State University 
 
 
Richard Lindzen Atmospheric Scientist, MIT 
 
Science Advisory Board of the 
Marshall Institute 
 
Patrick Michaels Virginia’s State Climatologist 
 
Senior Fellow in Environmental 
Studies at the Cato Institute 
 
S. Fred Singer Retired professor of Environmental 
Science, University of Virginia 
 
advisory editor for the Cato Institute’s 
quarterly magazine Regulation 
 
Senior Fellow at the Heritage 
Foundation 
 
Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the 
Hoover Institution 
 
Robert Wesson Fellow in Scientific 
Philosophy and Public Policy at the 
Hoover Institution 
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The scholars associated with these conservative think tanks provided credible 
sources through which these groups could levy their foundational arguments against 
climate change.  In total, these scholars have regularly testified in front of Congress 
written publications, and presented arguments for various media outlets (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2003, p. 357).  This group of dissenting scholars is frequently discredited and 
maligned on the grounds of their partisan funding by mainstream sources that view 
their opinions and findings as necessarily biased.  However, a more meaningful criticism 
focuses on how these dissenting scholars have circumvented the traditional peer-review 
process and frequently published anti-climate change findings through non-peer review 
methods, such as conservative think-tank presses (McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  Based on 
these two criticisms it has become quite commonplace to implicitly dismiss climate 
change critics by simply focusing on the perceived scientific consensus (e.g., Grundman, 
2006; Kellstadt, 2008).    
Importantly, however, for the non-climate specialist—or the lay person—it is an 
extraordinarily difficult task to determine whether or not the substance of the criticisms 
levied by the dissenters is legitimate or not. I briefly illustrate this point by focusing on 
two skeptic publications: Singer and Avery (2008) and Lindzen (2008).  Singer and Avery 
(2008) acknowledge that the earth has been warming in recent history (6).  However, in 
their estimate, warming is not caused by carbon dioxide; rather, increased warming is 
the result of a natural 1,500 year cycle.  The authors argue that it is solar activity that 
has induced increased mean temperatures and not human activity: 
The key amplifier is cosmic rays.  The sun sends out a ‘solar wind’ that 
protects the Earth from some of the cosmic rays bombarding the rest of 
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the universe.  When the sun is weak, however, more cosmic rays get 
through to the Earth’s atmosphere.  There they ionize air molecules and 
create cloud nuclei.  These nuclei then produce low wet clouds that 
reflect solar radiation back into outer space.  This cools the Earth….The 
second amplifier is ozone chemistry in the atmosphere.  When the sun is 
more active, more of its ultraviolet rays hit the Earth’s atmosphere, 
shattering more oxygen (O3
 
).  The additional ozone molecules absorb 
more of the near-UV radiation from the sun, increasing temperatures in 
the atmosphere.  Computer models indicate that a 0.1 percent change in 
the sun’s radiation could cause a 2 percent change in the Earth’s ozone 
concentration, affecting atmospheric heat and circulation (p.6).   
A book written for the layperson, the first version of this argument was a New York 
Times bestseller.   
Spencer Weart (2008b) is a commonly cited believer in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gasses as a cause of climate change and generally regarded as a credible 
source.  Interestingly though, in refuting Singer and Avery (2008), Weart draws attention 
only to an urban heat island effect that Singer and Avery erroneously claim gave 
credence to raising temperatures, when no rise in temperatures existed (p.159).  Weart 
is also quick to point out that “…[Singer] founded an environmental policy group 
supported by conservative foundations” (Weart, 2008, p. 159).  This is the only 
reference in Weart’s book that addresses Singer and Avery’s bestseller criticism of 
climate change models, and the rebuttal is hinged on discrediting Singer and Avery as 
partisan hacks and not refuting the substance of their argument.  Importantly, Singer 
and Avery (2008,p. 6) claim only that not accounting for the urban heat islands inflates 
mean climate change estimates; they do not claim that there is no warming whatsoever 
(2008, p. 6).   
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Richard S. Lindzen, another prominent climate change skeptic, attests that 
increased CO2 is spuriously correlated with warming and that we simply do not have 
enough evidence to establish CO2
Who should the public believe? I even find myself, equipped with years of 
graduate school training and more than a minor interest in climate change, to be ill 
suited to pass judgment on the scientific merits of either Weart , Singer and Avery, or 
Lindzen’s positions.  It is also worth mentioning that I have no intention of deciding who 
is right or wrong; rather, the point made is that although we may as individuals be quite 
willing to dismiss or accept the skeptic’s criticisms, even a shallow probing of the 
arguments presented against climate change indicates that very specialized knowledge 
of how climate change models are constructed is needed to truly evaluate the paucity or 
 as a causal driver of warming (2008, p.21).  A major 
component of Lindzen’s criticism of climate change science focuses on the natural 
forcing and curve fitting assumptions built into the various climate models.  Lindzen 
describes forcing as a perhaps necessary element of climate modeling that attempts to 
account for various phenomenon that are inherently susceptible to researcher/modeler 
discretion (p. 25).  Particularly disturbing for Lindzen is the ‘forcing’ treatment of 
aerosols in the models, which the effects of are as of yet really unknown and where we 
may not even know the direction of the relationship (ie., heating or cooling) between 
various aerosols and global temperatures (Lindzen, 2008, p. 26).  Admittedly, the 
discussions of appropriate forcing protocols and urban heat islands rings of discussions 
between diehard sports fans debating the baseball pitcher’s ERA statistic or the NFL’s 
obscure quarterback rating system.  That is precisely the point. 
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robustness of these criticisms.  Despite the immense complexity involved in the science 
of climate change and the intricacies of the debate, however, individuals can and do 
decide who and what to believe.     
 
1.5 Public Opinion and Climate Change 
The previous sections have set forth a case that given the historical development 
of climate change policy and science that opinions about climate change and climate 
change policy are likely to influence said policy.  Summaries of the history and science of 
the development of climate change as both a policy issue and area of scientific concern 
have also been provided.  Noting the immense complexity of the science behind climate 
change, it should come as no surprise that the general public has not tracked with 
scientific opinion.  The prevailing explanation for this divergence is that antiregulatory 
conservative dissenters were able to manufacture public dissent.  Relying primarily upon 
a climate change public opinion summary article (Nisbet & Myers, 2007), the following 
section summarizes in more detail the development of public opinion on key climate 
change related issues.  This macro-assessment of public opinion about climate change 
and matters relevant to climate change transcends many of the previously discussed IAC 
stages, but serves the purpose of providing the reader a broader understanding of how 
public opinion has evolved.  Importantly, the following discussion details how and on 
what dimensions public opinion and scientific opinion have diverged.   
Opinions between the scientific community and public opinion writ large clearly 
diverge.  However and as Figure 1.2 illustrates, currently most of the American public is  
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Figure 1.2.  Climate Change Awareness, 1986-2006. Source: Nisbet and Myers, 2007.  
 
 
Question: Have you heard or read anything about the "greenhouse effect," or not? 
 
aware of climate change.  Public opinion polls demonstrate that prior to 1988 a majority 
of American’s had not heard or read anything about the greenhouse effect (Nisbet & 
Myers, 2007).  Since 1988, the number of Americans that are aware of the greenhouse 
effect has been steadily increasing with nine-tenths of Americans reporting having read 
or heard about the greenhouse effect by 2006 (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). In terms of the 
Downsian attention cycle, then, 1988 provides an appropriate demarcation point 
between the pre-1988 pre-problem stage and the 2nd
In conjunction with the rise in self-reported awareness, so too has there been a 
rise in self-reported knowledge of climate change.  Figure 1.3 illustrates the rise in self-
reported knowledge.  In the early 90’s, over 20% of Americans reported no knowledge 
of climate change, while in 2007, that number had fallen below 5% (Nisbet & Meyers,  
 stage of alarmed discovery and 
euphoric enthusiasm, referred to by Hempel (2003) as the policy frameworks stage.   
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Figure 1.3. Self-Reported Climate change Knowledge, 1992-2007. Source: Nisbet and 
Myers, 2007. 
 
 
Question: Next, thinking about the issue of climate change, sometimes called the 
“greenhouse effect,” how do you feel you understand this issue? 
 
2007); concurrently, those that reported understanding the issue very well has 
remained steadily over 50% for the past decade.     
Despite high levels of self-reported knowledge, objective measures demonstrate 
some confusion on the part of the public regarding the causes of climate change (Nisbet 
& Myers, 2007).  Table 1.8 reports polls taken in 1994 and 2000 on two questions 
related to the public’s objective understanding of climate change.  Importantly, 39% 
(1994 and 2000) were unable to make a definitive link between fossil fuels and the 
greenhouse effect.  Additionally, 57% (1994) and 54% (2000) erroneously linked the 
causes of climate change to a hole in the atmosphere.  The confusion between a hole in  
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Table 1.8. General Public Objective Knowledge Measures, 1994 and 2000. Source: 
Nisbet and Myers, 2007. 
 
Survey Statement Response Date 
 
Every time we use coal or oil or 
gas, we contribute to the 
greenhouse effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
January, 
1994 
 
February, 
2000 
 Definitely True (correct) 14 18 
 Probably True (correct) 47 44 
 Probably Not True 21 19 
 Definitely Not True 4 5 
 Can’t Choose 14 15 
 
The Greenhouse effect is caused by 
a hole in the Earth’s atmosphere. 
 
   
 Definitely True 16 17 
 Probably True 41 37 
 Probably Not True 
(correct) 
16 18 
 Definitely Not True 
(correct) 
11 12 
 Can’t Choose 17 16 
N  2992 2817 
 
the atmosphere and climate change is quite common, as previous research finds that 
members of the public conflate the problem of the hole in the ozone layer with climate 
change (Bord et al., 1998; Read et al. 1994).   Moreover, events dramatizing climate 
change, both fictionalizing the issue and increasing its salience, have contributed to fact 
confusion regarding climate change (e.g., Lowe et al., 2006).   
Despite fairly low performances on objective knowledge measures, American 
citizens are increasingly in line with scientists on two major facets of the climate change 
debate: 1) most believe that increased carbon dioxide is a significant cause of climate  
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Figure 1.4. Mass Public belief in Anthropogenic GHG’s as a Cause of Climate Change, 
1997-2002. Source: Nisbet and Myers, 2007. 
 
 
Do you believe the theory that increased carbon dioxide and other gases released into 
the atmosphere, will, unchecked, lead to climate change and an increase in average 
temperatures or not? 
 
change (Figure 1.4) and 2) most agree that climate change is probably happening (Figure 
1.5).  Since 1997 the percentage of American’s that believe that increased carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere will lead to climate change has risen to over 70%, and that 
number has remained a relatively stable floor.  Since 1997, the number of polled 
respondents has increased to over 80% and steadfastly remained above that 80% floor.   
Despite this seemingly informative data that speaks to the public’s agreement with the 
scientific community on these two very foundational components of climate change  
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Figure 1.5. Mass Public Belief that Climate change is Happening, 1997-2007. Source: 
Nisbet and Myers, 2007. 
 
You may have heard about the idea that the world’s temperatures may have been going 
up slowly over the past 100 years.  What is your personal opinion on this—do you think 
this is probably been happening, or do you think it probably hasn’t been happening? 
 
theory, the public appears quite off target in assessing exactly what the scientific 
community thinks. 
Since 1994, roughly 30% or more of the public believes that most scientists are 
unsure about climate change, while a majority (70+ %) hold that most scientists believe 
climate change is occurring (Figure 1.6).  A somewhat conflicting poll reports results in 
the opposite direction, with  a steady number of over 50% of respondents from 1997 to 
2007 contending that there is a lot of disagreement about the reality of climate change 
(Figure1. 7).  This is not the only contradiction.  Sterman and Sweeney (2007) find that  
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Figure 1.6. What the Public Believes Most Scientists Believe, 1994-2006. Source: Nisbet 
and Myers, 2007. 
 
 
On the Environmental Issue Known as climate change, just your impression, which one of 
the following statements do you think is accurate: most scientists believe that climate 
change is occurring, or most scientists believe that climate change is not occurring, or 
most scientists are unsure about whether climate change is occurring or not? 
 
although most Americans believe climate change is a problem, most believe curtailing 
GHG’s can be deferred to the future.   Perhaps shedding some light on the conflicting 
polling information provided in figures 1.6 and 1.7, Table 1.9 reports levels of trust that 
the public has for scientists and what they report on climate change.   
Recent scholarship suggests some of the mistrust may be warranted. Sundberg 
(2007) finds that climate change funding agencies and funding seekers engage in a sort 
of game where “both know funds are likely to be used for something other than what is  
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Figure 1.7. Public Opinion of Scientific Consensus, 1997-2007. Source: Nisbet and Myers, 
2007. 
 
 
Do you think most scientists agree with one another about whether or not climate 
change is happening, or do you think there is a lot of disagreement among scientists on 
the issue? 
 
proposed” (474).  Of course, the implication here is that grant funding is being siphoned 
away to the researchers more pressing interest under the auspices of climate change.  In 
short, the public does not completely trust scientific information about the 
environment, with only 31% of polled respondents reporting more than a moderate 
level of trust, nor do they trust the models they employ (Yearley, 1999).   
The previous summary of public opinion data offers several revealing conclusions 
about the current state of the public’s understanding of climate change.  The vast 
majority of members of the American public are aware of climate change and the 
greenhouse effect.  A majority of Americans also self-report that they understand how  
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Table 1.9.  Public Trust of Scientists on the Environment. Source: Nisbet and Myers, 
2007. 
 
  03/06    04/07   
 Completely (%)   5 5 
 A Lot (%)   27 27 
 Moderate amount (%)   41 43 
 A Little (%)   22 19 
 Notatall (%)   5 5 
 N   1,002    1,002   
How much do you trust the things that scientists say about the environment—
completely, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all? 
 
the greenhouse effect works, although substantial numbers of those polled are unable 
to link fossil fuels to greenhouse gasses and frequently conflate the hole in the ozone 
layer with climate change.  Despite erroneously identifying causes of climate change, a 
sizable majority of Americans believe that greenhouse gasses are a cause of climate 
change.  Polled respondents also generally believe climate change is probably 
happening, but at the same time believe there is some disagreement in the scientific 
community with as many as 3 in 10 scientists are unsure if climate change is a reality.  
Importantly, the public does not generally trust the scientific community when it reports 
on this issue.     
 
1.6 Scientific Consensus and Public Dissonance: Why the Difference? 
The previous sections have demonstrated that the relationship between public 
opinion and public policy is important, particularly in cases where the policy issues are 
salient with the general public.  The previous analysis has also demonstrated that 
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climate change salience, at a minimum, is on the rise.  It has also been empirically 
demonstrated that there is a scientific consensus on the reality of climate change and 
that most scientists, except for a few deniers, believe human beings are a significant 
cause of that change.  It is important to note that no stance has been taken on the 
rightness or wrongness of this consensus.  Science has been wrong in the past and it is 
possible that science could be wrong here, however unlikely that may be.  However, 
despite that scientific consensus, a non trivial component of the public neither believes 
that climate change is real, nor that human beings are the cause.  In fact, the public can 
be characterized as not trusting the scientists that provide that information.  Why?  
Public opinion and climate change research offers three categories of explanations for 
the disjunction between science and the public on the issue of climate change.  The two 
dominant explanations offered by previous scholarship suggest that divergent public 
opinion is best explained by climate change knowledge deficits (e.g., Kellstadt et al., 
2008) and directed by misrepresented scientific controversy in primary media outlets 
(e.g., Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007).  That is, if people simply knew more and the media were 
more responsible, previous scholars conclude, the public would display similar levels of 
consensus to that of the scientific community.   
 
1.6.1 The Knowledge-Deficit Model 
The foundation of the knowledge-deficit model is a well-documented difference 
between lay people’s and expert opinions across a multitude of complex issues 
(Kellstedt et al. 2008, p. 114), such as genetically modified foods (e.g., Hansen et al., 
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2003; Qin & Brown, 2006). Typical to complex issue areas, the scientific community, 
embedded as it is in practices designed to understand the issue, possesses a far greater 
array of facts and knowledge related to the relevant issue, while the lay public 
frequently relies upon truncated versions of this knowledge provided by intermediaries, 
such as the media (Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007).   Kellstedt et al. (2008) provide a concise 
specification of the knowledge-deficit model as it relates to climate change. The authors 
argue that the central premise of the knowledge-deficit model is that “scientific 
assessments of risk are both correct and objective, and then, by implication, the public’s 
perceptions of risks are both inaccurate and subjective “(p.114).   Findings illuminating 
the relationship between lay-opinions and climate change offer support for this 
assumption. 
 As indicated in the analysis of public opinion polls in the previous sections, 
research indicates that there is a general and stable level of awareness amongst the 
public about climate change (Bord et al. 1998; Stamm et al. 2000).  Furthermore, the 
public has demonstrated the capacity to evaluate complicated scenarios about climate 
change (Berk & Schulman, 1995).  Examining 600 residents in Southern California, Berk 
& Shulman (1995) find that when respondents are exposed to complicated climate 
scenarios, including multiple dimensions of concern (e.g., precipitation and 
temperature), respondents are capable of reasonably anticipating change and assigning 
an individual cost to that change.  Although able to associate individual cost with 
anticipated climatic change, there is, however, a lack of willingness by the public to pay 
a substantial immediate price to deal with climate change—the tendency is to defer 
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costs to a future time (Bord et al., 1998).    Supporting the knowledge-deficit model, 
these studies show individuals are able to form rational opinions about climate change 
policy when exposed to accurate scenarios and information.  Absent the stimulus, 
though, these policy opinions are based upon something other than the findings most 
scientists agree with.    
 Recent research shows that distinguishing between potential consequences for 
individual respondents is often difficult (Berk & Fovell, 1999; Stamm et al. 2000). Stamm 
et al. (2000), in their study of a cross-section of the Seattle population, find the 
respondent’s have difficulty in accurately discerning the causes and potential 
consequences of climate change.  In this study, respondent’s tended to incorrectly 
identify deforestation as a primary cause of GHG’s and also made the mistake of linking 
a reduction in aerosol can use as a solution to climate change—which is more commonly 
associated with the problem with the ozone layer.   The aerosol can misidentification is 
indicative of a larger issue with the public’s understanding of climate change.  That is, 
individuals often show a lack of understanding about the causes of climate change (e.g., 
Read et al., 1994), frequently confuse climate change with general pollution models 
(Bord et al., 1998), particularly the hole in the ozone layer (Read et al., 1994).  Perhaps 
the natural outcome of the various knowledge deficiencies just cataloged and discussed 
in the previous section detailing the evolution of public opinion about climate change, 
knowledge-deficit studies show that the most important determinant in predicting a 
willingness to act on climate change is correct knowledge of the causes (e.g., Bord et al., 
2000).  Importantly, when educated about climate change, the public’s views become 
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remarkably similar to that of the scientific community (Doble, 1995).  The knowledge-
deficit model presumes that shifts in opinion that make the public more like the 
scientific community are also shifts in the correct direction.     
 
1.6.2 Sensational Media Coverage and Journalistic Norms 
Whereas the knowledge-deficit model explains the division between public and 
scientific opinion by a lack of accurate knowledge on the part of the public, a second 
prominent model explains the difference as a product of sensationalistic media 
coverage.  The term sensational is understood here to mean a focus by media outlets on 
particular dimensions of issues to draw forth sustained attention from the public.  In 
practice, this means media outlets have shown strong tendencies to focus on conflict 
and debate (Gans, 1979; Graber, 1997), as opposed to the alternative proposed by the 
knowledge-deficit model, which would prescribe a more “neutral and objective” 
reporting of agreed upon scientific findings.  By focusing on conflict and debate, media 
coverage is deemed problematic because coverage may present issues as being more 
contested than they really are.   This tendency to focus on conflict has manifested itself 
in media coverage of climate change.    
 Compared to other countries such as France (Broussard et al. 2004), New 
Zealand, and Finland (Dispensia & Brulle, 2003), media coverage of climate change in 
the United States has a much greater tendency to focus on the conflict between 
scientists and politicians (Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007).  Where the previous sections on the 
science and policy history of climate change have demonstrated a high degree of 
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consensus, media outlets have been able to focus on conflict by focusing on both 
scientific uncertainty (Zehr, 2000) and partisan dimensions of the debate (Boycoff & 
Boycoff, 2007; Lahsen, 2005; McCright & Dunlap, 2003).    
Science, which in ideal form mandates an open epistemology and sets forth 
conclusions that are always viewed as tentative, is self-reflective in the sense that most 
scientists viewed as credible will speak to the uncertainty of their models and findings.  
This presents fertile ground for media outlets (or any critic for that matter) to plant 
seeds of conflict, even if little exists.  Where such discussions of uncertainty are 
necessary in science, these same discussions, when amplified by media outlets, 
undermine the perceived authority and legitimacy of science in the eyes of the public 
(Shackley & Wynne, 1996).  Taken a step further, the conflict focus of media reporting, 
rooted as it is in scientific uncertainties, usually takes on a partisan flavor (Lahsen, 2005; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  That is, coverage has historically moved from a focus on 
scientific findings to controversial policy questions related to costs, values, and 
outcomes (Trumbo, 1996).  In moving to policy questions and outcomes, the uncertainty 
presented by scientists has collapsed along partisan dimensions.  For example, it is 
commonplace for the frequently conservative and Republican opposition to climate 
change regulation to assert that the science provided by the IPCC is little more than 
conjecture (McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  Importantly and perhaps unsurprisingly, media 
coverage of scientific knowledge is found to have substantial influence over public 
opinion (Antilla, 2008; Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007).   
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Figure 1.8: Public Perceptions of the Medias Treatment of Climate change. Source: 
Nisbet and Myers, 2007. 
 
Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is the seriousness of climate 
change—generally exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally underestimated? 
 
 Figure 1.8 illustrates recent polling data from 1997 to 2007 presented in a 
summary article on the public’s assessment of the media’s treatment of the seriousness 
of climate change (Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  Generally speaking, at any point in time over 
the ten years captured in these polling data, roughly 1/3rd of those polled fall into one of 
the three categories regarding their perceptions of the media’s portrayal of the 
seriousness of climate change: generally exaggerated, generally correct, or generally 
underestimated. Of course there are spikes or dips in one category or another, 
particularly in 2004 and 2006, yet by 2007 the three categories converge.  Figure 1.8 
shows that only a third generally trust that the media’s portrayal is correct, while the 
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remainder believe that the media’s portrayal of climate change is either underestimated 
or overestimated—in roughly equal proportions nonetheless.     
Many conclusions have been drawn as to why media outlets focus on the 
sensationalistic dimensions of relevant issues.  One explanation is that special interests 
such as the fossil fuel industry (e.g., Dispensia, 2003) have co-opted media outlets and 
used the acquired platform to promote their specialized interests.   Potential conspiracy 
theories aside, Boycoff and Boycoff (2007) contend that the reasons for media behavior 
are more likely derived from considerations endogenous to media organizations.  The 
authors argue that the motive behind media coverage is inextricably tied to journalistic 
norms.   
Boycoff and Boykoff (2007, pp. 1192-1193) supply a model of the internal 
workings of media organizations by categorizing norms governing media behavior into 
first and second orders.  The first-order refers to “baseline influences on the selection of 
what is news and the content of news stories” (p. 1192).  These norms are 
personalization, dramatization and novelty, all of which help determine what news to 
cover and what the content should look and sound like.  Personalization downplays 
large systemic or thematic coverage in favor of a personal focus on human elements; 
dramatization emphasizes crisis over continuity—static states do not make for good 
news; and, novelty which establishes that something new is better than something old.  
These three first-order norms inform and direct second-order norms.  Second-order 
journalistic norms include authority-order and balance. The authority-order norm 
dictates that journalists primarily focus on “authority figures—government officials, 
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business leaders, and others” (p. 1193).  Balance is a norm, the authors argue, that 
works as a proxy for objectivity.  That is, there is a cultural norm in journalism to present 
both sides of a debate on any given issue in a proclaimed interest in fairness and an 
objective treatment of the issue.   
Performing a content analysis of television and newspaper coverage of climate 
change in the U.S. from 1988 to 2004, the authors find that “adherence to first-order 
norms significantly influence the employment of second-order norms” (p.1190).  They 
further interpret their findings as an explanation as to why media have produced an 
informationally deficient and partisan-charged discourse environment related to climate 
change.  That is, normalized institutional behaviors on the part of the media play an 
important contributing role in the proliferation of the notion that climate change 
science is uncertain and contested.   The popularization of this notion has occurred 
primarily through the vehicle of giving the authorities on the dissenting side of the 
debate an equal, yet undeserved, standing.   
The sensational media model can by summarized as a model that focuses the 
researcher’s attention on the structure and delivery system of communications about 
climate change.   This model has found that media do in fact influence public opinion.  
However, this influence is also found to be detrimental.  Second-order journalist norms, 
guided by first-order norms, are found to steer coverage in a direction that centers on 
the need of news organizations to generate interest.  Much like the previously discussed 
knowledge-deficit model, the presumption here is that media should reflect scientific 
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opinion on the issue of climate change in a way that mirrors the debate within the 
scientific community.   
 
1.6.3 Assessing the Models 
The knowledge-deficit and the sensational media models are two of the 
dominant explanations of why public opinion diverges from scientific opinion on climate 
change.  It is not uncommon to present them as alternative explanations.  For example, 
Kellstadt et al. (2008), presents the models as competing explanations, finding the 
knowledge deficit model lacking in that  “the more information a person has the less 
responsible he/she will feel for it; and, indirectly, the more information a person has 
about global warming, the less concerned he or she is for it” (p. 122).   Certainly, the two 
models have differences, but both have provided some traction in explaining why 
individuals hold the opinions they do about climate change.  While the knowledge-
deficit model draws our attention to the content of messages, the sensationalistic media 
model draws our attention to how that information is conveyed—or, the structure of 
communication messages.  Both models also have similarities in the sense that they also 
focus our attention on the information offered by the scientific community and how 
best to get the general public to understand and retain that information.  However, in 
drawing our attention to these important elements of communication structure, these 
approaches have, in general, neglected a potentially necessary synergy between the 
attributes brought to the table by each individual when processing information and both 
the structure and content of communications.   
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Individuals do not process information in a vacuum; rather, individuals bring 
their life experiences and their understanding of the world to bear when determining 
what information to accept, what information to reject, and, most importantly, what 
that information means.  These experiences and understandings are typically accounted 
for in social scientific models using an array of variables including such categories as 
race, gender, ideology, culture, and religion, among others.  These variables, referred 
heretofore as priors, attempt to capture those common life experiences that might help 
individuals process information.  To be clear, the argument made here is not that 
previous analyses knowledge-deficit and media have neglected prior attributes when 
operationalizing their models.  Both models, when assessing public opinion, have usually 
accounted for priors, typically in the form of controls.  The thrust of the argument 
presented here is that there is a potential synergy between message structure and 
content and the prior attributes of individuals that influence the processing and 
retention of information.   
Several studies have offered findings providing valuable insights as to how and 
why priors influence information processing.  In many cases, albeit indirectly, these 
findings call into question the previously discussed models.  For example, Steel et al. 
(2004) find that the level of trust an individual has in science is heavily influenced by 
their ideological orientation.  Whereas liberals are more likely to trust scientists, 
conservatives are more likely to view scientists as biased, or having some hidden agenda 
(Steel et al., 2004).   Indicating that the scientific community at least implicitly 
understands this point, Carolan (2006) finds that scientists in disciplines such as 
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sociology, policy, biology, and ecology employ the use of value-laden metaphor, 
suggesting these metaphors provide valuable cues to readers related to their priors.  
Linking metaphor to individual interpretation of scientific information, Unger (2000) 
observes that the ozone layer was readily understood and processed easily by the lay 
public precisely because it was frequently structured by information providers bound in 
cultural metaphor. Carvalho, in a recent 2007 study, finds a similar relationship with 
media representations of scientific information.  The author finds that “…scientific 
claims in the media are strongly entangled with ideological standpoints [and] ideology 
works as a powerful selection device in deciding what is scientific news” (Carvalho, 2007 
p. 223).   
Findings questioning the efficacy of the knowledge-deficit model also draw forth 
how important it may be to consider priors as scientific knowledge is often not enough 
to change or even significantly guide opinions or perceptions of risk (e.g., Durant & 
Legge, 2005, McLennan, 2000). For example, Durant & Legge (2005) find that support 
for genetically modified foods is also heavily influenced by a respondent’s trust in 
government. McLennan (2000), examining motherly tendencies to purify water for 
infants in developing countries, finds that social support networks are more important 
than increased knowledge in determining whether or not mothers will engage in the 
practice of boiling water to purify infant drinking water.  Specifically related to climate 
change,  Doble (1995), as noted earlier, found that educating the public does make their 
views resemble that of scientists; however,  Doble also found that differences in opinion 
remained and those differences were largely rooted in values (Doble, 1995).  These 
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findings and the discussion of priors indicate that information can be made more or less 
accessible by packaging said information in a way that is aligns with the individuals prior 
attributes.  A recent theorized but not yet empirically verified relationship between 
narrative communication structures and prior cultural orientations may provide avenues 
to better understand why the public holds the opinions it does about climate change.   
 
1.7 Cultural Stories 
A merger of several theoretical literatures has generated a promising structural 
discourse-analytic framework that may help explain the differences between scientific 
and public opinion.   Stephen Ney (2006) relies on narratively structured policy stories to 
integrate the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), Cultural 
Theory (Thompson et al., 1990) and the broad theoretical foundations of the 
argumentative turn (e.g., Fischer & Forrester, 1993) to identify distinct narrative 
structures: setting (basic assumptions), villains (policy problem), and heroes (policy 
solution) (Ney, 2006. p.26).  Using these narrative components, researchers are able to 
map areas of policy agreement and disagreement thereby generating solutions to policy 
problems.   
Promising findings have been produced using this method.  Research utilizing 
this framework has examined climate change, detailed the relevant cultural stories in 
terms of their narrative structural components, and proposed cross-cutting cultural 
solutions (Ney & Thompson, 2000; Verweij &Thompson, 2006; Verweij et al. 2006).  The 
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following section focuses on the policy stories techniques as they have been applied to 
the study of climate change.   
 The policy stories approach relies on two theoretical components to map issues: 
Cultural Theory (CT) and narrative (both theories are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 2).  CT measures belief systems along two dimensions of grid and group.  Grid 
measures preferred levels of group interaction, while the dimension of group captures 
the degree that these groups are expected to constrain the individual’s beliefs and 
behavior (Thompson et al., 1990).   The two dimensions of grid and group create four 
categories of cultural orientation: individualist, egalitarian, hierarch and fatalist.   Each 
category produces differing and mutually exclusive orientations towards nature, making 
it an especially useful theory to examine climate change.   
Fatalists believe that nature is capricious, or random, and that there is little 
individuals can do to control their lives.  Hierarchs believe that nature can be controlled, 
but in doing so individuals must be bound by tight societal prescriptions where experts 
and specialists manage their particular sphere.  Individualists, much like the position of 
classical economics, believe nature is resilient.  Whatever the individual does, nature 
will return to equilibrium.  Egalitarians view nature as dangerously fragile.  For the 
egalitarian, human activity always runs the risk of going too far, where little can be done 
to correct for previous mistakes.     
There are numerous studies validating CT measures in survey research, as well as 
other applications (see Mamadouh, 1999, for a concise summary of CT literature).  
Additionally, CT measures regularly outperform demographics, partisanship, ideology, 
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and knowledge in explaining policy preferences and opinion when applied in survey 
research (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Kahan & Braman, 2007).11
 Narratives are a central feature of the policy stories approach.  Narratives are a 
perhaps understudied communication structure in the social sciences as narratives are a 
ubiquitous means by which individuals communicate, process, and organize information 
(see Herman 2002).  In identifying key narrative components researchers have been 
able to isolate the dominant cultural stories for each relevant cultural type in the 
dominant form through which information is conveyed.   
   These value orientations 
are always present and influence how incoming information is processed (Wildavsky, 
1987; Thompson et al., 1990).    
Recent CT scholarship jus surveyed has demonstrated a natural synergy between 
CT and narrative.  Performing an extensive analysis of climate change discourses, a 
series of studies describe three cultural stories about climate change that have 
dominated public and elite communications (Raynor & Malone, 1998; Ney & Thompson 
2000; Verweij et al., 2006):12
 
   
1.7.1 Profligacy: An Egalitarian Story 
In this story the cause of global warming is over-consumption.  For the 
egalitarians, global warming is a moral issue, where selfishness has driven the 
environment to the brink of destruction.  The villains of this story are profit driven 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that most of these studies have been performed by scholars sympathetic to CT.   
12 It is common in CT scholarship to exclude fatalists from analysis.  See Mamadoah (1999) for a concise 
historical overview of CT applications.   
69 
 
corporations, governments that facilitate these corporations, and any group that 
supports the status quo.  The heroes of the profligacy story are groups like Eco-defense 
and Earth First that seek the elimination of greenhouse gasses and advocate for 
fundamental changes in the human relationship with nature.   The setting of this story is 
a fragile world where humans have overstepped their bounds, while the moral of the 
story is that humankind is doomed if it does not correct for past mistakes.  The 
profligacy story favors renewable resources to deal with GHG’s.   
 
1.7.2 Lack of Global Planning: A Hierarchical Story 
The hierarchical story narrates the cause of climate change as runaway markets 
that have led to excessive economic and population growth.  The setting is a world 
where humans have not properly managed economic and societal systems to allow for 
growth at a responsible pace that the climate can tolerate.  The heroes in this story are 
groups like the Club of Rome, impartial scientists, and the governments that employ 
them.  Hierarchs advocate for increased scientific management and governmental 
intervention to curtail climate change.  The hierarchical story favors expert driven 
solutions like nuclear energy to solve the problem of GHG’s. 
 
1.7.3 Business as Usual: An Individualistic Story  
The individualistic story’s heroes are groups such as the Cato Institute and organizations 
like the Wall Street Journal.  The cause of global climate change for these groups is 
generally naïve but dangerous idealists (egalitarians) and self-interested government 
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representatives (hierarchs) that have fabricated the story (it is a hoax).  Should they 
admit climate change is reality, they will argue the cause is irrelevant.  The only solution 
for climate change is to allow market forces to move naturally as individuals compete 
and innovate to create new technologies that reduce carbon emissions and allow 
adaptation.  The moral of the story is that markets must operate with minimal 
interference.  Thus, Individualists are likely to be more sympathetic to market solutions 
such as a cap-and-trade on GHG’s.   
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Although the three stories mentioned have been painstakingly chronicled and 
detailed by previous scholars, their persuasiveness or actual effectiveness has yet to be 
empirically verified.  Wildavsky (1987) observed that one’s culture is always at hand, 
providing valuable information shortcuts the facilitate decision-making and information 
processing; Hayden White (1987), a prominent narrative scholar, makes a similar 
observation about narrative, noting that narratives are ubiquitous if not omnipresent. It 
would seem, then, that CT and narrative have a natural synergy, which previous 
scholarship has confirmed (e.g., Verweij et al. 2006).   If White and Wildavsky’s daring 
assertions are correct, then these two theories merged should explain considerable 
variation in public opinion related to climate change.  Importantly, the policy stories 
research may shed light on previous gaps in our knowledge produced by the knowledge 
deficit and media models, by focusing our attention on the interactions between 
established priors and communication structures.  Working from the policy stories work 
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and integrating several strands of social scientific literature and research, chapter two 
lays out a Cultural Narrative Model designed to assess how individuals process 
information and form opinions on climate change.   
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CHAPTER 2: THE CULTURAL NARRATIVE MODEL, DATA, AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that global climate change is easily 
identified as one of the most complex and contentious policy problems facing not only 
the United States, but the human race.  In a democratic society such as our own, 
understanding the public’s capacities and tendencies in processing information and 
forming opinions about climate change has serious and far-reaching policy implications.  
Historically quite low, public knowledge about climate change is now on the rise, as is 
the importance of the issue on the public agenda (Leiserowitz, 2006).  Consequently, it 
is not unreasonable to expect the public, for better or worse, to play a larger role in 
future climate policy melees (Burstein, 2003; 2006).  
In light of the prospect of an increasingly important public role in shaping policy 
contours, this research seeks to explain how individuals form opinions about climate 
change and how those opinions vary.  Importantly, the previous chapter demonstrates 
that while scientists largely converge on their opinions about the reality and causes of 
climate change, the public does not follow the same pattern.  Dominant explanations for 
this divergence in opinion between the public and the scientific community in the social 
sciences can be characterized by two general models.  The knowledge-deficit model 
finds that if people were better informed about climate change, their opinions would 
shift towards the scientific consensus (e.g., Kellstedt et al., 2008); the sensational media 
model finds that it is the coverage of climate change by primary media outlets, focusing 
on conflict and the exciting dimensions of news worthy events, that misinforms the 
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public—manufacturing a sense of conflict about climate change science, when little 
exists (e.g., Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007).  However, both models were identified to not pay 
adequate attention to potential interactions between message structures and the prior 
beliefs and experiences individuals use to filter incoming information.  In order to 
address these questions, two theories that account for both individual internal factors 
and external stimuli in opinion formation and change are merged to create the Cultural 
Narrative Model (CNM).   
The first, Cultural Theory (CT), argues that there are four exclusive value 
orientations to which individuals subscribe based upon valued levels of group 
interaction and the degree that these groups are expected to constrain the individual’s 
beliefs and behavior.  These value orientations are always present and influence how 
incoming information is processed (Wildavsky, 1987; Thompson et al., 1990).  Cultural 
Theory has a proven history of explaining variation in opinion (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; 
Kahan & Braman, 2003); however, the influence of message structures in CT scholarship 
is lacking.  Relying upon the previously detailed policy stories literature of chapter one 
(e.g., Verweij et al., 2006) this research operationalizes narrative theory to address this 
gap.  Seeking to determine if cultural narratives help explain variations in opinions 
related to climate change, two research questions are addressed:  
RQ1:  Does cultural narrative structure influence opinions related to climate 
change?   
RQ2:  Does cultural narrative content explain variation in opinions related to 
climate change?  
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In order to develop hypotheses for these broad research questions, a model of how the 
individual processes information must be specified. To that end, in what follows the 
extant literature and research relevant to information processing is synthesized to 
produce the Cultural Narrative Model (CNM).  Specific hypotheses derived from the 
discussion of CNM are detailed in subsequent sections on research design and 
methodology.  
 
2.1 The Cultural Narrative Model (CNM) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the theorized relationships between exogenous cultural narratives 
and key endogenous variables of the Cultural Narrative Model. As illustrated, affect 
plays a central role. Several postulates derived from the extant literature generally guide 
the posited relationships within the model:13
1. Hot Cognition: All socio-political concepts are affect laden (Lodge & Taber, 2005; 
Morris, Squires, Taber & Lodge, 2003) and when these concepts are activated, 
affective attachments to said concept are activated as well (Redlawsk, 2002, p. 
1023).   
   
2. Selective Exposure: Individuals select sources and information that are congruent 
with what they already believe (Kunda, 1990, p. 495; Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
3. Confirmation Bias: Individuals have a predisposition to treat congruent evidence 
that agrees with their priors as stronger than incongruent evidence (Taber & Lodge, 
                                                          
13 These postulates are slightly modified summaries of recent work by Taber & Lodge 
(2007).   
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2006), and process congruent stimuli quicker than incongruent stimuli (Lodge & 
Taber, 2005).   
4. Disconfirmation Bias:  Evidence that is incongruent to an individual’s priors is 
counter argued (Taber & Lodge, 2006) and takes longer to process than evidence 
that is congruent (Lodge & Taber, 2005).   
5. Knowledge and Prior Beliefs:  Selective exposure, confirmation bias, and 
disconfirmation bias are conditioned by knowledge and prior beliefs.  Those with the 
strongest prior attitudes employ what they know to protect their priors (Taber & 
Lodge, 2006), especially those with higher levels of knowledge and political 
sophistication (Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
 
2.1.1 I. Affect   
Affect is defined as positive or negative emotional response to stimuli (Leiserowitz, 
2005, p. 1436; Lodge & Taber, 2005).  In line with previous scholarship observing that 
affect precedes all cognitions (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Lodge & Taber, 2007 p. 6-7), CNM 
assumes the primacy of affect in human cognitive processes. The mechanism of affect’s 
effect occurs by individuals positively or negatively “charging” socio-political concepts 
(e.g., I “hate” or “love” Obama) when either first encountered or through a process of 
updating (Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1436; Redlawsk 2002, p.1021).  These affective 
assessments occur spontaneously within 100-250 milliseconds before cognition (Lodge 
&Taber, 2007 p.16; Lodge &Taber 2005; Morris, Squires, Taber &Lodge, 2003) and are 
later integrated with conceptual knowledge (Duncan & Barrett, 2007).  Found to be  
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critical to such essential human functions as language fluency and memory 
(Duncan & Barrett, 2007), affective ascription allows individuals to engage in the 
very activity of choosing amongst various and often conflicting preferences 
(Taber & Lodge, 2007, p.18).  That is, the act of choosing would be near 
impossible if human beings were incapable of assigning positive and negative 
value.  Indeed, many individuals that are deficient in the ability to assign affect 
have been categorized as sociopaths and psychopaths, or are known to have 
suffered traumatic brain injuries (Damasio, 1994).  In CNM, affect is posited as 
operating as an essential heuristic (Slovic et al. 2007), allowing individuals to 
form on-line opinions quickly, even when these individuals may not be able to 
articulate why they hold a given opinion.   Affect is also theorized to serve an 
important role in the memory-based computational updating of preferences, as 
one “systematically weighs the pros and cons” (Lodge & Taber, 2007, p. 8).   
Affect research has demonstrated importance in preferences for 
candidates (Granberg & Brown, 1989), issues (Lodge & Taber, 2005), groups 
(Lodge & Taber, 2005) and political parties (Granberg & Brown, 1989), among 
many other important socio-political concepts.   Specifically related to the 
cultural narrative content of the model, marketing research demonstrates that 
narratives elicit stronger affective responses in consumers than do alternatives 
such as lists (Matilla, 2000; 2002), while cultural worldviews and affect are found 
to drive preferences about nuclear energy (Peters & Slovic, 1996).   
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2.1.2 II. Cognition: Online and Memory Based Processing 
Given that affect is empirically found to come prior to cognition, all 
stimuli in CNM are theorized to move through an affective filter. Conditioned by 
the affective response, CNM posits that the incoming information is processed in 
one of two ways: on-line or through memory-based cognitions.14
Stimuli that are attitudinally congruent with the respondent (Kunda, 
1990), that support their priors (Taber & Lodge, 2007, p. 33), and/or is affectively 
congruent is processed faster than stimuli that does not meet these conditions 
(Lodge & Taber, 2005), indicating an on-line cognition process.  Thus, stimuli that 
are attitudinally and/or affectively incongruent (Taber & Lodge, 2007, p. 33) and 
challenge a respondent’s priors (Taber & Lodge, 2007, p. 9) take longer for a 
respondent to process (Lodge & Taber, 2005).  These incongruent stimuli are 
demonstrated to provoke active counterargument on the part of the respondent 
   Memory-
based cognition posits an individual that accesses current and individually salient 
considerations from memory to structure incoming information (e.g., Zaller, 
1992).  On-line cognition posits an individual that develops a running-tally of 
general phenomenon, updating various heuristics using affect-laden 
considerations and then discarding most information, but retaining the 
emotional attachment (e.g., Sniderman et al.,1991).  
                                                          
14 There is considerable debate as to whether cognition modelers should 
embrace on-line or memory-based models.  Following, Druckman and Lupia 
(2000), the position in this research does not view the two positions as 
dichotomous.  Rather, CNM embraces both cognition models as accessible, 
viable, and beneficial processes human beings engage in to make sense of the 
world.     
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(Taber & Lodge, 2007,  p. 9) and intended to protect the respondent’s previously 
held beliefs and preferences (Kahan et al., 2007).  Thus, incongruent stimuli are 
posited to be processed using a memory-based cognitive process.  Memory-
based processing is the less frequent of the two cognitive processes (Druckman 
& Lupia, 2000).   
 
2.1.3 Endogenous Priors 
In line with previous research on public opinion, CNM distinguishes 
between two categories of variables in models of opinion formation: 
endogenous and exogenous (Kuklinski & Segura, 1995).  Frequently referred to 
as priors, endogenous variables are characteristics intrinsic to the individual. 
 
2.1.3.1   III. Demographics 
The most widely cited and studied endogenous variables are standard 
demographic characteristics.  For example, race has been found to be a strong 
predictor of attitudes about welfare (Kinder & Sanders, 1997) and risk (Finucane 
et al., 2000), while gender has a proven record with helping explain risk 
(Finucane et al., 2000) and opinions on foreign policy (Holsti, 2004, pp. 219-221).   
Other common demographic variables in explaining opinion include age, 
education, and income, all of which demonstrate predictive power, dependent 
upon the issue considered.  
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2.1.3.2  IV. Knowledge 
Respondent knowledge is a well-studied concept in preference formation 
and change research (e.g., Sniderman et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992; Delli Caprini & 
Keeter, 1996).  In CNM, knowledge serves the primary function of filtering 
stimuli moving through the memory-based cognition path.  Individuals with little 
process or domain specific knowledge are likely to rely on heuristics such as 
culture (Gastil et al., 2005; Wildavsky, 1987) and partisanship (Goren, 2005), and 
thus track the information through on-line processing.  Individuals with high 
levels of knowledge will use this knowledge to help process the stimuli; however, 
they will do so for the primary purpose of defending their preexisting beliefs and 
preferences (Kahan et al., 2007; Sniderman et al., 1991).  In generating internal 
counterarguments, individuals with high levels of knowledge “…limit the extent 
to which new information surprises them” (Druckman & Lupia, 2000).  
Therefore, individuals with the lowest and highest levels of knowledge are least 
likely to shift opinion (Druckman & Lupia, 2000 p. 15).  Respondents with 
moderate levels of knowledge are therefore posited as being most susceptible to 
new arguments and information (Zaller, 1992, p. 124).   
 Recently, Gilens (2001) finds that new policy specific information 
frequently changes opinions across many policy domains, including crime, 
foreign aid, and taxes. Knowledge has been measured as educational level, 
knowledge about the policy domain, and knowledge of the political process 
(Gilens, 2001; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990, p. 47).  Given the critical role knowledge 
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plays in preference formation and change, policy specific knowledge (Gilens, 
2001) related to climate change (Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2008) is included as a 
control variable in CNM.    
 
2.1.3.3 V. Belief Systems: Partisanship and Ideology 
Partisanship and ideology demonstrate substantial explanatory power 
over an array of preferences.  Measured as the strength of an individual’s 
affiliation with a political party, scholars find that partisanship filters incoming 
political information (Bartels, 2002), explains issue positions (Markus & 
Converse, 1979), and drives core values (Goren, 2005).  Partisanship is also 
demonstrated to be stable and resistant to change (Goren, 2005).  Typically 
measured as a liberal/conservative continuum, tests of ideology have found that 
most Americans do not organize political information ideologically, save for a 
small percentage of political sophisticates (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992).  As 
potentially powerful explanatory priors, partisanship and ideology are included 
as controls in CNM.   
 
2.1.3.4 VI. Cultural Theory  
The use of partisanship and ideology as endogenous measures in opinion 
models has become orthodoxy in political science.  Despite the proliferation of 
these measures, both have suffered validity criticisms concerning their uni-
dimensionality.  The most notable of the critics in this vein, the late Aaron 
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Wildavsky, argued that both measures, particularly ideology, collapse issues into 
categories that have little theoretical coherence (1987).15
Although not nearly as prominent as partisanship and ideology, Cultural 
Theory (CT) is modeled in CNM as a third belief system construct.  CT attempts to 
specify and explain how people sustain a particular way of life (Thompson, Ellis, 
& Wildavsky 1990, p. 1).  In doing so, the original architects of CT (Douglas, 1982; 
Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990) merge two historically competitive 
definitions of culture: the first is embedded in cultural bias and derived from 
  Wildavsky (1987) 
observed that along the liberal/conservative continuum, libertarians that oppose 
government regulation in private matters and moralists who ardently support 
such policies are strangely lumped together as conservatives.  Although not the 
majority position in the literature, scholars have detailed yet more 
inconsistencies, thus illuminating potential deficiencies (see, for example, 
Klingeman, 1979; Luttberg & Grant, 1985).  In sum, the thrust of these criticisms 
is that although ideology and partisanship do serve as organizing devices, they 
are not necessarily the most frequent devices employed by most individuals 
most of the time when processing political information and forming political 
preferences.   
                                                          
15 That is not to say that ideology and partisanship are ineffective metrics for 
assessing a wide array of opinion related dependent variables.  They most 
certainly are.  However, seen as coherent belief systems, partisanship and 
ideology are rife with inconsistencies.  Although tangential to the research 
conducted here, the reason for both the effectiveness and the inconsistencies is 
likely institutional as issues and positions are captured by the two dominant 
political parties and forced to collapse along a single dimension (see Downs, 
1957).   
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political science (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Elazar, 1966); the second is 
embedded in social relations (e.g., Benedict, 1934) and largely the product of 
anthropology (e.g., Douglas, 1982).  These two concepts reperesent the two 
defining dimensions of CT, where cultural bias is defined as “shared values and 
beliefs” and social relations are defined as “patterns of interpersonal relations” 
(Thompson, Ellis, &Wildavsky, 1990, p. 1). 
The two dimensions produce two conditions and one theorem that 
theoretically anchor CT.  The compatibility condition states that the viability of a 
particular form of life is conditioned by “a mutually supportive relationship 
between a particular cultural bias and a particular pattern of relations” whereby 
these biases and relations cannot be randomly or indiscriminately mixed 
(Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 2).   That is to say, “a change in the way 
an individual perceives physical or human nature, for instance, changes the 
range of behavior an individual can justify engaging in and hence the type of 
social relations an individual can justify living in” (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky 
1990, p. 2).  The impossibility theorem states that given the compatibility 
condition, “five and only five ways of life—hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism, 
individualism, and autonomy (also referred to as the hermit)16
                                                          
16 Please note that the hermit classification is discussed only briefly, and not 
operationalized as a CT component of CNM. Three reasons guide this decision: 
first, the hermit, when perfectly identified, is the zero point of the two 
dimensions—hence, the likelihood of a pure hermit emerging is slight; second, 
hermits, defined by their social isolation and prescription rejection are unlikely 
to participate in surveys; third, it is common in the literature to exclude this 
category (see Mamadouh, 1999).   
 meet these  
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Figure 2.2. Cultural Theory Grid and Group Typology. Source:  Thompson, Ellis, 
and Wildavsky, 1990. 
            Grid 
 
 
 
 
conditions of viability” (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 3).   There are five 
viable combinations of cultural bias and patterns of social relations.  These ways 
of life compete with each other, but are interdependent in the sense that the 
individual ways of life cannot exist without the others.  As a consequence, the 
requisite variety condition states that “there may be more than five ways of life, 
but never fewer” (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky 1990, p. 4).  Each way of life will 
be represented in a culture, but not necessarily in equal proportions and is 
Fataltist (↓Group ; ↑ Grid)
•people who find themselves subject to binding prescriptions 
and are excluded from group membership
•sphere of autonomy restricted
•do not have membership in the group respsonsible for 
making decisions about their life. 
•Nature Capricious
Hierarchist (↑Group ; ↑ Grid)
•strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions
• indviduals are subject to control by other members and the 
demands of socially imposed roles.
•"different roles for different people enable harmony"
•Nature Perverse/Tolerant
Individualist  (↓Group ; ↓ Grid)
• indiviudals are bound by neither group incorporation nor 
prescribed roles
•all boundaries are provisional and subject to negotiation.
•success is often measured by the size of a following a person 
can command.  
•Nature Benign; 
Egalitarian (↑Group ; ↓ Grid)
•strong boundaries coupled with minimal prescriptions 
•groups lack internal role differentiations--relations are 
ambiguos.
•Individuals can only exercise power by claiming to speak for 
the group.
•Nature Ephemeral; 
Hermit: the individual who 
witdraws from coercive or 
manipulative social 
involvement altogether.
Group 
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dependent on the other ways of life for the defining characteristics that make 
that way of life possible.    
Operationalizing the previously mentioned dimensions, CT measures 
belief systems along two dimensions of grid and group.  Grid measures valued 
levels of group interaction, while the dimension of group captures the degree 
that these groups are expected to constrain the individual’s beliefs and behavior 
(Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990).  By surveying respondents, individuals can 
be placed in a two-dimensional space and classified as most closely 
approximating one of four types: fatalist, hierarch, individualist, and egalitarian.  
In addition to information about an individual’s grid and group, CT argues 
that each quadrant produced by the two dimensions provides an exclusive view 
of nature, thereby making CT an appropriate tool for the study of climate 
change.  Figure 2.3 illustrates this understanding of nature in terms of a ball 
representing human choice and agency atop a line representing nature’s 
reaction to that agency.  Fatalists believe that nature is capricious, or random, 
and that there is little individuals can do to control their lives—the ball rolls 
about randomly.  Hierarchs believe that nature can be controlled, but in doing so 
individuals must be bound by tight societal prescriptions where experts and 
specialists manage their particular sphere.  Individualists, much like the position 
of classical economics, believe nature is resilient.  Whatever the individual does, 
nature will return to equilibrium, just like markets.  Egalitarians view nature as  
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Figure 2.3. Cultural Theory Myths of Nature. Source: Mamadouh, 1999; 
Thompson et al. 1990, p.27. 
 
 
dangerously fragile.  For the egalitarian, human activity always runs the risk of 
going too far, where little can be done to correct for previous mistakes.    
There are at least three reasons to embrace CT theory and measures as 
the endogenous belief system of interest.  First, CT measures regularly 
outperform demographics, partisanship, ideology, and knowledge in explaining 
policy preferences and opinion (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Kahan & Braman, 
2007).17
                                                          
17 It is worth noting that most of these studies have been performed by scholars 
sympathetic to CT.   
   Second and as discussed in chapter one, CT has already been applied to 
the study of climate change in terms of stories.  Finally, there is an intuitive 
linkage between CT’s views of nature and how these views might relate to 
climate change policy.  CT measures are the endogenous priors of interest in 
CNM.   
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2.1.4 VII. Exogenous Stimulus: Cultural Narrative 
The most compelling reasons to embrace narrative as a model for exogenous 
influence on preference formation are straightforward: there is considerable 
evidence that humans use narrative to organize, process, and convey 
information (see for example, Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Gerrig & Egidi, 2003; 
Klein, 2003).  Indeed, there is persuasive evidence that narrative cognition is 
fundamental to human existence.  Neuroscience research has located the neural 
network responsible for narration (Troiani et al., 2006; Young & Saver, 2001), 
and determined that brain injuries or degeneration such as that caused by 
Alzheimer’s disease (Ash et al., 2007)  can result in the loss of the ability to 
narrate (Young & Saver, 2001).   Once this loss occurs, neuroscience research 
finds that the loss of narration is more problematic than losses of other functions 
such as kinesthetic, mathematic, or linguistic (Young & Saver, 2001).  The loss of 
the ability to narrate results in the patient’s inability to perceive the self (Young 
& Saver, 2001, p. 77).   
The study of narrative unsurprisingly finds its genesis in literary theory, 
where two general approaches materialized: structuralism and 
poststructuralism.    Applications of narrative in public policy are predominantly 
poststructural (Jones & McBeth, 2010).  Poststructuralist scholarship asserts that 
each instance of narrative, caused by every conceivable act of interpretation, is 
unique (e.g., Derrida, 1981) and generalization is impossible (Fischer, 2003, p.vii).  
For the poststructuralist, each narrative and the interpretations that constitute 
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said narrative, is the unit of analysis (Huisman, 2005, p. 39).  On the other hand, 
structuralists assert that each story has general identifiable components from 
which generalizations can be formed (e.g., Genette, 1980).  Structural 
applications of narrative seek generalizable components that can be applied in 
different contexts (Herman, 2009; McQuillan, 2000).  Jones & McBeth (2010) in 
their synthetic review of narrative applications in public policy find that to avoid 
the relativistic claims of poststructural research, empirically oriented studies of 
narrative should define both general narrative structures and anchor those 
structures to generalizable content.  Therefore, a structural treatment of 
narrative is essential to empirical investigation.   
Structural approaches have found some success in policy studies (see 
Jones & McBeth, 2010 for an overview of this literature).  For example, McBeth 
et al. (2005) use narrative structure to quantitatively identify core policy beliefs, 
while Ricketts (2007) finds that narratively structured communications are 20% 
more likely to get individuals to comply with safety instructions than traditional 
abstract safety warnings.  Drawing on the structural tradition in narrative policy 
research, CNM rejects the poststructural position of relativity and posits that all 
narratives have general structural components that compose the skeletal frame 
of stories—regardless of context.     
CNM invokes the baseline structural definition of narratives provided by 
Jones & McBeth (2010) in their overview of narrative research in public policy. 
Narrative is defined as a story with distinct components consisting of a 
89 
 
beginning, middle, and end (McBeth et al., 2005) that takes place in a particular 
setting (Stone, 2002), contains a plot (Abell, 2004; Stone 2002), is composed of 
characters (McBeth et al., 2005; Verweij et al., 2006), and offers a moral to the 
story (Verwiej et al., 2006).   
Jones & McBeth (2010) also argue that if the position of relativity 
asserted by postpositivists is to be avoided, narrative must also be shown to 
have generalizable content.  In order to avoid charges of narrative relativity, 
narrative content must be anchored in generalizable content that limits 
variability. That is, narratives must also be about something that transcends 
specific contexts.  Admittedly, this is a more difficult task than identifying generic 
narrative structures.  Jones and McBeth (2010) suggest that one effective 
strategy for identifying generic narrative content is to employ previously proven 
belief system measures in the social sciences to identify this content, such as 
ideology and Cultural Theory.  These belief system measures will allow for the 
identification of the previously mentioned narrative structural components such 
as characters and plots within a range that is wide, but nonetheless limited.  For 
example, a narrative designed to persuade conservative voters that 
characterized Nancy Pelosi as a hero is likely to be rejected, as Speaker Pelosi is 
viewed by many of these voters as the archetype of liberal philosophy.    Cultural 
Theory provides the necessary content anchor for CNM.  
The policy stories research summarized in chapter one provides the 
necessary content for the stories presented as exogenous message structures in 
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CNM, while the previously identified narrative structures inform what 
components must be in a narrative. The policy stories approach tells how those 
components should be populated with cultural theory content.    
 
2.1.5 Mechanisms of Persuasion 
Two mechanisms of persuasion are theorized in CNM.  The first, 
congruence and incongruence, suggests that individuals are more likely to be 
persuaded by cultural stories that fit their world view.  The second, narrator 
trust, suggests that the more an individual trusts a narrator, the more likely a 
persuasion effect is to occur.   
 
2.1.5.1  Congruence and Incongruence 
New information in narrative form is generally easy for individuals to process as 
it is structured similarly to life experience (Matilla, 2000; 2002).  Narratives 
persuade to the extent they comport with that individual’s understanding of the 
world or life experience (Schank et al., 1995).  Concerning CNM, narrative is 
posited to comport to an individual’s reality to the extent that it is congruent 
with their cultural worldview.  Through cultural symbols (e.g., characters), plots, 
causal connections, and language, certain facets of the story are sharpened and 
more apparent, while others become leveled and obscure (Gilovich, 1991).  
These cultural identifiers allow an individual to quickly gauge congruence or 
incongruence.  Congruence is preferred by the individual as he/she protects their 
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existing understanding of the world (Kunda, 1990, p. 495; Taber & Lodge, 2006); 
incongruence is actively rejected (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006) as 
individuals engage in cultural identity protection (Kahan et al., 2007). Cultural 
identity protection makes it difficult to persuade an individual to accept an 
alternate cultural view.  Congruence and incongruence are critical conceptual 
components of CNM. Cultural Theory metrics determine a respondent’s cultural 
type and the extent to which the cultural narrative stimulus they encounter is 
congruent or incongruent is likely to influence that individual’s processing of the 
information within that narrative.  
 
2.1.5.2  Narrator Trust 
The importance of source effects is well documented as an important 
exogenous component of message persuasion (Page et al., 1987; Mondak, 1993).  
A source’s trustworthiness (Popkin, 1994, p.47), accuracy and objectivity (Iyengar 
& Kinder, 1985), expert status (Page et al., 1987), likeability (Sniderman, Brody, 
& Tetlock, 1991), and ideology (Zaller, 1992, p. 47) have all been identified as 
affecting a recipient’s willingness to accept a message. Thus, a recipient of a 
given message is likely to be persuaded by an argument if the respondent and 
the message source share interests and the speaker is believed to be 
knowledgeable (Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 17).  Related specifically to the 
narrative stimulus, the plausibility of a story is conditioned by both the 
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recipient’s knowledge and the extent to which they trust the narrator or the 
source (Hovland &Weiss, 1951; Olson, 2003).   
 
2.2 Research Design, Data, and Methodology 
The previous discussion has specified the Cultural Narrative model’s key 
endogenous and exogenous categorizations and expected relationships.  To 
reiterate, CT measures constitute the primary belief system measures, while 
narrative theory provides the primary exogenous structuring theory. The 
following sections detail the research design, data, methodology, as well as 
discussing some of the inherent tradeoffs in operationalizing cultural narratives.  
Moving forward from CNM’s theoretical specification, recall that CNM addresses 
two general research questions: 
RQ1:  Cultural Narrative Structure: Does cultural narrative structure 
influence opinions related to climate change?  
RQ2:  Cultural Narrative Content: Does cultural narrative content 
explain variation in opinions related to climate change?  
The above research questions guide the research design, data collection 
strategy, and applications of method.  Relevant hypotheses are tested for each 
research question.  Briefly summarizing this research, the data consist of a 
nationally representative sample of 1586 respondents.  Each respondent takes 
an online internet survey, consisting of fifty-eight questions (See Appendix A for 
the full survey).  Built into the survey, is an experimental design testing the  
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influence of cultural narrative structure (RQ1) and the influence of cultural 
narrative content (RQ2).  Each respondent is randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental tracks.  The experimental progression, by track, is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4.  Three of the tracks (a-c) provide the cultural narrative treatment 
while a fourth provides a control list (d). 
 
Figure 2.4. Experimental Progression, by Track 
 
 
This experimental design sets up a comparison between respondent 
responses to key climate change opinion related dependent variables across 
experimental tracks, addressing RQ1 and RQ2.   Based on the three stories 
identified by previous research detailed in chapter one (e.g., Verweij et al., 
2006), each cultural narrative is constructed to stay true to the experimental 
design by alternatively varying structure or content.  RQ1 (narrative structure) is 
assessed by comparing the control list (track d) to each of the three cultural 
narrative tracks (a-c).  Holding narrative structure constant, RQ2 (narrative 
content) is addressed by varying the cultural content in terms of characters, 
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cultural symbols, and policy solutions of the narratives and comparing responses 
across cultural narrative tracks (a-c).  The content of each exogenous narrative 
experimental treatment is culturally specific to the egalitarian, hierarch, and 
individualist stories identified in previous scholarship (e.g., Verweij et al., 2006).   
 
2.2.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
Survey responses for this research consist of 1,586 individuals drawn from 
Survey Sampling Inc.’s (SSI) pool of internet survey volunteers. The data were 
collected between April 24th and April 27th
Table 2.1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the overall 
survey sample.  For comparative purposes, the corresponding demographic 
percentage of the U.S. national population is included in Table 2.1.  For the most  
, 2009.   Although not a true random 
probability sample, SSI’s pool of respondents is screened as the sample is drawn 
to form the sample population to be representative of the U.S. national 
population more generally.   A true probability sample, such as that gathered 
using random digit dialing techniques (RDD), is not usually necessary “…when the 
most important variables of interest are based on experimental treatments” 
(Berrens et al., 2003, p. 2).  Additionally, on the substantive issue of climate 
change, internet samples and traditional RDD phone samples are found to be 
quite similar (Berrens et al., 2003, p. 21).  As the survey employed in this 
research is an experimental design and substantively related to climate change, 
obtaining a true probability sample is deemed unnecessary. 
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Table 2.1. General Survey Population Demographics. Source:  U.S. National 
Population Figures, Herron and Jenkins-Smith, 2006, p. 180. 
Demographic Frequency Respondent 
(%) 
US National Population 
(%) 
Gender    
Male 688 43.4 48.1 
Female 893 56.3 51.9 
Age    
18-24 150 9.5 13.2 
25-54 948 59.6 57.0 
>54 488 30.8 28.8 
Education    
High School Grad or 
Higher 
1538 97.3 83.1 
College Grad or Higher 603 38.2 24.3 
Race/Ethnicity    
White, non-Hispanic 1075 67.8 72.7 
Black 256 16.1 11.5 
Hispanic 176 11.1 11.0 
Other 72 5 4.7 
Household Income    
$0-49,999 917 57.8 57.3 
$50,000-99,999 509 32.1 29.3 
$100,000 and above 124 7.8 13.4 
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part, the survey sample supplied by SSI conforms to national standards, with 
significant over representation of educated respondents, which is a common 
feature of internet surveys (Berrens et al. 2003), but presents no validity threats 
to this research.   
The survey is taken online after a potential participant receives an e-mail 
invitation from Survey Sampling, Incorporated (SSI) and accepts the invitation. 
Response rates for initial acceptance are unknown and not provided by SSI. Each 
respondent that finished the survey received three dollars in compensation.    A 
sample size of 1,586 respondents allows for >250 respondents in each 
experimental track, providing a sample error within each treatment group of +/- 
5%.   
 
2.2.3 RQ2: Narrative Structure 
Constructing exogenous cultural narrative treatments on climate change 
for this dissertation’s nested experimental internet survey presents a tension 
between at least two competing objectives.  On the one hand, narratives have 
largely been treated as context dependent by dominant postpositivist 
applications of narrative (Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1993; 1995; Stone, 2002); thus, by 
this definition narratives are highly variable and situation specific—in fact many 
assert this is their primary virtue (e.g., Dodge et al. 2005); on the other hand, the 
demands of experimental design require that all but the stimulus be held 
constant (McDermott, 2002).  This presents an interesting problem.  How does 
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one create a general narrative structure when that structure’s effectiveness is 
largely argued to be contingent upon the degree to which the content matches 
the unique context it is applied to or attempting to explain?  Or, stated 
differently, narratives are typically argued to illuminate the contexts to which 
they are applied and must necessarily do so to be considered “good stories;” 
experimental designs, on the other hand, require stripping away much of this 
context to test generalizable knowledge.  In what follows, how this tension has 
been navigated in the construction of the cultural narrative and the control 
treatments are addressed.  
2.2.4 The Control List 
What can and should be classified as a narrative is a highly contentious 
point in narrative scholarship.  While some argue that everything is implicitly 
narrative (e.g., Derrida, 1981), others argue that narratives must be tightly 
bound by stringent qualifications (e.g., Abell 2004; Jones & McBeth, 2010).  It is 
not the purpose of this research to resolve this debate.  Rather, it is asserted, 
along with other scholarship (e.g., Herman, 2002; White 1980), that certain texts 
(broadly understood) possess more “narrativity” than others.  As has been done 
in other experimental designs testing the influence of narrative, a list stimulus is 
employed as a control to determine the influence of narrative structures (e.g., 
Mattilla, 2000). While there is substantial disagreement on what a narrative is, 
most would agree that either a list is not a narrative or, at the very least, 
possesses less narrativity than the cultural narrative stimuli.  The control list 
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contains identical information and nearly identical wording to that detailed in 
both the cultural narrative standardized facts and the cultural narrative US 
scenario (see Table 2.2). The gray-scale columns identify the cultural narrative 
treatment of the same information contained in the control, while the italicized 
words in the same columns indicate textual changes between all cultural 
narrative tracks and the control list. Comparing the cultural narrative responses 
to responses to the control should help illuminate the broader importance (or 
lack of) of narrative structure. 
 
2.2.5 Cultural Narrative Structure 
The influence of narrative structure (tracks a-c) on key climate change 
opinion dependent variables is ascertained in relation to the control list (track d).  
Table 2.3 specifies the question and progression for each experimental track.  
The far left hand column identifies the pre-treatment question progressions, the 
middle column the cultural narrative question progressions, and the right hand 
column details the control list question progressions.18
Following pre-stimulus questions including measures of CT, 
demographics, ideology, and partisanship, all respondents receive the same 
factual information, derived from the Intergovernmental Panel Climate Change 
(IPCC) Report, 2007.  In the control list, the information is presented as two 
separate lists. One list provides general facts about climate change, while the  
 
                                                          
18 Please note that Table 2.3 lists all of the progressions for this survey.  However, 
not all of the questions are empirically tested in this dissertation project.   
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Table 2.3.  Survey Question Progression Coding  
Pre-Test Questions  
 
Demographics 
1. Age Screening 
2. Age (verbatim) 
3. Education 
4. Gender 
Party and Ideology 
5. Political Party 
6. Strength of Party 
identification 
7. Ideology 
General Political Knowledge 
8. House of Rep. 
9. Veto Override 
10. Federal Judges 
11. Senator 
General CC Knowledge 
12. Temperature Rise 
13. Ocean Levels 
14. Droughts 
15. Floods 
16. Severe Weather 
CC Causes 
17. Auto Exhausts 
18. Nuclear Power 
19. Toxic Chemicals 
20. Coal Power 
21. Deforestation 
22. Avg Temp. Increase 
Cultural Theory Measures 
23. Hierarchy: ahead 
24. Hierarchy: authority 
25. Hierarchy: rules 
26. Individualist: fail 
27. Individualist: 
disadvantaged 
28. Individualist: individual 
29. Egalitarian: Fair 
30. Egalitarian: Power 
31. Egalitarian: Income 
32. Fatalist: Random 
33. Fatalist: Fate 
34. Fatalist: Plans 
Cultural Narrative  
(Tracks a-c) 
 
Standardized Facts 
35. Surprise 
US Scenario  
36. Surprise 
The Villain 
Ind. 
 
Hierarch Egal. 
 
37a. Egal1 
38a. Egal2 
39a. Hier1 
 
37b. Egal1 
38b.Egal2 
40b.Ind.1 
41b.Ind.2 
 
 
39c. Hier1 
40c.Ind.1 
41c.Ind.2 
 
 
 
Policy Solution 
42. Argument Surprise 
43. Hero Response 
Post Stimulus 
44. Narrator Risk 
45. Narrator Trust 
46. Affective Response 
47. Respondent Risk 
48. Climate Change Action 
Fact Agreement 
49. Climate Change Belief 
50. GHG Cause 
51. US Scenario  
Climate Change Policy Preference 
52. Hierarchical 
53. Individualist 
54. Egalitarian 
More Demographics 
55. Race 
56. Income 
57. Zip code 
Narrative Organization 
58. Sorting Exercise 
 
Control Group  
(Track d) 
 
Standardized Facts 
35. Surprise 
US Scenario 
36. Surprise 
 
Group Responses 
 
37d. Egal1 
38d. Egal2 
39d. Hier1 
40d. Ind1 
41d. Ind2 
 
 
Post Stimulus 
44. Narrator Risk 
45. Narrator Trust 
46. Affective 
Response 
47. Respondent 
Risk 
48. Climate Change 
Action 
Fact Agreement 
49. Climate Change 
Belief 
50. GHG Cause 
51. US Scenario  
Climate Change Policy 
Preference 
52. Hierarchical 
53. Individualist 
54. Egalitarian 
More Demographics 
55. Race 
56. Income 
57. Zip code 
Narrative Organization 
58. Sorting Exercise 
 
 
101 
 
second provides a list of potential consequences of climate change for the 
United States.  In narrative form (as opposed to a list), the same information is 
presented in each cultural narrative as the setting.  The setting does not vary 
across cultural narratives and is exactly the same for each of the three cultural 
narratives.   
Following the general facts and the predictions for the US, respondents in 
the control track move directly to post-stimulus questions; respondents exposed 
to a cultural narrative setting move to the next cultural narrative section in their  
assigned track.  Five narrative structural components are consistent across all 
cultural narrative tracks: 
1. Setting:  Each cultural narrative begins with a setting (Stone, 2002) 
detailing the specific context of the story.  The findings of the IPCC 
report (2007) are used to establish this setting. The report serves the 
purpose of legitimizing climate change as a reality, which is supported 
by a general level of acceptance in public opinion polls in the United 
States (Leiserowitz, 2005).19
2. Plot:  Plots are fundamental components of narrative (Somers 1992; 
Abell 2004), providing relationality of component parts (e.g., 
characters and the setting), and structuring causal explanations 
 All three cultural narratives and the 
control list use the same fact base to set the stage.   
                                                          
19 IPCC reports have been identified as hierarchical sources (Raynor & Malone, 
1998) and likely to bias survey responses. Therefore, the setting descriptions and 
lists do not credit the IPCC directly.  
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(Somers 1992; Stone, 2002) that determine the plausibility of the 
narrative.  The plot used in all cultural narratives is the “stymied-
progress” plotline (Stone, 2002).  The “stymied-progress” plotline 
details an obstruction of progress in dealing with climate change 
caused by the “dangerous” interests of the enemy (other cultural 
types). The causal explanation (Stone, 2002) details the hero’s actions 
as intentionally obstructed by the villains.  
3. Characters: Characters are an integral part of narrative structure. 
Consistent with previous operationalizations in the policy literature 
(McBeth et al. 2005; Verweij et al. 2006), each narrative contains 
tangible and culturally specific heroes, villains, and victims.   
4. Moral of the Story: The moral of the story in narrative is often 
portrayed to prompt action (Stone, 2002) and is frequently presented 
as a policy solution (Ney & Thompson, 2000; Verweij et al. 2006).  
Consistent with these past treatments of “the moral of the story,” this 
component of each cultural narrative is operationalized as a culturally 
specific policy solution.    
Methods of analysis include t-tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA) and (where 
appropriate) linear regression models.  Discussed in more detail in chapter four, 
the following hypotheses are tested for narrative structure: 
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H01
H
:  There is no relationship between a respondent’s perceptions of  
  the narrator’s assessment of the risk climate change posses and  
  narrative structure.   
02
H
:  There is no relationship between levels of trust a respondent 
ascribes to an  author  and narrative structure.   
03
H
:  There is no relationship between the level of affect a respondent 
assigns to the experimental stimulus and narrative structure.   
1
H
:   Personal Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages 
will increase the respondent’s sense of threat that climate change 
poses to them personally relative to the control group. 
2
H
:  Sociotropic Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages 
will increase the respondent’s sense of threat that climate change 
poses to the United States in general relative to the control group. 
3
H
:  Climate Change Belief: Narratively structured messages will 
increase the respondent’s willingness to accept that climate 
change is a reality relative to the control group. 
4:  Anthropogenic Cause: Narratively structured messages will 
increase the respondent’s willingness to accept that human 
beings are a critical cause of climate change through increased 
GHG emissions relative to the control group. 
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H5
H
:  GHG Regulation: Narratively structured messages will increase 
the respondent’s willingness to regulate GHG’s relative to the 
control group. 
6
H
:  Hero Affect: Characters (groups) treated as heroes in the cultural 
narratives will facilitate more positive affective responses than 
groups in the control.   
7
H
:  Villain Affect: Characters (groups) treated as villains in the 
cultural narratives will facilitate more negative affective responses 
than groups in the control.   
8
H
:  Moral of the Story: Policy preferences advocated by a cultural 
narrative will be preferred by respondents exposed to that 
narrative. 
9
H
:  Culturally Antithetical Moral of the Story: Policy preferences 
admonished by the cultural narrative will find less support from 
respondents exposed to that narrative.   
10a
H
:  Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will be more trusting of the narrator than their cultural 
counterparts in the control. 
10b:  Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will be less trusting of the narrator than their 
cultural counterparts in the control. 
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H11a
H
:  Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have higher perceptions of risk in relation 
to climate change, relative to their cultural counterparts in the 
control. 
11b
H
:  Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have lower perceptions of risk in relation 
to climate change, relative to their cultural counterparts in the 
control. 
12a:  Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have more positive affect for culturally identified
H
 
heroes than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12b:  Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have more negative affect for culturally identified
H
 
villains than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12c:  Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have more positive affect for culturally 
identified
H
 heroes than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12d:  Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have more negative affect for culturally 
identified enemies than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
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H13a:  Relative to the control group, respondents will have higher levels 
of support for culturally identified
H
 policy solutions, regardless of 
which narrative treatment they are exposed to.   
13b:  Relative to the control group, respondents will have lower levels 
of support for culturally identified
 
 incongruent policy solutions, 
regardless of which narrative treatment they are exposed to. 
2.2.6 RQ2: Narrative Content 
In order to determine the influence of cultural narrative content on key 
climate change opinion related dependent variables, the following narrative 
structural components are held constant:  setting, plotline, the spatial location of 
characters and policy solutions within the text.  Where possible, only the cultural 
content within the narrative structures vary from cultural narrative to cultural 
narrative.20
                                                          
20All of the stories begin from the same setting of constituent facts and 
predictions for the United States derived from the IPCC Report (2007).  The IPCC 
(2007) findings are judged to be the safe ground to leverage all three stories 
from in that it is common for most of the public in the United States to accept 
climate change as a problem (See chapter one).  However, it is not universal to 
do so.  Several preliminary stories were constructed that set forth an 
individualist cultural narrative that began from the premise that climate change 
was a concoction of hierarchs and egalitarians built on faulty science.  Indeed, 
this cultural narrative seemed to intuitively adhere itself better to the 
individualist worldview.  However, beginning from the premise that climate 
change is not real (which must be done to satisfy the requirements of the 
experimental design) is a much more difficult task for the hierarchal cultural 
narrative, and a simple nonstarter for the egalitarian cultural narrative.  This 
  Holding narrative structure constant the following content is varied: 
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1. Characters:  The same characters are used across cultural narratives, but 
their treatment in each is different.  Characters are either heroes or 
villains in each cultural narrative.  Each group used as a character has 
been linked as a hero or villain to a cultural type in previous research 
(Verweij et al. 2006).  Hierarchs ally with the Club of Rome and 
government; Egalitarians ally with Earthfirst and Ecodefense; 
Individualists ally with the Wall Street Journal and the Cato Institute.  A 
hero for one cultural type is treated as an villain for the other two; each 
hero or villain is situated in exactly the same place (relative to the other 
two cultural narratives) in the text and nested in nearly identical wording.   
2. Moral of the Story (Policy Solution):  Each cultural story is identified to 
promote a policy solution specific to their worldview (Verweij et al., 
2006).  In each of the cultural narratives, a policy solution is offered, 
while the two solutions offered in the alternative cultural narratives are 
rebuked.  The egalitarians promote renewable and community owned 
energy; the hierarchs promote nuclear energy; the individualists promote 
a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions.   
Table 2.4 illustrates which content components are manipulated in each 
experimental track.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
storyline had to be abandoned in the interest of holding the structures constant 
across cultural narratives.  
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Table 2.4: Cultural Narrative Content Variation, by Experimental Track 
 
Narrative 
Structure 
Control 
Treatment 
Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarchical 
Narrative 
Egalitarian  
Narrative 
Plot 
 List Stymied 
Progress 
Stymied 
Progress 
Stymied 
Progress 
Setting 
Facts List Narrative form Narrative form Narrative form 
US List Narrative form Narrative form Narrative form 
Characters 
Heroes NA Cato Institute Club of Rome Ecodefesnse 
Villains NA Club of Rome 
Ecodefense 
Earthfirst 
Cato Institute 
Wall Street 
Journal 
Ecodefense 
Earthfirst 
Cato Institute 
Wall Street 
Journal 
Club of Rome 
Moral of the Story 
Policy 
Solution 
NA Cap-and-Trade Nuclear Energy 
 
Renewable 
Energy 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes a word-by-word comparison broken down by narrative 
structural categories of the three cultural narratives.21
                                                          
21 The same language was used where possible to operationalize each cultural 
narrative, but changes were often necessary to avoid undue repetition and the 
consequent decrease of narrativity across stories.  In many cases, changes made 
 The cultural narratives are  
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Table 2.5. Cultural Narrative Content Comparison, by Structural Category 
 Total Words Egalitarian Individualist Hierarchical Control a 
Standardized Facts 133 133 (100%) 133 (100%) 133 (100%) 121 (90.9%) 
US Scenario 239 239 (100%) 239 (100%) 239 (100%) 226 (94.6%) 
Enemy Transition 55 52 (94.5%) 52 (94.5%) 52 (94.5%)  
Enemy 1:     Egalitarian 83  63 (75.9%) 48 (57.8%)  
Enemy1:      Individualist 83 63 (75.9%)  48 (57.8%)  
Enemy1:      Hierarch 83 48 (57.8%) 48 (57.8%)   
Enemy 2:     Egalitarian 83  47 (56.6%) 64 (77.1%)  
Enemy2:      Individualist 83 47 (56.6%)  46 (55.4%)  
Enemy2:      Hierarch 83 64 (77.1%) 46 (55.4%)   
Hero Transition 90 77 (85.5%) 77 (85.5%) 77 (85.5%)  
Cultural Solution 109 15 (13.7%) 15 (13.7%) 15 (13.7%)  
Moral of the Story 64 33 (51.6%) 33 (51.6%) 33 (51.6%)  
Total:  1188 771 
(75.44%) 
753 
(73.67%) 
755 
(73.87%) 
347 
(93.28%) 
 
roughly 7/10ths similar: the egalitarian narrative is 75.44%, the individualist 
narrative is 73.67%, and the hierarchical narrative is 73.87% similar to the other 
two.22
                                                                                                                                                              
may seem trivial but where necessary for pure readability.  For example, 
repeatedly using the word “groups” in reference to the groups identified in the 
story makes for a very boring read.  In this case, the word “organization” was 
substituted when discussing the second enemy.  See Appendix C for a sentency-
by-sentence comparison of the cultural narrative treatments.   
 Each of the three cultural narratives is one-thousand and twenty-two 
22 The cultural narratives are described as roughly similar because similarity 
largely depends on how one chooses to compare the texts.  For example, given 
that there are three narratives in which each possess an admonishment of the 
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words long.  In short, roughly 25-30% of the text changes in each cultural 
narrative. 
Methods of analysis include analysis of variance and linear regression 
models.   Discussed in more detail in chapter four, the following hypotheses are 
tested for narrative content:  
H15
than respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent 
cultural narratives. 
:  Narrator Trust: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their 
cultural narrative treatment will be more trusting of the narrator 
H16
H
:  Affect: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their cultural 
narrative treatment will show more positive affect for the cultural 
narrative than respondents of the same cultural type in 
incongruent cultural narratives. 
17
                                                                                                                                                              
other cultural narrative allies (i.e., the enemy) the ordering of these characters is 
different across Cultural Narrative conditions.  Whereas the hierarch narrative 
chronologically discusses the egalitarian enemy first, the individualist discusses 
the egalitarian enemy second.  Cross-comparing these texts (as opposed to the 
comparison of the enemies chronologically in the text) produces a more 
favorable similarity percentage than the one reported in the above text.  The 
percentages reported above are a conservative estimate of cultural narrative 
track similarity.  
:  Personal Risk: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their 
cultural narrative treatment will view climate change as more of a 
personal threat than respondents of the same cultural type in 
incongruent cultural narratives.   
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H18
H
:  Sociotropic Risk: Respondents with congruent cultural type to 
their cultural narrative treatment will view climate change as 
more of a threat to American society than respondents of the 
same cultural type in incongruent cultural narratives.   
19
H
:  Climate Change Belief: Respondents with congruent cultural type 
to their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to 
believe that climate change is real than respondents of the same 
cultural type in incongruent cultural narratives 
20
H
:  Anthropogenic Cause: Respondents with congruent cultural type 
to their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to accept 
that human beings are a principal cause of climate change than 
respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent cultural 
narratives 
21
H
:  GHG Regulation: Respondents with congruent cultural type to 
their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to regulate 
GHG’s than respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent 
cultural narratives. 
22:  Cultural Heroes: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to 
the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive affect for 
culturally identified heroes than their cultural counterparts in 
incongruent cultural narratives. 
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H23
H
:   Cultural Villains: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to 
the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive affect for 
culturally identified villains than their cultural counterparts in 
incongruent narratives.   
24
 
:   Cultural Policy Solutions: Respondents with incongruent cultural 
type to the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive 
affect for culturally identified policy solution than their cultural 
counterparts in incongruent narratives.   
2.3 CT Measures and Construct Validity 
Chapter three addresses narrative structure and hypotheses one through 
twelve; chapter four addresses narrative content and hypotheses thirteen 
through twenty.  The analyses of chapters three and four consist primarily of 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares regressions.  However, 
before conducting these analysis clarity on the validity of the several of the 
variables theorized is necessary as well as clarity specific variable 
operationalizaitons.  In what follows, relevant CT indices, manipulations, and 
construct validity are addressed.  These variables will be used throughout the 
various analyses performed in subsequent chapters.   
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2.3.1 Cultural Theory Metrics 
In order to assess a survey respondent’s cultural type, twelve cultural 
theory questions are asked—three questions for each type: individualist, 
hierarch, egalitarian, and fatalist.  Table 2.6 lists these questions by cultural type.  
    
Table 2.6. Cultural Theory Survey Questions 
 
Hierarchy 
 
Q23 Ahead: The best 
way to get ahead in 
life is to do what you 
are told to do. 
 
 
 
 
Q24 Authority: Our 
society is in trouble, 
because we don’t 
obey those in 
authority. 
 
 
Q25  Rules:  Society 
would be much 
better off if we 
imposed strict and 
swift punishment on 
those that break the 
rules. 
 
Individualist 
 
Q26  Fail: Even if some 
people are at a 
disadvantage, it is best 
for society to let 
people succeed or fail 
on their own. 
 
Q27  Disadvantaged: 
Even the 
disadvantaged should 
have to make their 
own way in the world. 
 
 
Q28_ind3_indv: We 
are all better off when 
we compete as 
individuals. 
 
 
Egalitarian 
 
Q29  Fair: What our 
society needs is a 
fairness revolution to 
make the distribution 
of goods more equal. 
 
 
Q30  Power: Society 
works best if power is 
shared equally. 
 
 
Q31:  Income: It is our 
responsibility to 
reduce the 
differences in income 
between the rich and 
the poor. 
 
Fatalist 
 
Q32 Random: Most 
of the important 
things that take place 
in life happen by 
random chance. 
 
 
 
Q33 Fate: No matter 
how hard we try, the 
course of our lives is 
largely determined 
by forces outside our 
control. 
 
Q34 Plans: It would 
be pointless to make 
serious plans in such 
an uncertain world. 
 
CT questions are presented to the respondent pre-treatment in random 
order.  Respondent’s are then asked to place themselves on a scale from one to 
seven for each question, where one is strongly disagree and seven is strongly 
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agree.  The scores are then typically aggregated to produce a strength of cultural 
type score.  These same questions have been utilized in previous research and 
been shown to produce reliable indices and factor scores (Herron & Jenkins-
Smith, 2006; Mamadouh, 1999; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990).  Table 2.7 provides 
descriptive data for these aggregations as well as Cronbach’s Alpha scores which 
indicate the reliability of the each index.   
 
Table 2.7. Strength of Cultural Type 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean alpha N 
Individualism 3 21 12.333 .673 1557 
Hierarchism 3 21 11.6100 .576 1559 
Egalitarianism 3 21 12.3201 .723 1559 
Fatalism 3 21 9.8544 .643 1566 
 
Typically, from these aggregate scores a researcher might derive factor 
scores or use the raw numbers themselves as indicators of strength of cultural 
type.  These approaches are sufficient for providing interval data indicating the 
intensity of a respondent’s cultural orientation.  However, such an approach 
does not account for central theoretical CT propositions identified earlier in this 
chapter.  Summarizing the previous discussion of these propositions, the 
compatibility condition, the impossibility theorem, and the requisite variety 
condition come together to assert that one cannot occupy multiple quadrants of 
the gird-group typology simultaneously and that the existence of the other three 
types makes the existence of any given cultural type possible.  As the simple 
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aggregation procedures used to produce Table 16 violate these conditions, a 
different approach is necessary when categorizing individuals in each quadrant.  
This procedure removes the possibility of a respondent occupying multiple 
quadrants simultaneously.  The following formula is used to categorize survey 
respondents in a single Cultural Theory category: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇 > 𝐴𝐴 & 𝐵𝐵 & 𝐶𝐶, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑇𝑇 = �{(𝑇𝑇 − 𝐴𝐴) + (𝑇𝑇 − 𝐵𝐵) +  (𝑇𝑇 − 𝐶𝐶)} 
Where: 
T= the highest Stength of Cultural Type Score  
A, B, C= the remaining three Strength of Cultural Type scores 
For the purposes of categorization, any score higher than one places that 
survey respondent in the appropriate category, as a score higher than one 
indicates a comparatively higher tendency by a respondent to value that 
particular cultural orientation.  This categorization produces the following 
number of cultural type respondents in each experimental track detailed in Table 
2.8: 
 
Table 2.8: Strong Cultural Type, by Experimental Track 
Strong Cultural Type Control 
Treatment 
Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Strong Individualist 104 107 86 101 
Strong Hierarch 72 63 57 66 
Strong Egalitarian 155 140 147 136 
Strong Fatalist 45 57 41 44 
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2.3.2 Cultural Narrative Construct Validity 
In constructing the cultural narrative treatments used in this survey 
research several narrative components were identified by previous research to 
be associated with specific cultural orientations, particularly characters (e.g, 
Verwiej et al. 2006).  The following sections tests the validity of the cultural 
characters operationalized in each cultural narrative track.   T-tests are used to 
determine if there is a significant difference in means between affective 
assessments of groups (i.e., characters) by strong cultural types within the 
control group.  Table 2.9 reports the results.  
The left hand column of Table 18 lists the groups identified as cultural 
narrative heroes for each strong cultural type for which cultural narratives were 
operationalized: individualist, hierarch, and egalitarian.  The Group 2 column 
represents all other groups used in the cultural narratives.  On a scale ranging 
from zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means 
completely positive, respondents assessed their affective reaction to all of these 
groups free of a cultural narrative treatment.   The groups operationalized as 
heroes work quite well for strong individualists and strong egalitarians, with 
mean differences moving in the expected direction (positive) and the majority of 
the differences significant.  However, the single hierarch hero, the Club of Rome, 
does not perform as expected with all of the mean differences moving in the 
wrong direction (negative) and 3/4ths of those differences significant.  The 
groups identified by previous scholarship for the individualists and egalitarians  
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Table 2.9.  Strong Cultural Type Group Affective Evaluations Paired Comparisons 
Individualist 
Group 
Mean 
(n) 
Group 2 Mean 
(n) 
Mean 
Difference 
T-stat.  p 
The Cato 
Institute 
4.8596 
(57) 
Earth First 4.0351 
(57) 
+0.8245 -2.200 .032 
The Cato 
Institute 
4.8333 
(54) 
Ecodefense 3.9630 
(54) 
+.8703 -3.018 .004 
The Cato 
Institute 
4.6522 
(46) 
The Club of 
Rome 
3.8043 
(46) 
+.8479 -3.150 .003 
Wall Street 
Journal 
5.1389 
(72) 
Earth First 4.5139 
(72) 
+.0625 -1.715 .091 
Wall Street 
Journal 
5.2951 
(61) 
Ecodefense 4.3607 
(61) 
+.9344 -2.608 .011 
Wall Street 
Journal 
4.9787 
(47) 
The Club of 
Rome 
3.9362 
(47) 
+1.0425 -2.908 .006 
Hierarch 
Group 
Mean 
(n) 
Group 2 Mean 
(n) 
Mean 
Difference 
T-stat.  p 
The Club of 
Rome 
4.3514 
(37) 
Earth First 5.6486 
(37) 
-1.2972 3.151 .003 
The Club of 
Rome 
4.3514 
(37) 
Ecodefense 5.1622 
(37) 
-.8108 1.693 .099 
The Club of 
Rome 
4.3514 
(37) 
Cato Institute 4.6216 
(37) 
-.2702 -.911 .368 
The Club of 
Rome 
4.3889 
(36) 
Wall Street 
Journal 
5.0833 
(36) 
-.6944 -2.071 .046 
Egalitarian 
Group 
Mean 
(n) 
Group 2 Mean 
(n) 
Mean 
Difference 
T-stat.  p 
Earth First 6.1972 
(71) 
Club of Rome 4.9296 
(71) 
1.2676 4.965 .000 
Earth First 6.0789 
(76) 
Cato Institute 5.1579 
(76) 
.921 3.265 .002 
Earth First 6.5437 
(103) 
Wall Street 
Journal 
5.5728 
(103) 
0.9709 3.279 .001 
Ecodefense 5.8028 
(71) 
Club of Rome 4.9296 
(71) 
0.8732 3.895 .000 
Ecodefense 5.5946 
(74) 
Cato Institute 5.2838 
(74) 
0.3108 1.306 .196 
Ecodefense 5.9070 
(86) 
Wall Street 
Journal  
5.4186 
(86) 
0.4884 1.646 .103 
 
appear suitable hero characters, while the Club of Rome may be a bad choice for 
a hierarchical hero.   
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2.4 Conclusion 
Chapter two has set forth two general research questions intended to 
offer an explanation for why the public diverges from scientific opinion on 
climate change.  Attempting to better articulate the potential interactions 
between individual priors and exogenous communication structures, a 
theoretical model of the individual is specified.  This model, CNM, emphasizes 
cultural theoretic belief systems and their potential congruence or incongruence 
with incoming information, among other control variables deemed relevant by 
previous research and scholarship.  Importantly, however, the structures of the 
communication messages are operationalized in terms of the most common 
organizing and communication structures invoked by human beings: narratives. 
 Emanating from the review of previous research on climate change and 
public opinion presented in chapter one and CNM’s theoretical specifications, 
two general research questions manifest along with testable hypotheses related 
to these questions.  An online experimental survey is employed to test these 
hypotheses.  The next two chapters address each of the two research questions 
in sequence.  Chapter three examines the relationship between narrative 
structure and opinions on climate change, while chapter four addresses cultural 
narrative content and opinions related to climate change.   
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CHAPTER 3: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND MASS OPINIONS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
 
With a focus on when and where public opinion influences public policy, 
chapter one summarized the relationship between these two concepts as they 
relate to climate change.   A case was made that climate change is a high salience 
issue and that the American public is steadily showing more awareness of the 
issue and increasing knowledge of climate change processes and potential 
consequences. These conditions have been identified by previous scholarship as 
likely indicators that public opinion will influence public policy in the United 
States (Burstein, 2003; 2006). It is the influence that public opinion is likely to 
exhibit over climate change policy that provides both the practical and 
theoretical impetus to study the proclivities of mass opinion on this scientifically 
complex and contentious issue.    
Following the discussion of public opinion and public policy, a brief 
history of the development of climate change policy and the science that 
accompanies it was summarized.  Special attention was given to trends and 
developments in public opinion during periods of scientific advancement and the 
politicizing of the climate change debate.  Emerging from this discussion is a 
clear line of demarcation between the scientific community, which exhibits high 
levels of agreement about climate change temperature increases and 
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greenhouse gas causes, and a non-trivial component of the public that has been 
historically resistant to the findings of the scientific community.   
Chapter one continues by describing two general research models that 
have been offered to explain differences between scientific and public opinion 
about climate change: 1) the knowledge deficit model and 2) the sensational 
media model.  Each model is argued to have critical strengths and weaknesses.  
Arguing that there is room for improvement in accounting for interactions 
between individual priors and message structure form and content when 
considering the opinions of the mass public, a recent summary of a policy stories 
approach (e.g., Verweij et al., 2006) to climate change is summarized as a 
potential way to address these interactions.   
Based upon the discussions in chapter one, chapter two offers a Cultural 
Narrative Model (CNM) as a potential candidate to explain mass opinions about 
climate change.  Integrating several distinct literatures, CNM models key 
variables considered intrinsic (endogenous) to the individual such as Cultural 
Theory (CT), partisanship, ideology, knowledge, and affect with external 
(exogenous) message structures.  Exogenous message structures are modeled 
using narrative theory, providing key experimental structuring components such 
as plot, characters, and a moral to the story.  However, modeling narrative in 
such a way comes with specific issues relevant to the theory’s dominant 
treatment in the social sciences.  Within the content of CNM, chapter two 
addresses these issues.   
121 
 
Summarizing chapter two’s discussion, narrative is often viewed as 
synonymous with poststructural approaches in the public policy literature (e.g., 
Dodge & Ospina, 2005) and its migration to the social sciences has been almost 
exclusively under the umbrella of post-positivist approaches (Jones & McBeth, 
2010).  Indicative of the post-positivist approach is an orientation toward 
epistemologies that emphasize individual interpretation that militate against 
generalization, falsification, quantification, and the scientific approach more 
generally (e.g., Fischer, 2003).  As a rebuttal of this dominant understanding of 
narrative theory in public policy, CNM argues that narrative can be studied using 
traditional scientific methods and techniques, provided one embraces a 
structural model of narrative.  However, in offering a structural account of 
narrative, both general narrative structures and generalizable content must be 
specified to limit variability.  CNM models commonly identified exogenous 
narrative structures in the study of public policy and relies on CT as a familiar 
and well regarded content anchor to accomplish these two tasks.     
Following a discussion of key causal drivers specific to CT and narrative 
theory, including narrator trust and cultural congruence and incongruence, 
specific cultural narratives relevant to climate change are operationalized.  
Relying on previous research (Verweij, et al. 2006), specific value orientations, 
characters (heroes, villains, and victims), plots, and morals of the story (policy 
solutions) are specified for three CT narratives: egalitarian, hierarch, and 
individualist.  These three stories provide the basis for the message structure 
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(i.e., narrative) experimental manipulations specified in chapter two’s 
elaboration of the research design employed in this research.   
Chapter two details how CNM is operationalized to determine if cultural 
narratives help explain variation in key dependent variables identified to be 
theoretically and practically important to the issue area of climate change.  Two 
general research questions are addressed: 
RQ1:  Cultural Narrative Structure: does cultural narrative structure 
influence opinions related to climate change?  
RQ2:  Cultural Narrative Content: Does cultural narrative content 
explain variation in opinions related to climate change?  
Relevant hypotheses are specified for each research question.  Data are 
acquired using an online internet survey with a built in experimental design.  This 
chapter, chapter three, addresses hypotheses relevant to RQ1.  Specifically, 
comparisons between narrative treatments and the control treatment guide both 
the analysis and discussion.  
Table 3.1 lists hypotheses, corresponding survey questions, and 
measurement information for each dependent variable addressed in this chapter 
(See Appendix D for dependent variable descriptive statistics).  Where 
significance is found or interesting findings emerge, measurement issues are 
discussed more thoroughly in the analysis presented in this chapter.  Where 
significance is not found, please refer to Table 3.1 for measurement information 
and the corresponding appendices for relevant frequency and descriptive data. 
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Table 3.1. Narrative Structure Hypotheses, Survey Questions, and Measurement 
 Dependent Variable  Measurement Range 
 Description Q#’s 0 10 
H Narrator Threat 01 44 No threat at all Extreme 
threat 
H02 Narrator Trust 45 No trust Complete 
trust 
H Affect 03 46 Extremely 
negative 
Extremely 
positive 
H1 Personal Risk 47 No threat at all Extreme 
threat 
H Sociotropic Risk 2 51 No problem 
whatsoever 
Devastating 
H3 Climate Change Belief 49 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H Antropogenic Cause 4 50 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H5 GHG Regulation 48 Not at all 
important 
Extremely 
important 
H Hero Affect 6 43a-43d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H7 Villain Affect 37a-41d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H Moral of the Story 8 52-54 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H9 Culturally Antithetical Moral of the 
Story 
52-54 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H Congruent Narrator Trust 10a 45 No trust Complete 
trust 
H10b Incongruent Narrator Trust 45 No trust Complete 
trust 
H Congruent Risk 11a 47 
51 
No threat at all 
No problem 
whatsoever 
Extreme 
threat 
Devastating 
H11b Incongruent Risk 47 
51 
No threat at all 
No problem 
whatsoever 
Extreme 
threat 
Devastating 
H Congruent Cultural Heroes 12a 43a-43d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H12b Congruent Cultural Villains 37a-41d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H Incongruent Cultural Heroes 12c 43a-43d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H12d Incongruent Cultural Villains 37a-41d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H Congruent Policy Solutions 13a 52-54 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H13b Incongruent Policy Solutions 52-54 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
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3.1 Narrative Structure and Non-Directionally Specified Relationships 
Much of the narrative literature is silent on the matter of what 
relationships we might expect with several dependent variables addressed in this 
research.  Previous scholarship does not suggest a relationship between 
narrative structure and a respondent’s perception of the narrator’s sense of 
threat (Narrator Threat), the level of trust a respondent will have for the narrator 
(Author Trust), or the emotional response a respondent will have to the cultural 
narrative treatment (Affect); therefore, the null is hypothesized for these 
variables. The following null hypotheses are tested for these select dependent 
variables:  
H01
H
:  There is no relationship between a respondent’s perceptions of 
the narrator’s assessment of the risk climate change posses and 
narrative structure.   
02
H
:  There is no relationship between levels of trust a respondent 
ascribes to an  author  and narrative structure.   
03
Table 3.2 summarizes OLS estimates for key dependent variables where 
the null is hypothesized for RQ1.  Each row in Table 3.2 represents an 
independent OLS regression, controlling for age, education, gender, income, 
:  There is no relationship between the level of affect a respondent 
assigns to the experimental stimulus and narrative structure.   
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race, ideology,23
                                                          
23 Partisanship was initially included in all models.  However, the collinearity 
between partisanship and ideology proved problematic to the analysis.  
Partisanship was removed as ideology proved the more powerful explanatory 
variable of the two.   
 climate change knowledge, and CT.  All respondents are 
eighteen years or older.  Ages range from eighteen to eighty-eight.  Education is 
coded on a scale ranging from one to seven, where one represents elementary or 
some high school education and seven represents a doctorate of any type.  
Gender is coded one for male and zero for female.  Race is coded one for 
white/Asian and zero for other racial categories.  Ideology is coded on a scale 
from one to seven, where one is strongly liberal and seven is strongly 
conservative.  Climate change knowledge is a composite measure derived from a 
series of questions on climate change causes and scientific expectations.  In total 
there are eleven of these questions.  The scale on climate change knowledge 
ranges from one to eleven, where each cumulative point represents a correct 
answer on one of the climate change knowledge questions.  CT measures are 
aggregations of three agree/disagree questions for each cultural type (discussed 
in chapter 2; see appendix C for control variable descriptive statistics).   Each 
narrative column in table 3.2 represents a dummy variable where zero indicates 
a lack of the narrative treatment identified in the heading of the column and a 
one represents that a respondent was randomly assigned to that narrative track.  
The control list experimental treatment is the baseline and is necessarily omitted 
from the OLS regressions.  The three dependent variables in Table 2.2 are all 
assessed in the online survey post-treatment. 
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Table 3.2. Narrative Structure and Key Non-Directional Dependent Variable 
Summary (OLS Estimates) 
 Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian    
Dependent 
Variable 
Narrative Narrative Narrative Adj. 
R2 
F-
Statistic 
n 
       
Narrator Threat -.562** 
(.184) 
-.376* 
(.189) 
.117 
(.187) 
.081 9.665 1382 
Author Trust -.456* 
(.182) 
-.474* 
(.187) 
-.303 
(.185) 
.106 12.725 1384 
Affect .032 
(.173) 
.138 
(.177) 
.247 
(.175) 
.063 7.645 1380 
 
The OLS regression coefficients in Table 3.2 show no significance for the 
relationship between narrative structure and the respondent’s affective 
assessment of the narrative track (Affect).  H03
Narrator threat is measured on a scale of one to ten, where one means 
no threat at all and ten means extreme threat, and is intended to gauge how 
much of a threat the respondent feels the author of the cultural narrative 
believes climate change to pose.  Or, stated as a question, does the respondent 
feel that the author of the cultural narrative treatment believes climate change 
is no threat at all (0) or does the respondent believe that the narrator views 
climate change as an extreme threat (10)?   Respondents randomly assigned to 
the individualist cultural narrative experimental track see their perceptions of 
the narrator’s sense of threat climate change presents decrease by a little over 
half a point (-.562).  Similarly, those assigned to the hierarchal narrative 
 is accepted.  However, both 
narrator threat and author trust have statistically significant relationships with 
narrative structure.    
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treatment show significant decreases in their perceptions of narrator threat (-
.376).  Respondents assigned to the egalitarian narrative track show no 
statistically significant relationship with narrator threat.  Given that two of the 
tracks actually lower perceptions of narrator threat for respondents assigned to 
these tracks, H01 
Measured on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no trust and ten 
means complete trust, author trust is a measure intended to gauge how much 
the respondent believes that the information presented in the cultural narrative 
is truthful.   Both the hierarch and individualist narrative stimuli have a 
significant influence on author trust, while the egalitarian cultural narrative 
comes very close to statistical significance (p value= .101).  In both cases where 
the relationship between narrative structure and author trust are significant, 
that relationship is negative.  In both the individualist and hierarch narratives, 
respondent trust drops by roughly half a point relative to the control group.   
Nominally, the egalitarian narrative treatment has a similar negative influence 
over respondent levels of trust for the narrator of the experimental treatments.  
H
is rejected. Although wording is very similar in all three 
experimental tracks (roughly 75%), respondents in both the hierarch and 
individualist narrative tracks perceive the narrator as viewing climate change as 
less of a threat than respondents in the control group.   
02 is rejected.  Table 3.2 demonstrates that respondents assigned to the 
narrative treatments are less trusting of the narrated information than are 
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respondents presented with only a list of facts in the control group. (See 
Appendix E1 for full regression tables related to Table 3.2). 
 
3.2 Narrative Structure and Directionally Specified Relationships 
Table 3.3 summarizes OLS estimates for key dependent variables related 
to RQ1 where a directional relationship with narrative structure is hypothesized.   
Directionality is determined based on theoretical assumptions modeled in CNM 
and relevant empirical findings.  All cultural narratives offer a story that assumes 
the reality of climate change, that greenhouse gasses (GHG’s) are the cause, and 
makes a case for GHG reduction via one of three policy solutions: cap-and-trade 
(individualist), nuclear energy (hierarch), and renewable energy (egalitarian).  As 
narrative research finds narratives to be more persuasive than non-narrative 
stimuli (Ricketts, 2007), in the cases of respondent risk, sociotropic risk, climate 
change belief, anthropogenic cause, and GHG regulation, a positive relationship 
between narrative structure and these dependent variables is expected, given 
the assumptions and arguments built into each cultural narrative.   
Each narrative invokes culturally linked groups or organizations as heroes 
and villains.  In cases where narratives deploy a group as a hero, the affective 
assessment of that group should be positive; conversely, groups deployed as a 
villain should elicit negative affective reactions from the respondent.  Each 
narrative also invokes a culturally specific policy solution (moral of the story) for 
climate change while admonishing the solutions offered in the other two 
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narratives, thus it is expected that narrative experimental tracks will have 
influence over policy preferences in directions specified by the narrative: positive 
when argued for and negative when argued against.   
Similarly to Table 3.2, each row in Table 3.3 represents an independent 
OLS regression where the independent variable of interest is the respondent’s 
random assignment to a narrative track (zero not present, one present).  The 
control list serves as the baseline.  Each regression controls for age, education, 
gender, income, race, ideology, climate change knowledge, individualism, 
hierarchy, egalitarianism, and fatalism (see Appendices E2-E5 for full regression 
tables).  The control variables in Table 3.3 are operationalized in the same 
manner as the controls presented in Table 3.2.  The following hypotheses are 
addressed in Table 3.3: 
H1
H
:   Personal Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages 
will increase the respondent’s sense of threat that climate change 
poses to them personally relative to the control group. 
2
H
:  Sociotropic Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages 
will increase the respondent’s sense of threat that climate change 
poses to the United States in general relative to the control group. 
3:  Climate Change Belief: Narratively structured messages will 
increase the respondent’s willingness to accept that climate 
change is a reality relative to the control group. 
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H4
H
:  Anthropogenic Cause: Narratively structured messages will 
increase the respondent’s willingness to accept that human 
beings are a critical cause of climate change through increased 
GHG emissions relative to the control group. 
5
H
:  GHG Regulation: Narratively structured messages will increase 
the respondent’s willingness to regulate GHG’s relative to the 
control group. 
6
H
:  Hero Affect: Characters (groups) treated as heroes in the cultural 
narratives will facilitate more positive affective responses than 
groups in the control.   
7
H
:  Villain Affect: Characters (groups) treated as villains in the 
cultural narratives will facilitate more negative affective responses 
than groups in the control.   
8
H
:  Moral of the Story: Policy preferences advocated by a cultural 
narrative will be preferred by respondents exposed to that 
narrative. 
9
Statistically significant relationships are not found between narrative 
structure and sociotropic risk (H
:  Culturally Antithetical Moral of the Story: Policy preferences 
admonished by the cultural narrative will find less support from 
respondents exposed to that narrative.   
2), climate change belief (H3), anthropogenic 
cause (H4), and GHG regulation (H5).  H2 through H5 are rejected.  However, 
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TABLE 3.3. Narrative Structure and Key Directional Dependent Variable Summary 
(OLS Regression Estimates) 
 
 Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian    
Dependent Variable Narrative Narrative Narrative Adj. R2 F-Statistic n 
       
Personal Risk .005 
(.192) 
.243 
(.197) 
.322* 
(.195) 
.197 25.161 1382 
Sociotropic Risk .157 
(.165) 
.262 
(.169) 
-.015 
(.168) 
.265 36.461 1380 
Climate Change Belief -.105 
(.183) 
.063 
(.188) 
-.165 
(.186) 
.171 21.366 1382 
Anthropogenic Cause -.196 
(.185) 
.177 
(.189) 
-.102 
(.187) 
.251 34.088 1382 
GHG Regulation -.120 
(.185) 
.241 
(.189) 
-.063 
(.187) 
.220 28.728 1380 
 
Character Affect 
 
Ecodefense -1.614*** 
(.214) 
-1.509*** 
(.220) 
.641** 
(.218) 
.258 29.181 1135 
Club of Rome -1.281*** 
(.222) 
1.214*** 
(.230) 
-1.553*** 
(.226) 
.231 23.483 1045 
The Cato Institute .718*** 
(.220) 
-1.530*** 
(.223) 
-1.754*** 
(.222) 
.182 18.413 1092 
 
The Moral of the Story (Policy Preferences) 
 
Cap and Trade .776*** 
(.229) 
-.124 
(.234) 
-.535* 
(.235) 
.128 14.119 1248 
Nuclear Energy -.355 
(.227) 
-.211 
(.232) 
-.539*** 
(.233) 
.090 10.026 1273 
Renewable Energy -.056 
(.211) 
-.546* 
(.216) 
.366* 
(.215) 
.057 6.465 1275 
       
* p < .05, **p<.01, *** p <.001 one-tailed test 
Controls: Age, Education, Gender, Income, Race, Ideology, Climate Change 
Knowledge, Individualism, Hierarchy, Egalitarianism, Fatalism 
 
several key dependent variables yield statistically meaningful relationships with 
narrative structure, including personal risk, the broad categories of character 
affect (i.e., heroes and villains) and policy preferences (i.e., the moral of the 
story).   
132 
 
Personal risk is designed to assess a respondent’s sense of personal 
threat that climate change presents to them directly.  The question appears 
post-treatment in the online survey as follows: 
Personal Risk: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at 
all and ten is extreme threat, in your considered assessment, how much 
of a threat do you believe climate change poses to you personally in the 
next 50 years? 
 Respondents randomly assigned to the egalitarian narrative track see their 
sense of personal risk increase by slightly less than a third of a point (.322); 
however, the remaining two narrative treatments show no statistical 
significance. H1
Discussed in detail in chapter two, characters are a structurally essential 
component of narrative, both driving plotlines and helping to solidify causal 
relationships. Narrative theory expects and relies upon the treatment of 
characters within a story to influence perceptions of those characters and, as a 
consequence, influence the overall persuasiveness of the story.  In the cultural 
narrative experimental treatments, affective responses to the cast of characters 
are measured using the following survey question: 
 is rejected.   
Character Affect: The author mentioned several groups in the above text. 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely negative 
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and ten means completely positive, please indicate your reaction to these 
groups.24
In the control list treatment groups receive no textual help.  The list treatment in 
the control presents no culturally specific interpretation and relies upon what 
the respondent already feels about the group by simply prompting the 
respondent for an affective assessment of each group. In the control, character 
affective responses are measured as follows:  
 
Group Affect (Control): Now I would like to ask your opinion about a few 
groups commonly associated with debates about climate change. Using a 
scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten 
means completely positive, please indicate your reaction to these groups. 
Table 3.3 indicates that narrative structure plays a powerful role in 
shaping respondent affective assessments of the characters within each cultural 
narrative.  Relative to the control group, in every case a group identified as a 
hero elicits a more positive affective response from respondents while those 
characters treated as villains find a more negative affective assessment—even 
when controlling for priors.     
Affective assessments of characters are measured on a scale of zero to 
ten.  Given the measurement range, the statistical effects facilitated by the 
narrative treatments on character affective assessments are not trivial.  The 
                                                          
24 Only three characters are included in Table 3.3: Ecodefense, The Club of Rome, 
and The Cato Institute.  The reason for this is that only these three characters 
occur in all three narratives, while the Wall Street Journal and Earth First do not.  
See chapter two for more detail.   
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presence of the individualist narrative experimental track results in a +.718 
increase in affective assessments of the Cato Institute (the hero), and decreases 
of over a full point in assessments of both Ecodefense (-1.614) and the Club of 
Rome (-1.218) (both villains).  Similar relationships exist for both the hierarchical 
and egalitarian tracks.  In the hierarchical track, the Club of Rome (the hero) is 
assigned positive affect by respondents (+1.214), while both Ecodefense (-1.509) 
and the Cato Institute (-1.530) are reacted to negatively by respondents (again, 
both are villains).  In the egalitarian narrative track, Ecodefense (the hero) is 
responded to positively (+.641), while the villain characters, the Cato Institute (-
1.754) and the Club of Rome (-1.553), are assigned more negative affect by 
respondents.  These effects are large and distinct even while controlling for both 
demographic and belief system variables.  Therefore H6 and H7
Each cultural narrative presents a culturally specific policy solution 
presented as the moral of each story.  The individualist narrative, reliant as it is 
on competition and markets, offers cap-and-trade.  Rooted in cultural 
prescriptions that rely on societal stratification such as that offered by scientific 
expertise, the hierarch narrative offers nuclear energy as a solution to rising GHG 
levels.   Guided by the premise that all should be treated equally, the egalitarian 
narrative prescribes community owned renewable energy as a solution to 
increasing levels of GHGs.  Table 3.3 summarizes statistical significance for the 
, hypothesizing 
that narrative structure influences character affective ascriptions in directions 
specified by the narrative, are accepted.   
135 
 
respondent’s preferences for the moral offered in each narrative track.   
Although there are significant findings in each track, the findings do not 
demonstrate the same level of consistency as findings related to character 
affect.  However, significant coefficients do move in expected directions.   
Each narrative argues for one policy solution while arguing against the 
two policy solutions offered in the other narratives.  The individualist cultural 
narrative track argues for and statistically increases respondent preferences for 
cap-and-trade (+.766).  Argued against, the hierarchical track facilitates 
statistically significant and negative influence on a respondent’s preference for 
renewable energy (-.546).  Finally, the egalitarian track finds significant 
decreases in preferences for cap-and-trade (-.535) and nuclear energy (-.539), 
both of which were argued against in the cultural narrative.  The egalitarian 
narrative also finds increasing support for the favored policy solution of 
renewable energy (.366).  Overall, these findings suggest that narrative structure 
does influence preferences for climate change policy solutions in hypothesized 
directions, but the effect is not universal for all policy solutions across all 
experimental tracks.  However, since over half of the possible coefficients for the 
policy preferences are significant in hypothesized directions (five of nine and at 
least once in each experimental track), H8 and H9 
 
are accepted.   
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3.3 Narrative Structure and Cultural (In)Congruence 
The analysis presented so far in this chapter has looked primarily at the 
influence of narrative structure on key dependent variables while controlling for 
several variables, including CT belief system measures.  While finding that there 
are many significant relationships between key dependent variables and 
narrative structure, the models presented so far have not adequately addressed 
potential interactions between the exogenous cultural narrative structures and 
Cultural Theory.  The following sections address these potential interactions as 
modeled in the CNM.   
 In chapter two several theoretical narrative causal mechanisms were 
posited, including congruence and incongruence.  Briefly summarizing that 
discussion, narratives are theorized to persuade to the extent that they are 
congruent or “fit” with an individual’s view of the world (Shank, 1995). The 
experimental manipulation employed in this dissertation research 
operationalizes congruence and incongruence in terms of Cultural Theory (CT).   
Narratives are constructed specifically to mirror previous scholarship’s (e.g., 
Verweij, 2006) assessment of one of three cultural stories about climate change 
that are found to dominate climate change discourse: individualist, hierarch, and 
egalitarian.   Previous research indicates that cultural congruence should be 
preferred by the individual (Kunda, 1990, p. 495; Taber & Lodge, 2006) while 
incongruence should be actively rejected (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 
2006). Or stated in terms of how congruence and incongruence are modeled in 
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this researh, respondents previously identified as a strong cultural type should 
prefer cultural narratives of the same cultural type (congruence) and reject 
information, arguments, and assumptions provided in cultural narratives of 
opposing types (incongruence). Several hypotheses related to congruence and 
incongruence are tested using one-way ANOVA to ascertain if there is a 
significant difference between strong cultural type means in congruent or 
incongruent cultural narrative experimental treatments and the control group.  
As detailed in chapter two (see pp. xx-xx), strong cultural type is calculated by 
summing the battery of CT survey questions and categorizing respondents based 
upon their highest CT type score (individualist, hierarch, or egalitarian).   
 
3.4 Narrative Structure, Narrator Trust, and Cultural (In) Congruence 
Research on narrator trust, commonly operationalized in social scientific 
research as source credibility (see, for example, Page et al., 1987 & Mondak, 
1993), supports the theorized importance of congruence and incongruence.  
Research on source credibility has demonstrated a source’s trustworthiness 
(Popkin, 1994, p.47), accuracy and objectivity (Iyengar & Kinder, 1985), expert 
status (Page et al, 1987), likeability (Sniderman et al., 1991), and ideology (Zaller, 
1992, p. 47) influence a recipient’s willingness to accept a message. Thus, 
message recipients are likely to be persuaded if the respondent and the message 
source share interests and the speaker is believed to be knowledgeable 
(Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 17).  Therefore the following is hypothesized: 
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H10a
H
: Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will be more trusting of the narrator than their cultural 
counterparts in the control. 
10b
To test H
: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will be less trusting of the narrator than their cultural 
counterparts in the control. 
10a and H10b
Narrator Trust: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no trust 
and ten means complete trust, how much do you trust that the facts and 
arguments presented in the previous article are accurate? 
, mean responses to the narrator trust question, categorized 
by strong cultural type and experimental narrative treatment, are compared to 
the control group.  Narrator trust is measured using a single post-experimental 
treatment survey question:  
Table 3.4 summarizes mean scores for the control group and each of the three 
strong cultural types in congruent and incongruent narrative experimental 
tracks.25
 The only strong cultural type to register statistical significance is the 
Strong Egalitarian.  In the control, the Strong Egalitarian has a mean narrator 
trust score of 6.5742.  When Strong Egalitarian respondents are randomly 
 Congruent results in Table 3.4 are both italicized and set off from the 
rest of the table by grayed table cells. Bonferroni post-hoc one-tailed tests of 
mean difference significance are reported.   
                                                          
25 Strong Fatalists are excluded from the analysis do to small sample size.   
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Table 3.4. Narrative Structure, Author Trust, and Cultural (In)Congruence  
 Control Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian 
 Mean N Mean N Dif. Mean N Dif. Mean N Dif. 
Strong 
Individualist 
 
4.7692 107 4.5327 104 -.2365 4.4186 86 -.3506 4.4500 100 -.3192 
Strong  
Hierarch 
 
4.9296 71 5.1746 63 .2450 5.0351 57 .1055 5.5758 66 .6462 
Strong 
Egalitarian 
6.5742 155 5.5290 138 -1.0452* 5.1301 136 -1.4441* 5.7794 136 -.7948* 
One-way ANOVA, one-tailed test, Bonferroni post-hoc test 
*P <.05 
 
 assigned to the congruent egalitarian narrative, mean narrator trust falls to 
5.779.  When Strong Egalitarians are assigned to the incongruent individualist 
narratives the mean falls to 5.529, while also falling to 5.130 when assigned to 
the incongruent hierarchical narrative.  Related to H10a, which hypothesizes that 
cultural types assigned to congruent narratives will be more trusting, Strong 
Egalitarians move in the opposite direction hypothesized, while the remaining 
cultural types fail to produce statistically significant differences of means. 
Therefore, H10a 
Regarding incongruent narrative treatments, Table 3.4 demonstrates that 
Strong Egalitarians see their mean score significantly reduced in both 
incongruent narrative tracks suggesting there is some evidence to accept H
is rejected.  
10b.  
However, the remaining strong cultural types show no significant differences in 
mean trust levels between the control group and incongruent narrative 
assignments.  H10b
 
 is rejected as well.     
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3.5 Narrative Structure, Risk, and Cultural (In)Congruence 
Each of the three cultural narrative stimuli provide a setting where climate 
change is real, human beings are a central contributing cause to climate change 
in the form of increased greenhouse gasses, and offers potential climate change 
induced consequences in the United States. Since the notion that climate change 
is a threat is a central plot element of all of the cultural narratives and narratives 
are found more persuasive than lists, then this sense of threat should be passed 
along to respondents.  However, since CNM models a biased assimilator as the 
individual, one would expect that individuals with congruent belief system 
orientations to the communicated narrative should be even more susceptible to 
narrative persuasion, while actively rejecting information communicated in an 
incongruent cultural narrative.  Therefore, the following is hypothesized:  
H11a
H
: Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have higher perceptions of risk in relation to climate 
change, relative to their cultural counterparts in the control. 
11b
Summary findings in Table 3.5 illustrate the mean responses of strong cultural 
types in the control treatment and both the congruent and incongruent 
narrative treatments. Experimental tracks are represented by columns, while 
rows represent the two risk variables for each strong cultural type. Grayed cells  
: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have lower perceptions of risk in relation to 
climate change, relative to their cultural counterparts in the control. 
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represent congruent cultural narratives, while white cells represent incongruent 
narrative assignments and the control treatment.  Means and mean differences 
from the narrative track and the control treatment are provided for two 
variables: personal risk and sociotropic risk.  The following two survey questions 
are used to measure these two variables: 
Personal Risk: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at 
all and ten is extreme threat, in your considered assessment, how much 
of a threat do you believe climate change poses to you personally in the 
next 50 years? 
Sociotropic Risk: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no 
problem whatsoever and ten means devastating, how much of a problem 
do you believe climate change will be for the United States as a whole in 
the next 50 years? 
Table 3.5 reports post-hoc bonferroni one-tailed tests of significance between 
means in the control and culturally congruent and incongruent means. There is 
no significant difference in means between respondents categorized by strong 
cultural type assigned to the narrative treatments and the control.  H11a and H11b
 
 
are rejected.   
3.6 Cultural Congruence, Cultural Type, and Character Affect 
The OLS regression estimates produced and analyzed in the first part of 
this chapter demonstrate that narrative structure, even when controlling for 
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demographics and belief system variables such as Cultural Theory, play an 
important and statistically significant role in shaping respondent’s affective 
assessments of characters (groups) within the narrative.  These earlier OLS 
regressions show that the influence of narrative structure on character affect is 
such that the treatment of characters within each cultural narrative directs the 
affective response: villains are disliked, while heroes are viewed positively.  Does 
this relationship hold when one considers motivated reasoning, biased 
assimilation, (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2005), and identity protective cognition 
(Kahan et al., 2007) processes incorporated into the Cultural Narrative Model 
detailed in chapter two? 
 Modeling a biased assimilating individual, CNM posits that individuals will 
reject the influence of exogenous sources that are not congruent with their 
endogenous belief structures, while also being much more willing to accept 
information and arguments from sources that are congruent.  Therefore one 
might expect that the findings presented in the earlier part of this chapter would 
be conditioned by cultural congruence and incongruence.  The research design 
presented in chapter two operationalizes congruence and incongruence in terms 
of CT and it is expected that individuals of strong cultural type will be accepting 
of character ascriptions in congruent narratives and resistant to character 
ascriptions in incongruent narratives.  In fact, CNM suggests that incongruent 
information and sources are likely to prompt a more visceral response than 
congruent sources as individuals actively counter argue the incongruent 
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information (see postulates 3-5, chapter two).  In each hypothesis listed below 
the term culturally identified refers to the groups identified as being culturally 
congruent or incongruent to each cultural type by the policy stories literature 
reviewed in chapter one (i.e., Ecodfense is congruent to the egalitarian; the Club 
of Rome is congruent to the hierarch).  The following has been hypothesized:   
H12a: Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have more positive affect for culturally identified
H
 heroes 
than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12b: Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have more negative affect for culturally identified
H
 villains 
than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12c: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
stimulus will have more positive affect for culturally identified
H
 heroes 
than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12d: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural 
narrative stimulus will have more negative affect for culturally identified
In short, H
 
enemies than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
12a-H12d hypothesize that respondents engaging in cultural identity 
protection will prefer the groups identified by the previous policy stories 
research (Verweij et al., 2006) as cultural heroes and react negatively to groups 
identified by previous research as cultural villains (e.g., Verweij et al. 2006), 
regardless of narrative structure.  These hypotheses should help illuminate to 
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what extent the OLS findings presented in Table 3.3 earlier in this chapter are 
conditioned by interactions between strong cultural types and congruent or 
incongruent exogenous cultural narratives.   
Table 3.6 summarizes one-way ANOVA bonferroni post-hoc one-tailed 
tests of significance between the mean of strong cultural types in the control and 
the mean affective assessment of cultural narrative characters in congruent and 
incongruent cultural narratives.  Grayed table cells indicate strong cultural types 
assigned to congruent cultural narratives, while white cells represent strong 
cultural types assigned to incongruent cultural narratives.  Congruent 
hypotheses are addressed first (H12a and H12b), followed by a discussion of 
incongruent findings (H12c and H12d
Two points stand out when examining the congruent narrative (gray-
italicized) summary findings in Table 3.6.  First, in all cases except for the strong 
hierarch’s affective assessment of the Cato Institute in the hierarch narrative, 
the mean between strong cultural types in congruent narratives (grayed cells) 
and means in the control (left hand column) are significantly lower in congruent 
tracks for characters identified as villains.  These findings are as hypothesized.  
The decrease in mean ranges from just under a point and a half (-1.3964: The 
Wall Street Journal in the Hierarch narrative) to nearly three full points (-2.7750: 
The Club of Rome in the Egalitarian narrative).  It is also worth noting that the 
single non-significant affective assessment of a villain in a congruent cultural 
treatment moves nominally in the expected negative direction and is large.  In  
).   
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the hierarch cultural narrative, the strong hierarch mean affective response for 
the Cato Institute is a just over a point less (-1.1705) than the strong hierarch 
affective mean for the Cato Institute in the control treatment.  The second trend 
that stands out in Table 3.6 is that every hero identified in the congruent cultural 
track is nominally positive, but in all cases fails to achieve statistical significance.   
 In congruent tracks heroes fail to meet thresholds of significance, while 
nominally positive; villains, on the other hand, overwhelmingly achieve negative 
and statistically meaningful results.  Culturally congruent respondents clearly do 
not like the villains identified by the cultural narratives offered to them.  H12a is 
rejected, while H12b 
Culturally incongruent findings summarized in Table 3.6 show that all 
mean differences between culturally identified heroes in each incongruent 
cultural narrative for each strong cultural type nominally move in the opposite 
direction hypothesized by CNM.   Recall that CNM relies upon biased assimilation 
processes where strong cultural types will have more positive affect for their 
culturally specific groups and less affect for the culturally specific groups of the 
other cultural types.  The culturally identified heroes for each cultural type 
(individualist: the Cato institute and the Wall Street Journal; Hierarch: the Club of 
Rome; and, the egalitarian: Earthfirst and Ecodefense) all show nominally lower 
mean responses in incongruent cultural narratives for all strong cultural types.  
Many of these differences are statistically significant.  For the strong 
individualist, when the hero groups of the Cato Institute and the Wall Street 
is accepted.   
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Journal are presented in incongruent tracks, the mean affective response for 
these groups by strong individualists is negative and significantly different from 
the mean in the control  three of four times.  Four out of four times, the 
egalitarian’s culturally identified heroes of Ecodefense and Earth First, when 
presented in incongruent cultural narrative treatments, show mean differences 
from the control group that are negative and significant.  The strong hierarch’s 
hero, the Club of Rome, while nominally moving in the opposite direction 
hypothesized is not significant in any of the incongruent treatments.  Coded on a 
scale from one to ten, these mean differences for character affect are not slight.  
Significant mean differences range from -1.4682 for the strong individualist’ 
affective response to the Wall Street Journal in the incongruent hierarch 
narrative to -2.4764 for the strong egalitarian’s affective response to Earth First 
in the incongruent hierarch narrative.  H12c
Table 3.6 shows many mean differences that might support hypothesis 
H
 is rejected.  Culturally identified 
heroes are not received more positively in culturally incongruent narratives.  
Rather, the opposite is occurring as strong cultural types overwhelmingly ascribe 
affect to characters in the directions specified by that characters treatment in 
the cultural narrative.  
12d, which hypothesizes that strong cultural types will have more negative 
affect for culturally identified villains than their counterparts in the control.  For 
all strong cultural types, groups identified by previous research as cultural villains 
show statistically significant and negative differences in means between their 
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treatment in culturally incongruent narratives and the control group in nine 
different cells.   For example and as hypothesized, in the hierarchical narrative, 
strong egalitarian mean differences from strong egalitarians in the control group 
for both the Cato Institute (-2.1464) and the Wall Street Journal (-2.4301) are 
negative, significant and large.  Similar findings appear in all incongruent 
narrative treatments.  Strong individualists dislike Earth First and Ecodefense in 
the hierarch narrative; strong hierarchs dislike the Cato Institute and the Wall 
Street Journal in the egalitarian cultural narrative.  However and along with 
offering some confirmatory evidence to accept previous hypotheses, these mean 
differences also move in the directions of how these groups are treated in each 
cultural narrative.  That is, in general and regardless of which cultural narrative a 
strong cultural type is randomly assigned to, villains are disliked.   
Dictated by the treatment of a group in the narrative, several culturally 
specific villains yield mean differences that do not readily support the biased 
assimilating individual modeled in CNM.  Rather, significant mean differences 
appear to be dictated by the treatment of each group in the cultural narrative 
rather than guided by strong preexisting affective responses to these groups 
theorized to be guided by cultural orientation in the CNM.  For example, 
whereas previous scholarship suggests that strong individualists would have a 
negative affective response to the Club of Rome, strong individualists have a 
positive and significant reaction to this group when treated as a hero in the 
hierarch narrative.  Similarly, strong egalitarians are hypothesized to react 
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negatively to the Cato Institute, but when this group is treated as a hero in the 
individualist narrative, strong egalitarians mean scores significantly increase by 
just over a point (1.0892) relative to the control group.  Even where statistical 
significance is not found, all cultural villain means move in a direction that would 
indicate a strong influence of narrative structure and a weak form of resistance 
on the part of the respondent’s strong cultural orientation, when compared to 
mean affective responses in the control treatment.    Given the uniform negative 
movement of mean differences between incongruent character treatments and 
the control treatment of villains, H12d
Summarizing the findings presented in Table 3.6, strong cultural types 
appear to take narrative cues on villains as affective responses in congruent 
cultural narratives are meaningfully less than those in the control; however, that 
same relationship, while nominally positive for heroes, is not significant for 
respondents of strong cultural type in congruent narratives.   The mean 
differences between respondents in culturally incongruent narratives and the 
control treatment present a less straightforward set of results.  While some 
mean differences related to villains would support posited hypotheses, many 
mean differences do not.  For example, mean differences for culturally identified 
heroes in incongruent cultural narratives are always negative in incongruent 
narratives when compared to the control group.   Importantly and when 
compared to affective assessments of groups for each strong cultural type in the 
control treatment, the movement of each mean for all characters in all tracks is 
 is rejected. 
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consistent with the cultural narrative’s treatment of the group.   This is in all 
cases nominally true; in many the difference in means between incongruent 
cultural narrative and the control group for strong cultural types is also 
statistically significant. Mean difference significance in incongruent treatments 
mirror congruent narrative mean differences in this regard.  In sum, Table 3.6 
provides strong evidence that narrative structure influences individual affective 
assessments of characters in the directions specified by the narrative.   
 
3.7 Narrative Structure, Cultural (In)congruence, and Policy Solutions 
As narratives are more persuasive than non-narrative communication 
messages (Ricketts, 2007), including lists (Matilla, 2002), we would expect that a 
narrative account of climate change that is offering a solution to the problem of 
increasing GHG’s as a moral of the story, would be more effective in persuading 
than the control list.  Indeed, the OLS regression analysis conducted earlier in 
this chapter suggest this to be true.  Contra what these earlier findings would 
suggest, however, CNM models individuals that selectively process information 
that is congruent more easily and actively reject and counter argue incongruent 
information.  Given that the policy solutions were selected and framed in such a 
manner that would make them congruent to one of the three cultural types 
operationalized in the cultural narrative treatments, we would expect the 
individual modeled in CNM to prefer their culturally specific solution regardless 
of which narrative track it appears in: individualists should prefer cap-and-trade; 
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hierarchs should prefer nuclear energy; and, egalitarians should prefer 
renewable energy.   As each policy solution is embedded in culturally specific 
language and adorned with culturally specific symbolism when both argued for 
and against, CNM also expects strong cultural types to dislike solutions 
operationalized as congruent to the other cultural types. Table 3.7 addresses the 
following hypotheses:   
H13a: Relative to the control group, respondents will have higher levels of 
support for culturally identified
H
 policy solutions, regardless of which 
narrative treatment they are exposed to.   
13b: Relative to the control group, respondents will have lower levels of 
support for culturally identified
In the above stated hypotheses, the phrase culturally identified refers to 
policy solutions that are specifically linked to each strong cultural type.  Each 
policy preference is measured on a scale of zero to ten, where zero means 
completely disagree and ten means completely agree.  All preferences are 
measured post experimental treatment.  Like Table 3.7, grayed cells indicate a 
congruent cultural narrative, while white cells indicate an incongruent cultural 
narrative.  The preferred policy for each strong cultural type is set off from the 
rest of the table by both outlining the cell and italicizing the policy name in the 
left-hand column of the table.  Table 3.7 shows that much like the OLS 
regressions presented earlier in the chapter, narrative structural influences on  
 incongruent policy solutions, regardless 
of which narrative treatment they are exposed to. 
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policy preferences are intermittently significant. All three strong cultural types 
show statistically significant differences in means between cultural narrative 
treatments and the control group in at least one cell.  Hypotheses H13a and H13b
The culturally identified congruent policy solution for the individualist is 
cap-and-trade.  In the control treatment, Strong Individualists clearly do not 
prefer this solution with a mean response of 3.4043.  When exposed to the 
congruent individualist narrative treatment, the mean response increases by a 
statistically significant 1.7330 points.  This finding is as hypothesized by H
 
are addressed in sequence.     
13a; 
however, there should also be statistically significant mean increases in the two 
incongruent cultural narratives treatments for the Strong Individualist’s 
preference for cap-and-trade.  For the Strong Individualist, mean preferences for 
the cap-and-trade policy solution in incongruent tracks remains very similar to 
preferences in the control treatment, yielding no statistically significant 
difference of means.  Both the Strong Hierarchs and the Strong Egalitarians show 
no significant differences of means for their respective culturally identified policy 
solutions of nuclear energy and renewable resources between the control group 
and any cultural narrative treatment.  While there is evidence that Strong 
Individualists are heavily influenced by their congruent individualist narrative to 
prefer cap-and-trade as a policy solution, none of the other treatments suggest 
that CNM is correct in theorizing that strong cultural types will prefer their 
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culturally identified solutions, regardless of the exogenous source.  H13a
Hypotheses H
 is 
rejected.   
13b expects that because the policy solutions of “other” 
cultural types are framed in culturally specific language and symbolism that 
strong cultural types not culturally associated with a policy solution will provoke 
a negative reaction from respondents relative to the control group.  Table 3.7 
offers some evidence to support this hypothesis.  Two of the strong cultural 
types demonstrate a negative difference in means between the control and at 
least one cultural narrative treatment.  As H13b would predict, the Strong 
Egalitarian has a negative mean difference in preferences for nuclear energy in 
the hierarch cultural narrative (-1.11265) and in the egalitarian cultural narrative 
(-1.27389), as well as a negative mean difference for preferences for cap-and-
trade in the individualist cultural narrative (-.98513).    The Strong Individualist 
shows a negative reaction to renewable energy in the hierarch narrative (-1. 
57292) relative to Strong Individualists in the control.  All of these mean 
differences offer support for H13b
First, the vast majority of the cells listing mean differences within each 
cultural narrative treatment in Table 3.7 do not demonstrate statistically 
significant differences from the control treatment.  Of the twenty-seven mean 
differences reported for cultural narrative treatment mean responses, six 
differences are significant.  Second, of those six reported significant mean 
.  However, there are also several reasons 
illumanted by the data in Table 3.7 to reject this hypothesis.  
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differences, one moves in the opposite direction hypothesized. The Strong 
Hierarch has a significantly positive mean preference for renewable energy in 
the egalitarian cultural narrative.  There is simply insufficient evidence to accept 
H13b
 
.   
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has attempted to illuminate the 
relationship between narrative structure and key dependent variables related to 
climate change.  In the earlier sections of the chapter examining hypotheses H01 
through H09
The first set of OLS regressions found a significant relationship between 
narrative structure and both narrator threat and author trust.  The analyses 
showed that in the individualist and hierarch narratives, respondents believed 
the author of the cultural narrative to view climate change as less of a threat 
than the author of the control list.   The analysis also showed that in two of the  
, the relationship between narrative structure and climate change 
opinion related variables was examined using OLS regressions.  In these analyses 
the cultural narrative experimental treatments were the independent variables 
of interest, while key endogenous variables were included as controls.  Although 
many of the OLS regressions did not reveal a statistically significant relationship 
between narrative structure and the dependent variable in question, there were 
several meaningful findings reported.  Table 26 provides a summary of which 
hypotheses were accepted and which were rejected.   
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Table 2.8. Hypotheses Tests 
 Hypotheses Status Method 
H01  There is no relationship between a respondent’s perceptions of the narrator’s 
assessment of the risk climate change posses and narrative structure.   
Reject OLS 
H There is no relationship between levels of trust a respondent ascribes to an author and 
narrative structure.   
02 Reject OLS 
H03 There is no relationship between the level of affect a respondent assigns to the 
experimental stimulus and narrative structure.   
Accept OLS 
H Personal Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages will increase the 
respondent’s sense of threat that climate change poses to them personally relative to the 
control group. 
1 Reject OLS 
H2 Sociotropic Risk: Narratively structured climate change messages will increase the 
respondent’s sense of threat that climate change poses to the United States in general 
relative to the control group. 
Reject OLS 
H Climate Change Belief: Narratively structured messages will increase the respondent’s 
willingness to accept that climate change is a reality relative to the control group. 
3 Reject OLS 
H4 Anthropogenic Cause: Narratively structured messages will increase the respondent’s 
willingness to accept that human beings are a critical cause of climate change through 
increased GHG emissions relative to the control group. 
Reject OLS 
H GHG Regulation: Narratively structured messages will increase the respondent’s 
willingness to regulate GHG’s relative to the control group. 
5 Reject OLS 
H6 Hero Affect: Characters (groups) treated as heroes in the cultural narratives will facilitate 
more positive affective responses than groups in the control.   
Accept OLS 
H Villain Affect: Characters (groups) treated as villains in the cultural narratives will 
facilitate more negative affective responses than groups in the control.   
7 Accept OLS 
H8 Moral of the Story: Policy preferences advocated by a cultural narrative will be preferred 
by respondents exposed to that narrative. 
Accept OLS 
H Culturally Antithetical Moral of the Story: Policy preferences admonished by the cultural 
narrative will find less support from respondents exposed to that narrative.   
9 Accept OLS 
H10a Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will be more 
trusting of the narrator than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
Reject ANOVA 
H Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will be less 
trusting of the narrator than their cultural counterparts in the control. 
10b Reject ANOVA 
H11a Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
higher perceptions of risk in relation to climate change. 
Reject ANOVA 
H Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
lower perceptions of risk in relation to climate change. 
11b Reject ANOVA 
H12a Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
more positive affect for culturally identified heroes than their cultural counterparts in 
the control. 
Accept ANOVA 
H Respondents with congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
more negative affect for 
12b 
culturally identified
Reject 
 villains than their cultural counterparts in 
the control. 
ANOVA 
H12c Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
more positive affect for culturally identified heroes than their cultural counterparts in 
the control. 
Reject ANOVA 
H Respondents with incongruent cultural type to the cultural narrative stimulus will have 
more negative affect for 
12d 
culturally identified
Reject 
 enemies than their cultural counterparts in 
the control. 
ANOVA 
H13a Relative to the control group, respondents will have higher levels of support for 
culturally identified policy solutions, regardless of which narrative treatment they are 
exposed to.   
Reject ANOVA 
H Relative to the control group, respondents will have lower levels of support for 13b culturally 
identified
Reject 
 incongruent policy solutions, regardless of which narrative treatment they are 
exposed to. 
ANOVA 
 
  
158 
 
three cultural narrative tracks, respondents exhibited significantly lower levels of 
trust for the author of the cultural narrative treatment than the author of the list 
of facts presented in the control.  It would seem that respondents have more 
faith that information presented without narration is more accurate and 
trustworthy than information presented in narrative form.   Keep in mind that 
the information presented in the lists for both the control and the narrative 
treatments is exactly the same.   
 Other relationships between key climate change opinion variables and 
narrative structure were also found by the OLS regression analysis presented at 
the beginning of the chapter.  Groups identified as relevant to the climate 
change debate were found to have their affective assessments by respondents 
heavily influenced by their treatment in the cultural narratives.  Groups 
portrayed as villains were disliked, while groups portrayed as heroes were liked.  
A similar, but less convincing set of findings was found for policy preferences in 
the cultural narrative treatments. 
 By linguistic and symbolic linkages to specific cultural types, policy 
preferences are presented as a moral conclusion for each cultural narrative 
treatment. The solutions offered in the other two cultural narratives, couched in 
the same symbolic and culturally specific language used in the policy preferences 
home narrative, are admonished.  If narrative structure matters for these policy 
preferences, then, compared to the control group, each preference argued for 
should be preferred.  Each policy preference argued against should also receive a 
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more negative reaction from respondents.   OLS analysis confirmed these 
hypotheses, finding that five of nine relationships were significant with 
coefficients moving in the expected direction. 
 While the OLS regressions applied in the beginning of the chapter tested 
for the influence of narrative structure on key dependent variables while 
controlling for variables modeled in CNM, potential interactions between strong 
cultural type and the cultural narrative stimuli in the OLS models were 
insufficient to gauge the effects of narrative congruence and incongruence.   To 
account for this deficiency and better apply the CNM model developed in 
chapter two, differences of means tests were performed on sample sub-
populations of strong cultural type.  The idea of performing theses difference of 
means tests is to determine if the relationship between narrative structure and 
dependent variables of interest are conditioned by cultural type.   
The ANOVA analysis confirmed only one hypothesis (H12a).  Respondents 
of strong cultural type in congruent narrative tracks did in fact show higher 
affect for heroes in the congruent narrative treatment.  However, none of the 
remaining conditional hypotheses were confirmed.  If one considers the single 
confirmed hypothesis in light of the remaining rejected hypotheses, it is 
apparent that the confirmation is likely the result of the narrative treatment of 
the hero and not the cultural type of the respondent.  That is, in all tracks 
significant differences of means move in the directions specified by the cultural 
narratives.  Both the OLS and ANOVA analyses leave a strong impression that 
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narrative structure is an important element of driving respondent opinions about 
narrator threat, author trust, affect for characters, and policy preferences.  
However, the lack of findings from the analysis of mean differences is not viewed 
as a solid rebuttal of the CNM model.   
 It may still be the case that interactions between cultural type and the 
cultural orientation of the narrative treatments are both occurring and 
meaningful.  Chapter four addresses further interactions by comparing 
respondent preferences for key climate change opinion dependent variables 
across cultural narrative tracks.  In chapter four narrative structure is held 
constant while the content of the narratives varies.  The final chapter, chapter 
six, summarizes significant findings and offers an empirical model relying on the 
different components of narrative to try and illuminate how narrative structures 
might influence opinion formation and change related to climate change.  
Importantly, chapter six demonstrates that character affect is a central narrative 
input, driving both perceptions of risk and the respondent’s willingness to 
regulate GHG’s.   
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CHAPTER 4: NARRATIVE CONTENT AND MASS OPINIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
While the previous chapter examined hypotheses related to narrative 
structure, chapter four addresses RQ2 and narrative content.  Does cultural 
narrative content influence preferences for opinion related dependent variables 
relevant to climate change?  To assess this second research question, responses 
to survey questions associated to key dependent variables categorized by strong 
cultural type are compared across cultural narrative experimental treatments 
(e.g., individualist cultural narrative vs. egalitarian cultural narrative) in the 
context of congruence and incongruence.  However, before examining specific 
congruence and incongruence hypotheses, it is worthwhile to examine the 
relationship between Cultural Theory  (CT) metrics and the dependent variables 
operationalized in this research.   The benefit of doing so is that understanding 
the underlying CT relationships with these theoretically and practically important 
dependent variables will provide additional insight into any congruence and 
incongruence findings (or lack thereof).  Specifically, the aim is to identify 
underlying relationships between CT and the analyzed dependent variables to 
better understand the variation of cultural biases in congruent and incongruent 
cultural narrative treatments examined later in the chapter.   
4.1     Cultural Theory and Opinions on Climate Change 
Table 4.1 summarizes OLS partial regression coefficients for CT metrics 
for climate change opinion related dependent variables.  Each column represents 
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an independent OLS regression, controlling for age, education, gender, income, 
race, ideology, and climate change knowledge, where the three CT measures of 
interest are individualism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism (see appendix F1-F3 for 
complete OLS findings).26
All respondents are eighteen years or older.  Ages range from eighteen to 
eighty-eight.  Education is coded on a scale ranging from one to seven, where 
one represents elementary or some high school education and seven represents 
a doctorate of any type.   Gender is coded one for male and zero for female.  
Race is coded one for white/Asian and zero for all other racial categories.  
Ideology is coded on a scale from one to seven, where one is strongly liberal and 
seven is strongly conservative.  Climate change knowledge is a composite 
measure derived from a series of questions on climate change causes and 
scientific expectations.  The scale on climate change knowledge ranges from one 
to eleven, where each cumulative point represents a correct answer on one of 
the climate change knowledge questions.  CT measurements are aggregations of 
three agree/disagree questions for each cultural type (see appendix C for 
variable descriptive statistics).   
   
 Previous CT research expects that several of the dependent variables 
listed in Table 4.1 will have significant relationships with CT metrics.  Past 
research predicts that individualism will have a negative relationship with 
climate change risk (e.g., Kahan & Braman, 2006) and a positive relationship with
                                                          
26 Fatalism is included as a control.   
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preferences for nuclear energy (Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 
1994).  Hierarchs are also found to have a positive relationship with preferences 
for nuclear energy (Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Jenkins-Smith & Smith 1994).   On the 
other hand, egalitarianism is found to be positively related to perceptions of 
climate change risk (Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Kahan & Braman, 2006; Leiserowitz, 
2006) and also to be negatively associated with preferences for nuclear energy 
(Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Jenkins-Smith, 2001, p. 122; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994).  
For these variables a one-tailed test is used to assess statistical significance.  
Since past research is silent regarding what relationship we might expect 
between the remaining dependent variables and CT, the null is hypothesized for 
these relationships (two-tailed tests of significance).   
Generally speaking, the individualist CT measure performs as previous 
research expects (please refer to Table 4.2 for measurement information for 
each dependent variable).  In every cultural narrative track, as individualism 
increases for a respondent, there is a statistically significant positive increase in 
preferences for nuclear energy.  This finding is consistent with previous research 
(Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994).  Across all narrative 
experimental treatments, individualists have statistically lower perceptions of 
both personal and sociotropic risk.  As the sum of the individualism metric 
increases we also see significantly lower scores for belief in climate change, a 
belief that human beings are a primary cause of climate change (Anthropogenic 
Cause), and a willingness to regulate GHG’s in both the individualist and 
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egalitarian cultural narratives.  Given that individualists are found to have 
significantly lower perceptions of risk in previous research (e.g., Kahan & 
Braman, 2006) and in this research, it seems intuitive that individualists would 
have significantly lower responses for these variables.   Additionally, 
individualism is found to be significantly associated with lower affect for the 
egalitarian narrative as well as significantly lower levels of trust that the facts 
presented in the egalitarian narrative are accurate and unbiased (narrator trust).   
The egalitarian index also performs as expected.  In all of the narrative 
treatments, egalitarianism is positively related to perceptions of personal and 
sociotropic risk.  Similar to the performance of the individualist measurements 
(but in the opposite direction), egalitarianism has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship across all cultural narrative treatments with a belief that 
climate change is real, that human beings are a primary cause, and a willingness 
to regulate GHG’s.  Egalitarianism is also positively related to preferences for 
renewable energy across all experimental manipulations, indicating that the 
selection of this preference in the egalitarian cultural narrative was an 
appropriate choice.  Several partial regression coefficients exhibit intermittent 
significance across experimental tracks for the egalitarian index.   Interestingly, 
as egalitarianism increases, respondent affect for both the individualist and 
egalitarian narratives increase.  Egalitarianism is also significantly and positively 
related to an affirmative emotional assignment of affect to the individualist 
cultural narrative.  Unexpectedly, however, egalitarianism does not exhibit a 
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statistically significant negative relationship with preferences for nuclear energy 
in any of the cultural narrative treatments. 
The hierarchy CT index presents a set of interesting findings across the 
experimental treatments.  For starters, previous research suggests that hierarchy 
will be negatively related to perceptions of climate change risk.  The findings 
presented in Table 4.1, at least partially, indicate the opposite.  Hierarchy 
demonstrates a statistically significant and positive relationship with sociotropic 
risk in both the individualist and egalitarian cultural narrative tracks.  Similarly to 
the performance of egalitarianism, hierarchy is also significantly and positively 
related to a belief that climate change is real, that humans are a primary cause, 
and a willingness to regulate GHG’s in both the individualist and egalitarian 
narratives.   Where previous research would suggest more symmetry between 
hierarchism and individualism (Kahan & Braman, 2006), it appears that in the 
case of climate change, hierarchy and egalitarianism are converging on all of the 
variables mentioned.27
Hierarchy also demonstrates several intermittent relationships with 
opinion related climate change variables in select narrative treatments.  
Hierarchs show significantly higher narrative affect (affect) for the individualist 
and hierarch narratives.  Hierarchy is positively related to trust for the egalitarian 
   
                                                          
27 Cultural Theory argues that two of the four cultural types will typically ally to 
produce a societal status quo (Thompson et al., 1990).  In American society the 
status quo is typically conceived of as being produced by individualists and 
hierarchists.  Although beyond the scope of this research, the convergence of 
hierarchs and egalitarians on the issue of climate change could indicate a shift in 
this traditional alliance structure on the issue of climate change.   
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and individualist narrators.  The hierarchy index yields statistically significant and 
positive relationships with preferences for nuclear energy in the individualist and 
the hierarchical cultural narratives.  These findings are as previous research 
would expect (Ellen & Slovic, 1996; Jenkins-Smith & Smith 1994).  Finally, 
hierarchism demonstrates significant and positive relationships with both cap-
and-trade in the hierarchical narrative and renewable energy in the egalitarian 
narrative.   
Taken in total, the findings presented in Table 4.1 provide insight into the 
underlying influence of cultural theoretic priors.  That is, the performance of 
these measures indicates the strength of the biased assimilation processes 
modeled in CNM and provide reliable assessments of what cultural biases we can 
expect individuals to rely on when processing the incoming exogenous cultural 
narratives.  In the cases of the individualist and egalitarian, CT measures perform 
mostly as the literature would expect.  Contra expectations regarding climate 
change risk (and by extension climate change belief, anthropogenic cause, and 
GHG regulation), hierarchs seem more aligned with egalitarians than the more 
typical alliance found with individualists 
Most importantly, there is a high degree of consistency across the 
experimental treatments for each cultural measure. Certainly, for different 
dependent variables in different experimental tracks, some partial regression 
coefficients lose significance and fall out of the models.  For example, 
individualism has a negative relationship with climate change belief in both the 
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individualist and egalitarian narratives.  This relationship falls out in the 
hierarchical narrative.  These types of inconsistencies are expected when dealing 
with so many dependent variables and a number of experimental treatments.  
What stands out, however, is that all of the relationships that remain significant 
for each cultural measure, maintain their respective directionality and 
approximate magnitude within each model.  For example, in all cultural narrative 
treatments, individualism is negatively associated with personal risk, while the 
inverse is true for egalitarianism.  Partial regression coefficients do not switch 
signs and nor does the magnitude change dramatically for relationships that 
remain consistent across treatments.  Given the relatively consistent behavior of 
CT measurements across narrative treatments, the OLS analysis presented here 
suggests that there is not an interaction taking place between cultural theory 
measurements and the cultural content operationalized in each narrative.  The 
following section addresses this issue in more detail. 28
 
   
4.2 Cultural (In)Congruence, Narrative Content, and Mass Opinion on 
 Climate Change 
Given that each cultural narrative makes specific cultural appeals to 
individuals of the same cultural type as that narrative, the Cultural Narrative 
                                                          
28 OLS interactive models were ran for each dependent variable.  Narrative 
experimental tracks were dummied as a zero or one and interacted with cultural 
type.  As expected, these models perform quite similarly to the subgroup 
analysis presented here.  The subgroup analysis is presented do to the clarity of 
the models, which are not rife with the multicollinearity built into interactive 
models. 
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Model (CNM) detailed in chapter two would expect strong reactions from both 
congruent and incongruent cultural types assigned to each treatment. More 
specifically, postulates two and three modeled in chapter two theorize a 
confirmation and disconfirmation bias.  Confirmation bias states that Individuals 
exposed to culturally congruent stimuli should be more accepting of the 
information and arguments (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Lodge & Taber, 2006); 
disconfirmation bias states that individuals will be less accepting of information 
and arguments originating from culturally incongruent stimuli (Taber & Lodge, 
2006; Lodge & Taber, 2006).   The following analysis assesses these CNM 
postulates by examining the influence of narrative content and comparing strong 
cultural type survey responses in culturally congruent and incongruent 
narratives. 
 Strong cultural types are categorized based on which battery of Cultural 
Theory survey questions the respondent scored highest.  Once categorized by 
strong cultural type, mean responses are compared for these respondents 
between congruent and incongruent cultural narrative treatments.  Means are 
assessed using one-way ANOVA with bon ferroni post-hoc tests to determine if 
the difference in means is significant.  In the interest of clarity, Table 4.2 
summarizes and describes dependent variable measurement ranges examined in 
this chapter.  
The first set of hypotheses address assumptions built into each narrative 
that should be influenced by the varied content that produce congruent and  
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Table 4.2. Narrative Structure Hypotheses, Survey Questions, and Measurement 
 Dependent Variable  Measurement Range 
 Description Q#’s 0 10 
H Narrator Threat 14 44 No threat at all Extreme 
threat 
H15 Narrator Trust 45 No trust Complete trust 
H Affect 16 46 Extremely 
negative 
Extremely 
positive 
H17 Personal Risk 47 No threat at all Extreme 
threat 
H Sociotropic Risk 18 51 No problem 
whatsoever 
Devastating 
H19 Climate Change Belief 49 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H Antropogenic Cause 20 50 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
H21 GHG Regulation 48 Not at all 
important 
Extremely 
important 
H Cultural Heroes 22 43a-43d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H23 Cultural Villains 37a-41d Completely 
negative 
Completely 
positive 
H Cultural Policy Solutions 24 52-54 Completely 
disagree 
Completely 
agree 
 
incongruent narrative environments. CNM posits that respondents assigned to 
congruent narratives should be more responsive to the information, arguments, 
and assumptions built into each narrative treatment, while those assigned to 
incongruent information environments (i.e., cultural narratives) should be less 
so.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H14:  Narrator Threat: Respondents with congruent cultural type to 
their cultural narrative treatment will perceive the narrator as 
viewing climate change as more of a threat than respondents of 
the same cultural type in incongruent cultural narratives. 
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H15
H
:  Narrator Trust: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their 
cultural narrative treatment will be more trusting of the narrator 
than respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent 
cultural narratives. 
16
H
:  Affect: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their cultural 
narrative treatment will show more positive affect for the cultural 
narrative than respondents of the same cultural type in 
incongruent cultural narratives. 
17
H
:  Personal Risk: Respondents with congruent cultural type to their 
cultural narrative treatment will view climate change as more of a 
personal threat than respondents of the same cultural type in 
incongruent cultural narratives.   
18
H
:  Sociotropic Risk: Respondents with congruent cultural type to 
their cultural narrative treatment will view climate change as 
more of a threat to American society than respondents of the 
same cultural type in incongruent cultural narratives.   
19
H
:  Climate Change Belief: Respondents with congruent cultural type 
to their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to 
believe that climate change is real than respondents of the same 
cultural type in incongruent cultural narratives 
20:  Anthropogenic Cause: Respondents with congruent cultural type 
to their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to accept 
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that human beings are a principal cause of climate change than 
respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent cultural 
narratives 
H21
Table 4.3 illustrates the difference of means between strong cultural 
types in congruent and incongruent cultural narrative experimental treatments.  
The left-hand column lists climate change opinion related dependent variables 
(see Table 4.2 for measurement information).  The remaining three columns 
represent the individualist, hierarchical, and egalitarian narratives.  The table is 
broken up into three sections by strong cultural type, providing three separate 
sets of results.  Congruent cultural narratives are set off from the rest of the 
table by grayed table cells.  Differences of means are determined by comparing 
congruent means (grayed cells) with means of the same strong cultural type 
(horizontal comparisons to white celled mean values for the same cultural type) 
in incongruent cultural narratives.   
:  GHG Regulation: Respondents with congruent cultural type to 
their cultural narrative treatment will be more willing to regulate 
GHG’s than respondents of the same cultural type in incongruent 
cultural narratives. 
 Table 4.3 demonstrates that the differences between means for strong 
cultural types in congruent and incongruent narratives are rarely statistically 
meaningful.  Two differences of forty-eight possible tests show significance in  
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Table 4.3. Narrative Content, Cultural (In)Congruence, and Opinions on Climate 
Change 
    
Strong Individualist 
    
 Individualist (congruent) Hierarch Egalitarian 
 Mean n Mean Difference n Mean Difference n 
Narrator Threat 6.9159 107 6.6471 -.26883 85 7.5600 +.64411 100 
Narrator Trust 4.5327 107 4.4186 +.11411 86 4.4500 -.08271 100 
Affect 5.0374 107 5.1412 +.10379 85 4.5900 -.44738 100 
Personal Risk 4.4579 107 4.7294 +.27147 85 4.6300 +.17206 100 
Sociotropic Risk 5.0841 107 5.3488 +.26473 86 4.5800 -.50411 100 
Climate Change 
Belief 
6.5421 107 7.1860 +.64399 86 6.0900 -.45206 100 
Anthropogenic 
Cause 
5.1038 106 6.0581 +.95437 86 4.9208 -.18298 101 
GHG Regulation 6.3491 106 6.9884 +.63932 86 5.9901 -.35896 101 
    
Strong Hierarch 
    
 Individualist Hierarch (congruent) Egalitarian 
 Mean Difference n Mean n Mean Difference n 
Narrator Threat 6.9048 +.27318 63 5.0351 57 7.3333 +.70105 66 
Narrator Trust 5.1746 +.13592 63 5.6667 57 5.5758 +.54067 66 
Affect 5.1905 -.47619 63 5.5263 57 5.7273 +.06061 66 
Personal Risk 5.8413 +.314495 63 5.8772 57 6.2879 +.76156 66 
Sociotropic Risk 6.0952 +.21805 63 7.1250 56 6.5781 +.70093 64 
Climate Change 
Belief 
7.6032 +.47817 63 6.5614 57 7.9091 +.78409 66 
Anthropogenic 
Cause 
6.6774 +.11602 62 7.0536 56 7.1818 +.62041 66 
GHG Regulation 7.2698 +.21627 63 6.6316 57 7.6667 +.61310 66 
    
Strong Egalitarian 
  
 Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian (congruent) 
 Mean Difference n Mean Difference n Mean                  n 
Narrator Threat 6.8043 -.96771* 138 7.3288 -.44329 146 7.7721 136 
Narrator Trust 5.5290 -.25043 138 5.1301 -.64927 146 5.7794 136 
Affect 5.5108 -.46682 139 5.0685 -.90912* 146 5.9776 134 
Personal Risk 6.3453 -.55838 139 6.8699 -.03384 146 6.9037 135 
Sociotropic Risk 7.2374 -.11074 139 7.2877 -.06048 146 7.3481 135 
Climate Change 
Belief 
7.8489 -.35108 139 8.0759 -.12414 145 8.2000 135 
Anthropogenic 
Cause 
7.3094 -.43139 139 7.5241 -.21660 145 7.7407 135 
GHG Regulation 8.0576 -.39833 139 8.4315 -.02438 146 8.4559 136 
 
the directions hypothesized.  Strong Egalitarians assigned to the incongruent 
individualist track show lower perceptions of narrator threat (-.96771).  Strong 
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egalitarians assigned to the incongruent hierarch narrative show significantly less 
affect for the cultural narrative in general (-.90912).  The remaining mean 
differences are insignificant.  Given the paucity of significant findings, there is 
simply insufficient evidence to accept any of the hypothesized relationships. H14 
through H21
 
 are rejected, providing support to the earlier OLS findings 
suggesting that an interaction between cultural narrative content and prior 
cultural type is not taking place.   
4.3 Narrative Content, Characters, the Moral of the Story and Congruence 
Recall that each cultural narrative is exactly 1022 words long and roughly 75% of 
the text does not vary across cultural narrative treatments. Thus, the primary 
benefit of comparing across cultural narrative experimental tracks is that 
narrative structural components including setting, plotline, the spatial location of 
characters and policy solutions are all held constant.  In holding these structures 
constant, the influence of the varied content across tracks can be examined.     
While narrative structure is held constant, the content of each narrative 
varies along two dimensions.  The first dimension varies characters.  Each 
cultural narrative presents a group or organization as a hero advocating for a 
culturally specific policy solution.  Table 4.4 illustrates the textual treatment of 
the hero and villain characters in two different cultural narrative treatments.  
Note that the reference to the hero in each cultural narrative directly follows the  
 
175 
 
Table 4.4. Example of Character Treatments in Opposing Cultural Narratives 
 Individualist  
Cultural Narrative 
Egalitarian  
Cultural Narrative 
 
The Hierarchical Villain 
 
Government interests, 
represented by groups 
like bureaucratic unions 
and the infamous Club of 
Rome, are attempting to 
use climate change to 
promote their own 
agenda.  
 
 
Government interests, 
represented by groups 
like the infamous Club 
of Rome and selfish 
politicians, are 
attempting to use 
climate change to 
promote their own 
agenda.   
 
 They push for programs 
that solidify bureaucratic 
control and increase the 
size and cost of 
government.  
 
They push for programs 
that reinforce existing 
inequalities and 
increase the wealth and 
power of politicians.   
 
 
The Cultural Hero 
 
Thankfully groups like 
the Cato Institute have 
been tirelessly 
advocating for this 
solution.   
 
Thankfully organizations 
like the Club of Rome 
have been tirelessly 
advocating for this 
solution. 
 
 
policy solution advocated in each cultural narrative (See Appendix B for a 
sentence by sentence breakdown of the cultural narrative treatments).  Those 
groups that appear as heroes in one cultural narrative also appear as villains in 
the two remaining cultural narrative experimental treatments.  Consequently, 
each cultural narrative has one hero and at least two villains.  The treatment of 
the characters in each story is made as similar as possible, while also linking 
those villains to culturally specific language and symbols.  Table 4.4 
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demonstrates the textual similarities and differences in how the characters are 
treated in the cultural narratives. 
Table 4.4 presents the treatment of the hierarchal villain in both the 
individualist and egalitarian cultural narratives.  Differences in wording are 
bolded and italicized.  While both treatments claim that the Club of Rome is 
promoting a hierarchal agenda, both treatments ground that agenda in value 
positions that are antithetical to the cultural narrative they are presented in with 
the intent of provoking a strong cultural reaction from strong cultural types 
randomly assigned to the narrative—congruent or incongruent.  The individualist 
narrative claims the Club of Rome is trying to solidify bureaucratic control and 
increase the size and cost of government; the egalitarian narrative asserts that 
the Club of Rome is reinforcing existing inequalities and giving more wealth and 
power to politicians.  In both cases, if an individual is a strong cultural type 
congruent to a cultural narrative, that individual should react to these culturally 
specific appeals.  Likewise, incongruent strong cultural types should also 
recognize that there values are associated with a particular villain and that the 
cultural beliefs they hold dear are under assault.   
The second dimension of content that varies in each cultural narrative is 
the moral of the story.  The moral of the story, defined as a culturally tailored 
policy solution for each narrative, is designed specifically to appeal to strong 
cultural respondents of the same type as the cultural narrative.  In every case, 
the policy solution attempts to deal with increasing greenhouse gasses (GHG) 
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which are argued to be a result of human activity and a primary cause of climate 
change.  The egalitarian narrative appeals to equality by embracing community 
owned renewable energy resources such as wind and solar power.  The 
hierarchical cultural narrative appeals to the hierarchs value of societal structure 
and stratification by advocating nuclear energy, which requires significant 
scientific expertise and governmental oversight to be successful.  The 
individualist narrative appeals to values of competition and the mechanism of 
markets in advocating the cap-and-trade solution to GHG’s.  
 The analysis presented in the following section looks at the extent to 
which respondent affect for the varied content is directed by cultural 
congruence and incongruence.  As formulated in chapter two and directed by 
the CNM, several hypotheses are tested.  CNM posits both a confirmation and 
disconfirmation bias.  Confirmation bias finds that individuals are more willing to 
accept information and arguments from congruent sources (Taber & Lodge, 
2006; Lodge & Taber, 2006).  Disconfirmation bias finds that individuals actively 
reject and counter argue information presented in an incongruent information 
environment (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Lodge & Taber, 2006).  However, 
disconfirmation bias is found to be the more powerful of the two mechanisms in 
shaping opinion formation. 
The narrative portrayals of characters and policy solutions (the varied 
content of each cultural narrative) are interlaced with culturally specific symbols 
and language designed specifically to allow respondents to identify if that 
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character or solution is congruent or incongruent with their cultural type.  This is 
true for both congruent and incongruent narratives.  For example, when 
narrating the Ecodefense hero or the Ecodefense villain, all cultural types should 
recognize that the group is associated with notions of equality and that the 
environment is fragile.  For the strong egalitarian, respondents should recognize 
their cultural hero in the egalitarian cultural narrative; similarly, strong 
egalitarians should also recognize that the values they hold dear are under 
assault when Ecodefense is presented as a villain in incongruent cultural 
narratives.  It is this incongruent recognition that CNM posits will have the most 
powerful influence (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Lodge & Taber, 2006).    
In each hypothesis listed below the term culturally identified refers to 
groups and policy solutions identified as being culturally congruent or 
incongruent to each cultural type.  In the case of characters, Ecodefense and 
Earthfirst are congruent to egalitarians; The Cato Institute and the Wall Street 
Journal are congruent with individualism; the Club of Rome is congruent with 
hierarchy.  All congruent characters identified for one type are considered 
incongruent for the remaining two.  Similarly, cap-and-trade is congruent to 
individualism; nuclear energy is congruent to hierarchy; and, renewable energy is 
congruent to egalitarianism.  Reliant upon biased assimilation processes 
modeled in CNM (specifically, the strength of disconfirmation bias), the following 
has been hypothesized:   
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H22
H
:  Cultural Heroes: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to 
the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive affect for 
culturally identified heroes than their cultural counterparts in 
incongruent cultural narratives. 
23
H
:   Cultural Villains: Respondents with incongruent cultural type to 
the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive affect for 
culturally identified villains than their cultural counterparts in 
incongruent narratives.   
24
Each column in Table 4.5 represents one of the three cultural narrative 
treatments: individualist, hierarch, and egalitarian.  The left-hand column 
represents affective assessments of culturally specific characters and policy 
solutions.  The variables in the left-hand column are presented for strong 
individualists, strong hierarchs, and strong egalitarians.  Grayed table cells 
represent a strong cultural type randomly assigned to a congruent cultural 
narrative, while white table cells indicate an incongruent cultural narrative 
treatment.  One-way ANOVA comparisons of mean responses by strong cultural 
types are compared horizontally to assess significance for hypothesized
:   Cultural Policy Solutions: Respondents with incongruent cultural 
type to the cultural narrative treatment will have more positive 
affect for culturally identified policy solution than their cultural 
counterparts in incongruent narratives.   
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Table 4.5. Narrative Content and Cultural (In)Congruence: Characters and Policy 
Solutions  
    
Strong Individualist 
    
 Individualist (congruent) Hierarch Egalitarian 
 Mean n Mean Difference n Mean Difference N 
Ecodefense 1.8922 102 3.0260 +1.33382* 77 4.9773 +3.08512* 88 
Earth First 2.2718 103 3.2405 +.96866* 79    
The Club of Rome 2.0625 96 5.7429 +3.68036* 70 2.8250 +.7650 80 
The Cato Institute 5.1778 90 3.1481 -2.02963* 81 3.4706 -1.70719* 85 
         
Cap-and-Trade 5.1373 102 3.4762 -1.66106* 84 3.1034 -2.03381* 87 
Nuclear Energy 5.9320 103 5.8118 -.12027 85 5.5914 -.34064 93 
Renewable Energy 5.6667 102 4.5000 -1.6667* 82 5.6170 -.04965 94 
    
Strong Hierarch 
    
 Individualist Hierarch (congruent) Egalitarian 
 Mean Difference n Mean n Mean Difference N 
Ecodefense 4.2456 +.913953 57 3.3261 46 6.1071 +2.78106* 56 
Earth First 4.0351 -.01468 57 4.0204 49    
The Club of Rome 3.2982 -2.20175* 57 5.5000 42 3.2407 -2.25926* 54 
The Cato Institute 5.6800 +2.01333* 50 3.6667 45 3.3571 -.30952 56 
The Wall Street 
Journal 
   3.9608 51 3.8035 -.13028 59 
Cap-and-Trade 5.4231 .79042 52 4.6327 49 4.2295 -1.19357 61 
Nuclear Energy 5.2963 -.16370 54 5.4600 50 5.5167 .05667 60 
Renewable Energy 6.0364 .07718 55 5.9592 49 6.6500 .69082 60 
    
Strong Egalitarian 
  
 Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian (congruent) 
 Mean Difference n Mean Difference n Mean                  N 
Ecodefense 3.9675 -2.75752* 123 3.7442 -2.98081* 129 6.7250 120 
Earth First         
The Club of Rome 3.2881 +1.13161* 118 5.7544 3.59786* 114 2.1565 115 
The Cato Institute 6.1017 +3.69833* 118 2.8661 .46278 127 2.4034 119 
The Wall Street 
Journal 
   3.0074 +.001547 135 2.9919 128 
Cap-and-Trade 5.7302 +1.09991* 126 4.8797 .24945 133 4.6303 119 
Nuclear Energy 4.5118 .14740 127 4.9291 .56467 141 4.3644 118 
Renewable Energy 6.0465 -.68736 129 5.7101 -1.02373* 138 6.7339 124 
One-way Anova, One-tailed test, bonferroni post-hoc test 
 
mean respondent affective responses to characters, the direction of that 
difference is in the opposite direction hypothesized.  In the case of the cultural 
hero hypothesis, strong individualists show a lower mean response to the Cato 
181 
 
Institute in both the hierarch (-1.66106) and egalitarian (-2.03381) narratives.  
Strong hierarchs also demonstrate meaningfully lower affective responses for 
their culturally identified hero of the Club of Rome.  In the individualist narrative 
the mean response is 2.20175 points lower than the mean in the congruent 
hierarch narrative.  In the egalitarian cultural narrative, the strong hierarch 
response mean is 2.2596 points lower than the mean response in the hierarch 
narrative.  A similar relationship is found for the strong egalitarians.  The mean 
affective mean response for Ecodefense is significantly lower in both the 
individualist (-2.75752) and hierarch (-2.9081) narratives.  In all cases where 
significance is found the mean differences move in the opposite directions 
hypothesized for culturally identified heroes. 
 Similarly to the findings for culturally identified heroes, respondent affect 
for culturally identified villains moves in the opposite direction in all cases where 
the culturally identified villain is treated as a hero in the incongruent narrative.  
The Club of Rome is a culturally identified villain of the both the individualist and 
the egalitarian.  In the hierarch cultural narrative, where the Club of Rome is a 
hierarch hero, both strong individualist and strong egalitarian mean responses 
are significantly higher than mean responses for these strong cultural types in 
their congruent narratives (+3.59786 for the strong egalitarian; +3.6036 for the 
strong individualist).  This relationship is the same for both the egalitarian hero 
of Ecodefense and the individualist hero of the Cato Institute.  The remaining 
significant differences of means also continue this trend by moving in the 
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opposite direction hypothesized.  Affective responses to Ecodefense and 
Earthfirst both see significant mean increases in the hierarch cultural narrative 
for the strong individualist.  The Club of Rome has a significantly higher mean 
from the strong egalitarians in the individualist narrative.  H22 and H23
 The moral of each story, operationalized in each cultural narrative as a 
culturally identified policy solution, also show significant differences in means for 
strong cultural types between congruent and incongruent narrative treatments.  
Given that each policy solution is adorned with culturally specific language and 
symbolism, it is hypothesized that respondents of strong cultural type will be 
able to identify the link between the solution and their cultural identities 
providing a more positive response for their culturally specific policy solution.  
Strong hierarchs show no statistically significant differences in means for their 
preferences for nuclear energy in either of the incongruent narrative treatments.  
Strong individualists show significant mean decreases for preferences for their 
culturally specific policy solution of cap-and-trade in the incongruent hierarch (-
1.66106) and egalitarian (-2.03381) narrative treatments.  Similarly, strong 
egalitarian preferences for renewable energy demonstrate a significant mean 
decrease in the incongruent hierarch narrative (-1.02373).  Again, and much like 
 are 
definitively rejected; all of the evidence in Table 31 provides strong support for 
the findings presented in the earlier OLS analysis.  There does not appear to be a 
strong reaction between cultural type and the cultural character content of the 
narrative experimental treatments.  
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the character findings just presented, when significant differences in means are 
identified, the direction of that movement is in the opposite direction 
hypothesized.  Supporting the earlier OLS analysis suggesting that an interaction 
between cultural type and the cultural content of the narratives is not taking 
place, H24
 
 is rejected.   
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has attempted to address how 
cultural narrative content shapes the variation in respondent opinions about 
dependent variables relevant to climate change.  The first analysis utilized OLS 
regressions to assess the relationship of CT priors to each of the dependent 
variables examined in this research.  These analyses show that CT priors, to some 
extent, behave the way the literature would expect.   
Individualists and hierarchs prefer nuclear energy, while egalitarians do 
not.  Individualism is associated with lower levels of a belief that climate change 
is a threat to them personally and to American society more generally.  The 
inverse is true for egalitarianism.  Unexpectedly, however, hierarchy was found 
to be more in line with egalitarianism in respect to risk, as the hierarchy measure 
is positively related to both personal and societal measures of climate change 
risk.   
Where the literature provided insight into the directional relationship 
between nuclear energy, climate change risk, and CT, there were several 
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dependent variables where directionality was uncertain.  Where significance was 
found for these variables, CT measures performed in a way that matched the 
directional findings.  Egalitarians generally are more likely to believe climate 
change is a threat, by extension significance was also found between 
egalitarianism and a belief that climate change is real, humans are a cause, and 
GHG’s should be regulated.  Hierarchy findings mirrored that of the egalitarian 
findings.  Individualism, on the other, was significantly and negatively associated 
with these same dependent variables.   
Interestingly, the findings from the OLS analysis reveal a telling trend.  
Each analysis was performed on a subpopulation limited by cultural narrative 
treatment.  All of the findings briefly discussed above perform quite similarly 
across experimental tracks.  That is, if a variable remains significant in more than 
one track, the coefficients are similar in size and magnitude and the direction of 
the relationship never changes.  In short, these findings indicate that CT has 
influence over key dependent variables, but that influence does not appear to be 
interacting with the cultural content of the narratives.  This is the exact opposite 
of what the Cultural Narrative Model expects. 
The second set of analyses examined differences of means between 
strong cultural types randomly assigned to congruent and incongruent cultural 
narratives.  These findings provide confirmatory evidence that the earlier 
conclusion drawn from the OSL findings is accurate.  Table 30 summarized 
findings for climate change opinion dependent variables.  Only two of forty-eight 
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differences in means between congruent and incongruent narratives were found 
to be statistically meaningful.  A similar analysis was performed in relation to 
respondent affective reactions to characters within each story and culturally 
congruent policy preferences. 
The biased assimilation processes modeled in CNM suggest that 
individuals are more likely to accept congruent information and reject 
incongruent information.  Each of the characters and policy solutions offered in 
each story is operationalized as congruent to one of the three cultural types.  In 
practical terms, for example, this means that when Ecodefense appears as a 
villain in the hierarch narrative, egalitarians should recognize that their values 
are under attack.  It is hypothesized that respondents in congruent or 
incongruent narratives will be able to recognize the cultural symbolism defining 
the characters and policy solutions.  Therefore, a respondent assigned to either 
an incongruent or congruent treatment should recognize their culturally specific 
characters and solutions and adhere to them.  In fact, CNM argues that when an 
individual’s culture is attacked that disconfirmation bias should solicit an even 
stronger reaction from the individual than the moderately positive reaction 
drawn forth from a congruent information environment.   
The analysis presented in Table 4.5, the final analysis of the chapter, did 
not confirm the hypotheses.  There were many meaningful statistical 
relationships found, but like the previous analysis, all significant differences in 
means moved in the opposite direction hypothesized. Culturally identified 
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heroes demonstrate statistically negative differences in means between 
congruent and incongruent narratives when treated as a villain.  Similarly, 
culturally identified villains in an incongruent narrative for a given strong cultural 
type (e.g., a strong egalitarian in the hierarch narrative) demonstrate positive 
differences in means when treated as a hero.  These relationships hold for all 
strong cultural types in all cultural narrative treatments where significance is 
found.   
Similar to the character findings, preferences for culturally identified 
policy solutions do not perform as hypothesized. It was hypothesized that strong 
cultural types would adhere to their culturally specific policy solution, regardless 
of narrative treatment.  For both the individualists and their theorized 
preference for cap-and-trade and the egalitarian and their theorized preference 
for renewable energy, mean differences for incongruent narrative tracks  were 
significant and negative.  All of the hypotheses offered in this chapter have been 
rejected.   
Does cultural narrative content matter for the formation and change of 
opinions related to climate change?  The short answer is no.  All of the significant 
relationships found in this chapter support this conclusion.  More importantly, 
the findings also support the findings of the previous chapter that narrative 
structure matters.  For example, in almost all cases where significance is found, 
affective responses for characters and policy preferences move in directions 
specified by the narrative.  Heroes are liked; villains are disliked; policy 
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preferences are preferred.  However, there remains a pressing question:  why 
did the congruence and incongruence processes modeled in CNM fail to perform 
as expected?   
At least three possible explanations exist.  First, it may be the case that 
the cultural narrative content did not properly mirror cultural theoretic values.  
Perhaps in future research rather than relying on largely qualitative work (i.e., 
Verweij et al. 2006) preliminary empirical work (such as a survey) can be 
conducted to more clearly associate groups, solutions, and cultural symbols to 
cultural type.  Second, the poor alpha’s for the CT indices (unusual for CT 
research) discussed in chapter two may indicate that the sample does not offer a 
truly reliable assessment of CT priors for the population sampled.  Third, the 
“Strong Cultural Type” operationalization, while offering a more theoretically 
pure mode of modeling CT does sacrifice considerable sample to achieve such 
purity.  In turn, many of the ANOVA tests may achieve significance by increasing 
the sample size as many of the differences in means are at least nominally large.  
Fourth, it may be the case that the findings are simply accurate.  One 
explanation could be that narrative information is very successful at 
overwhelming prior orientations; however, these cross-sectional data do not 
speak to the longevity of such an effect.  It may very well be the case that these 
effects are quite temporary and would require repeated reinforcement to 
endure as a part of an individual’s beliefs and opinions.  In any case, this analysis 
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proceeds on the basis that, in the case of climate change cultural narratives, 
cultural narrative content appears to matter little.   
The next chapter summarizes the findings presented in chapters three 
and four.  The focus is to situate these findings in the context of the literature 
presented in chapter one and the Cultural Narrative Model summarized in 
chapter two.  Emerging from this discussion is a final model demonstrating how 
narratives help shape opinion.  Specifically, the consistent findings across 
chapters three and four point to the importance of characters.  These characters 
are demonstrated to play a central role in shaping the effectiveness of narrative 
persuasion.      
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CHAPTER 5: CHARACTERS AND NARRATIVE PERSUASION 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation a case is made that the condition 
of high salience necessary for public opinion to influence climate change public 
policy (Burstein 2003; 2006) is present (Leiserowitz, 2005; Nisbet & Myers, 
2007).  In practical terms, this means that what the public believes in relation to 
climate change is likely to influence what policy makers decide to do and what 
sorts of public policy emerge from those decisions.   Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to know what and why the public believes what it does about this volatile 
political issue. It is also demonstrated in chapter one that while there is near 
unanimity in the scientific community on the reality of climate change (mean 
global temperature increases) and that anthropogenic greenhouse gasses are a 
principal cause of that warming, a non-trivial component of the American public 
does not agree with the scientific community (e.g., Nisbet & Myers, 2007).   
Two academic theories have been offered to explain the gap in opinions 
between this potentially pivotal component of the American public and the 
scientific community.  The first, the knowledge-deficit model (e.g., Kellstedt et 
al., 2008), finds that individuals simply lack the information necessary to draw 
the same conclusions as the scientific community.  By extension then, the 
solution to the “problem” of a divergence between public and scientific opinion 
is to better inform the public by providing the largely agreed upon scientific 
findings—with more emphasis on the level of agreement.  The second model 
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draws attention to the framing of climate change by mass media.  Titled the 
sensational media model (e.g., Boykoff & Boycoff, 2008), this approach to 
understanding the divergence between scientific and public opinion finds that 
media’s focus on sensational facets of climate change, such as conflict and 
novelty, create gross misconceptions in the public related to these foci.  For 
example, scholars find that the focus on conflict (Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007) and 
the inherent uncertainty of scientific findings (Zehr, 2000) leads many members 
of the pubic to perceive larger levels of disagreement in the scientific community 
than can be empirically verified (Antilla, 2008; Boycoff & Boycoff, 2007). Similarly 
to the knowledge-deficit model, the solution in the case of the sensational media 
model is to have media outlets report more accurate information.  While 
frequently portrayed as alternative explanations of mass opinion on climate 
change, both models normatively favor transferring “correct” information to the 
public.  However, the discussion in chapter one also sought to draw attention to 
the incredibly complex science behind climate change and how it is very unlikely 
that the lay-person forms opinions about climate change by primarily relying on 
the science driving climate change findings.  Emerging from the discussion of 
these two models and the science behind climate change is a gap in our social 
scientific knowledge concerning the possible synergies between prior values and 
the structure and content of incoming climate change communications.  In short, 
despite the complexities of the science involved, individuals do form opinions 
about climate change and it is unlikely that simply providing more “objective” 
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information about climate change will close the gap between the public and 
scientists.   When individuals process information, they do so through the filters 
provided by their identities, which in turn are constituted by their life 
experiences and values.   
Specified in chapter two, the Cultural Narrative Model (CNM) posits an 
individual whose opinions about climate change are heavily biased by their prior 
values and knowledge.  Importantly, it is also theorized that incoming narrative 
information is likely affectively interacting with these priors to facilitate opinion 
formation and change about climate change.   In attempting to capture the 
influence of these interactions, CNM offers two general categories of variables: 
endogenous and exogenous.  Endogenous variables specified in CNM include 
controls such as demographics, ideology, partisanship, and prior knowledge 
about climate change.  The endogenous variables of interest in CNM are Cultural 
Theoretic (CT) priors. 
CT measures respondent values along the two dimensions of grid and 
group (e.g., Tompson et al. 1990).  Group measures the extent to which an 
individual values group interactions; grid measures the extent to which an 
individual values and expects those groups to constrain their behavior.  By 
surveying respondents, individuals can be classified as one of four cultural types: 
individualist, fatalist, hierarch, and egalitarian.  CT survey metrics have been 
frequently shown to outperform the controls modeled in CNM across an array of 
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public opinion related dependent variables (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Kahan & 
Braman, 2007).   
Because narrative is likely the primary cognitive (e.g., Gerrig & Egidi, 
2003; Klein, 2003) and communicative schema for human beings (Berinsky & 
Kinder, 2006), narrative theory is employed to construct an exogenous message 
structure in the CNM.  Narrative structures are defined as stories with a 
beginning, middle, and end that take place in a particular setting, have 
characters, and offer a moral to the story (Jones & McBeth, 2010).  CT provides 
the cultural content for each narrative. 
Focusing on the gap in climate change opinion research produced by 
insufficient attention to potential interactions between individual priors and 
message structure and content, an experiment was performed in the spring of 
2009.  The experimental manipulations in the experiment consist of climate 
change narratives populated by cultural theoretic content (e.g., Verweij et al. 
2006), where narrative structure and content are alternatively held constant.  
Two research questions are addressed: 
RQ1:  Cultural Narrative Structure: Does cultural narrative 
structure influence opinions related to climate change? 
RQ2:  Cultural Narrative Content: Does cultural narrative content 
explain variation in opinions related to climate change? 
Twenty-four hypotheses derived from these research questions are 
tested in chapters three and four, addressing each respective research question 
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in sequence.  In what follows is a summary of findings presented in the stated 
chapters.  While consistent statistically significant relationships were found, a 
substantial number of findings are either insignificant, or only intermittently so.  
However, the trends in the findings in both chapters point to the attribution of 
affect to characters as an important function of narrative.  How might these 
affective character findings influence narrative persuasion?  Subsequent sections 
of this chapter analyze the relationship between character affect and climate 
change opinion related dependent variables examined in this research.  This 
chapter concludes by situating findings within the context of previous research 
discussed in chapter one and offers a discussion for the implications of these 
findings for the CNM theorized in chapter two.     
 
5.1 Summary Findings for Narrative Structure and Content 
Employing statistical analyses including OLS regression and one-way 
ANOVA, chapter three addresses to what extent narrative structure influences 
respondent preferences for climate change opinion related dependent variables.  
Specifically, responses to survey questions by individuals randomly assigned to 
the cultural narrative treatments are compared to responses in the control 
group.  In the first part of this chapter, OLS regression analysis are performed 
where the experimental cultural narrative treatments are the independent 
variables of interest, while also controlling for age, education, gender, income, 
race, ideology, climate change knowledge, and strength of cultural type.  
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Significantly negative relationships are found between the individualist and 
hierarchical narratives for both narrator threat and author trust.  Respondents 
randomly assigned to these narrative treatments perceive the anonymous 
author of the individualist and hierarchical narratives as perceiving climate 
change less of a risk than respondents in the control.  Similarly, respondents 
assigned to the individualist and hierarchal narratives also tend to trust the 
author of the narratively structured communication less than the anonymous 
author of the fact list presented in the control.   There is some evidence to 
suggest that respondents react more negatively to narratively structured 
communications, particularly in levels of trust for the author.   
The null hypotheses for these relationships were rejected (H01 and H02
OLS regression analysis in chapter three confirms several hypotheses (H
); 
however it is important to note the difficulty in generalizing from these findings.  
The egalitarian cultural narrative does not yield a statistically significant 
relationship with either author trust or narrator threat.  In fact, the partial 
regression coefficient for the egalitarian narrative’s relationship with author 
trust nominally moves in the opposite direction of the partial regression 
coefficients in the other two cultural narrative treatments.  Promising as these 
findings are, more conclusive research and analysis is necessary to draw forth 
generalizable relationships between these two dependent variables and 
narrative structure.   
6 
through H8) related to respondent affective assessments of characters in each 
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narrative as well as preferences for each stories favored policy solution (i.e., the 
moral of the story).  Related to characters, across the board and in every case 
narrative structure facilitates a strong affective response from individuals 
assigned to each cultural narrative treatment.  Importantly, affect moves in 
directions specified by the cultural narrative:  heroes receive more positive affect 
and villains receive more negative affect.  Regarding narrative structure, policy 
preferences perform similarly, but less consistently than the character affect 
measures. 
OLS regression analysis demonstrates that five of nine policy preferences 
partial regression coefficients are significantly related to narrative structure in 
directions specified by the narrative. Both hypotheses H8 and H9 are confirmed. 
In two cases, policies argued for are positively related to narrative structure.  
Respondents exposed to the individualist narrative prefer the cap-and-trade 
solution; respondents exposed to the egalitarian narrative prefer renewable 
energy.  While each cultural narrative argues for a particular cultural solution, 
the narratives also admonish the two presented in the other two narratives.  
Three partial regression coefficients for the negatively portrayed policy solutions 
are significant.  Respondent preferences for cap-and-trade and nuclear energy in 
the egalitarian narrative are found significant and negatively related to narrative 
structure.  Likewise, renewable energy is demonstrated to be negatively related 
to exposure to the hierarchical narrative treatment.   
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The final section of chapter three assesses the influence of narrative 
structure while accounting for the potential synergy between cultural priors and 
the cultural narrative content of each story.  This synergy is operationalized as 
congruence and incongruence, where strong cultural types were expected to 
resist or embrace information based upon the cultural symbolism of each 
narrative.  Examining differences in mean responses for strong cultural types by 
cultural narrative treatment across all the dependent variables analyzed in the 
previous sections of chapter three yields the acceptance of one hypothesis 
(H12a
Taken in total, the findings and hypotheses tests in chapter three indicate 
that narrative structure matters across a host of climate change opinion related 
dependent variables.  The influence of narrative is particularly pronounced in the 
cases of character affect and policy preferences.  Surprisingly, however, the 
biased assimilation processes modeled in CNM, operationalized in terms of 
).  Respondents of congruent cultural type to the cultural narrative 
treatment show statistically meaningful differences in means from means of the 
same strong cultural type respondents in the control group for affective 
ascriptions to the hero of each narrative. This difference between the narrative 
treatments and the control is in all cases positive.  However, if this finding is 
considered in light of the more pervasive hypotheses rejections for this section 
of chapter three, there is a clear pattern that indicates that affective character 
ascription is moving in directions specified by the narrative treatment and not by 
interactions with cultural priors and cultural narratives.   
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cultural congruence and incongruence, do not perform as CNM expects.  Chapter 
four examines these unexpected findings related to congruence and 
incongruence in more detail by comparing survey responses across cultural 
narrative treatments. 
The analyses presented in chapter four addresses RQ2 in terms of 
congruence and incongruence.  That is, what effect does the cultural content of 
each narrative have on respondent opinions about climate change?  However, 
before directly addressing this research question the first section of chapter four 
examines the independent influence of CT measures on all of the climate change 
opinion related dependent variables analyzed throughout this research.  The 
intent of this analysis is to determine the strength and direction of any influence 
over relevant DV’s that CT might have.   
OLS regression analysis is performed on a host of dependent variables, 
controlling for age, education, gender, income, race, ideology, and climate 
change knowledge.  CT measures are aggregations of the three CT survey 
questions relevant for the individualist, hierarch, and egalitarian cultural types.  
In many ways CT measures perform as previous research would expect.  
Respondents that scored high on the individualism measure have lower 
perceptions of the risk climate change poses to both them directly and society 
more generally; the inverse is true for respondents that scored high in 
egalitarianism.  High individualist scores also correspond to significantly less of a 
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belief that climate change is real, a belief that human beings are the cause, and a 
willingness to regulate GHG’s.  Again the inverse is true for egalitarianism. 
The interesting finding in this section of chapter three’s analysis is the 
direction of significant relationships for hierarchy.  Typically, hierarchy is more in 
line with individualism in terms of the direction of relationships.  For example, 
hierarchs and individualists both tend to support nuclear energy (Ellen & Slovic, 
1996).  However, many of the significant relationships identified by the OLS 
regression analyses indicate hierarchy parallels egalitarian findings.  In two of the 
narrative treatments, hierarchy is positively related to sociotropic risk.  In both 
the individualist and egalitarian cultural narratives, as hierarchy increases so too 
does a respondent’s belief that climate change is real, the human beings are a 
cause, and the respondent’s willingness to regulate GHG’s increases as well.  
While the hierarchy CT measure does perform in the opposite way that we might 
expect for many of the relationships where significance is found, the findings are 
not out of bounds per se.  Hierarchs are defined by their adherences to standard 
practices and norms and thus inherently conservative in a literal way.  It may 
simply be the case that climate change as a reality is more a part of the status 
quo than it used to be.  In any case, the fundamental conclusion drawn from 
chapter four’s analyses of CT measures is that these measures are an effective 
way to explain many of the DV’s examined in this research.  Having found CT to 
be a meaningful explanatory variable across a multitude of dependent variables, 
the next section of chapter four sought to determine if meaningful interactions 
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are taking place between cultural priors and the cultural content of the 
experimental narrative instruments. 
The CNM theorizes an individual that is biased in their processing of 
information.  Individuals are hypothesized to process congruent information 
readily and perhaps passively.  Incongruent information, on the other hand, is 
actively counter-argued and CNM posits an even stronger negative reaction by 
respondents to incongruent information (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Lodge & Taber, 
2006).  To assess congruence and incongruence the analyses in chapter three 
compares strong cultural type survey responses for climate change opinion 
related dependent variables across cultural narrative treatments.   Mean 
differences are found to be insignificant for virtually all the dependent variables 
examined, save for character affect and policy preferences.  Importantly, in each 
and every case where mean differences are significant, the direction of that 
difference is in the direction specified by the narrative: heroes are liked, villains 
are disliked, policies argued for are preferred, and policies argued against are not 
preferred—regardless of strong cultural type congruent or incongruent random 
assignment.  Surprisingly, and very much against what the CNM would expect, 
not a single congruence or incongruence hypotheses related to narrative content 
was accepted in chapter four.   
 Chapter four’s discussion conjectures as to why the congruence and 
incongruence tests fail to produce results the CNM would expect.  Among 
several reasonable conjectures offered in chapter four was that the cultural 
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content of the narratives did not adequately represent CT biases.  Perhaps, but it 
is also worthwhile to recognize that when examining mean differences within 
cultural narrative tracks, that strong cultural types do produce different means.  
Future analysis will examine these differences within experimental tracks to 
probe deeper into congruence and incongruence and the potential differential 
effect of cultural narratives on strong cultural type.  At any rate, this research 
moves forward on the merits of the findings produced in chapters three and 
four.  Narrative structure appears to play a central role in opinion formation and 
change, while narrative content does not.  What stands out most noticeably in 
the analyses presented in the previous chapters is that the role of narrative 
structure is incredibly powerful and remarkably consistent in shaping affect for 
characters in ways directed by the narrative.  Emerging from this process of 
discovery driven by the robust findings is a new and unexpected question.  What 
role might these characters play in shaping climate change opinion more 
generally?  The next section of this chapter examines this question.   
 
5.2 Character Affect and Mass Opinions on Climate Change 
The heroic deed often signifies less a material than a symbolic reparation: 
a shift of affect from the vulnerability of victimization to the powerful 
confidence of valiant accomplishment.  Redemption, restitution, 
reparation, and revenge are all codified within the hero’s achievement 
and serve to deepen the significance of his or her deed. 
 
--Anker, 2006, p.25 (emphasis added) 
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The findings presented in chapters three and four tell us that the cultural 
narratives deployed in this experimental research were quite effective in both 
convincing the reader to like the hero and dislike the villain.  On the surface, 
these findings are interesting, but to this point the findings have not been linked 
to the transfer of climate change information and policy positions central to this 
dissertations research.  In short, characters are an obvious and necessary 
element of any narrative, but aside from being liked or disliked, what role might 
they play in shaping public opinion about climate change?   
 Narrative theory places a premium on the importance of characters to 
the stories they occupy.  For example, Deborah Stone (2002) argues that policy 
stories “…have heroes and villains and innocent victims, and pit the forces of evil 
against the forces of good” (2002, p.138).   A potential inference one may draw 
from Stone’s statement is that values manifest and collide through the narrative 
vehicle of characters.  Therefore, if this inference is correct, it is likely that the 
characters themselves come to embody the arguments, assumptions, and values 
of the stories they populate.  In the case of the climate change story 
experimental manipulations, these arguments, assumptions, and values are 
explicit and consistent across all tracks.   
 Each cultural narrative begins from the same set of facts about climate 
change.  Each narrative treatment assumes or explicitly argues that global 
warming is real, humans are a cause, there is a credible threat from warming 
effects, and that GHG’s should be regulated.  Each narrative also argues for a 
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culturally specific solution to the GHG problem and places a heroic champion in 
front of the reader capable of realizing that solution.  Villains, on the other hand, 
are adorned with nefarious motives and manipulative policy solutions of the 
“other” cultural types.  The hero of each story should embody each of the 
assumptions and arguments supported by all cultural narratives while the villains 
are the antitheses of the hero—and by extension all of the assumptions and 
arguments supported in all cultural narrative treatments.  Empirically, then, two 
new hypotheses are tested: 
H25
H
:  The Hero: As affect for the hero increases, respondent 
reactions to assumptions, arguments, and positions taken 
by the hero will increase. 
26
In testing these two hypotheses, the final analysis presented in this dissertation 
attempts to unearth how narratives influence public opinion.   
:  The Villain: As affect for the villain increases, respondent 
reactions to assumptions, arguments, and positions taken 
by the hero will decrease. 
 The OLS regression analysis presented in an early section of chapter three 
shows that the cultural narrative treatments employed in this research’s 
experimental design are exceptionally effective at both increasing respondent 
affective ascriptions for heroes and reducing respondent affective ascriptions for 
villains.  It is worthwhile to briefly revisit these findings.  For all hero characters, 
a respondent’s exposure to a cultural narrative increases affect for that hero 
203 
 
ranging from .641 to .718 of a point on a scale of zero to ten.  Similarly, for the 
villain characters, respondent affect decreases range from -1.281 to -1.754 when 
exposed to the cultural narrative stimuli.   On an 11-point scale, such as the one 
used to assess character affect, a .641 positive shift equates to 5.8% increase 
from respondents in the control group.  Alternatively, a -1.754 affective decrease 
equates to a 15.9% negative shift relative to the respondent affective 
assessments in the control.  These shifts in affect are not slight.  While the hero 
and villain structural narrative treatment of the groups in each cultural narrative 
help respondents shape affect, there is also strong evidence that the narrative 
treatment of characters also helps many respondents form any affective 
judgment whatsoever.  Figure 5.1 illustrates this point.   
Each column in Figure 5.1 represents the percentage of respondents who 
answered “don’t know” when prompted to provide affect for each of the groups 
treated as heroes or villains in each of the cultural narrative treatments.  The 
difference between the control group and the remaining cultural narratives is 
striking.  Recall that in the control group, respondents receive no textual cues 
related to the group.   The “don’t know responses” are in all cases much higher 
in the control, ranging from a low of 26.6% for Earthfirst to a high of 46.8% for 
the Club of Rome.  Clearly, as Figure 5.1 demonstrates, the cultural narratives 
are far more affective at providing cues that allow respondents to form 
emotional responses to groups in the first place.   
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Having shown that the cultural narratives in this research help respondents form 
initial affective appraisals of the groups treated as characters and that once 
formed the affective assessment of the character moves in the direction 
specified by the narrative, the next set of analyses explore to what extent these 
affective ascriptions guide responses toward other assumptions and arguments 
built into each narrative.   
OLS regression analysis is performed on each climate change dependent 
variable analyzed in chapters three and four to test H25 and H26
The left hand column in Table 5.1 indicates the character independent 
variables of interest in each OLS regression.  Moving from left to right, each 
column represents an independent OLS regression, reporting partial regression 
coefficients and significance for each regression.  Moving from top to bottom are 
the population subdivisions of the analyses by cultural narrative treatment.  The 
hero character is set off from the remaining table by grayed table cells and 
outlined table rows.  The remaining white table cells represent villain characters.   
.  The 
independent variables of interest in each regression are the character affective 
responses to heroes and villains by individuals randomly assigned to one of the 
three cultural narrative experimental treatments.  Controls include age, 
education, gender, income, race, ideology, climate change knowledge, and CT 
measures.  Each OLS regression is performed on a subpopulation of the entire 
sample broken down by cultural narrative track.  Table 5.1 summarizes these 
findings (see appendix x-x for fully specified OLS regression tables).   
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In total there are thirty-three OLS regressions where the character independent 
variables (as well as the control variables) are regressed on eleven different dependent 
variables demarcated by cultural narrative treatment.  The following discussion of 
findings that follows is broken down by dependent variable.   
Narrator threat is a measure designed to assess how much of a threat the 
respondent feels the anonymous author of the cultural narrative believes climate 
change to pose.  In all three cultural narrative treatments, as positive affect for the 
hero increases so too does the respondent’s sense of narrator threat.  In the hierarch 
cultural narrative both villains show a significant relationship with narrator threat.  As 
respondent affect for the villain increases, the respondent’s perceptions of narrator 
threat decreases.  Both findings for villains and heroes are as hypothesized where 
significance is found.   
 Measured on a scale of zero to ten, where one means no trust and ten means 
complete trust, narrator trust measures the extent to which the respondent believes 
they can trust that the information and arguments presented in the cultural narrative 
are forthright and accurate.  Only the hero of each narrative demonstrates statistical 
significance and does so in expected directions in all treatments.  In all cases a one 
point increase in character affect for the hero corresponds to roughly a half a point 
increase in narrator trust.   
 Measured on a scale from zero to ten where zero means extremely negative 
and ten means extremely positive, affect is a measure designed to assess a 
respondent’s overall emotional reaction to the entire cultural narrative treatment.  In 
208 
 
all cases, positive affect for the hero of each narrative is associated with positive 
increases in overall narrative affect.  Much like narrator trust, a one point increase in 
hero affect is related to roughly a half of a point increase in affect.  Interestingly, the 
Cato Institute is positively related to affect in the hierarch narrative.  In the case of 
heroes, relationships are as hypothesized; however, the relationship found between 
the villain Cato Institute and affect moves in the opposite direction hypothesized.   
Measured on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat at all and 
ten means extreme threat, personal risk is a metric designed to assess how much of a 
threat a respondent believes climate change poses to them personally.  In all cultural 
narrative treatments there is a significant and positive relationship between affect for 
the hero and personal risk.  The enemy character of the Cato Institute in the hierarch 
narrative also shows a significant relationship with the personal risk dependent 
variable.  A one point increase in a respondents affect for the Cato Institute 
corresponds with -.113 of a point decrease in the respondent’s assessment of personal 
risk.  All significant findings for personal risk move in directions hypothesized.  
 Measured in the same manner as personal risk, sociotropic risk is a metric 
designed to assess the respondent’s perceptions of how much of a threat climate 
change poses for the United States over the next fifty years.  In all cultural narrative 
treatments the hero of each story achieves significance in the positive direction 
hypothesized.  Additionally, in the hierarchical narrative both villains demonstrate a 
significant relationship with sociotropic risk.  As affect for the Cato Institute increases 
there is a negative corresponding decrease in sociotropic risk.  The hero and Cato 
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Institute findings are as hypothesized.  However, the remaining significant relationship 
between affect for the villain Ecodefense and sociotropic risk in the hierarchic 
narrative moves in the opposite direction hypothesized.  A one point increase in affect 
for Ecodefense corresponds with a .135 increase in sociotropic risk.   
 Much like personal and sociotropic risk, climate change belief, anthropogenic 
cause, and GHG regulation are all affirmative positions taken by each of the cultural 
narratives.  Measured on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely 
disagree and ten means completely agree, climate change belief is a post-stimulus 
survey question designed to assess how much the respondent believes that climate 
change is actually happening.  In all of the narrative treatments positive affect for the 
hero is significantly related to an increase in climate change belief.  None of the villains 
achieve statistical significance for this dependent variable. 
 Anthropogenic cause, measured on a scale from zero to ten where zero means 
completely disagree and ten means completely agree, is a metric that determines to 
what extent the respondent believes that human GHG emissions are a principal cause 
of climate change.  The hero in each cultural narrative treatment achieves significance 
in directions hypothesized.  Positive affect for the Cato Institute in the individualist 
narrative, the Club of Rome in the hierarchical narrative, and Ecodefense in the 
egalitarian narrative all translate into an increased belief by respondents that climate 
change is a human generated problem.  Villain characters in all tracks fail to produce 
statistically meaningful relationships with the dependent variable.   
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 GHG regulation, measured on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at 
all important and ten means extremely important, is a measure intended to evaluate 
how willing the respondent is to regulate human generated greenhouse gasses.  Two 
of the villain characters yield statistically significant relationships with the dependent 
variable.  A positive affective increase for the Cato Institute in the hierarch narrative 
corresponds to respondents being less willing to regulate GHG’s. This relationship is as 
hypothesized.  The relationship between respondent affective assessments of  
Ecodefense in the individualist narrative moves in the opposite direction hypothesized 
for villains.  A one point increase in affect for Ecodefense corresponds to a .220 
increase in respondent willingness to regulate GHG’s.   As the hero hypothesis expects, 
each hero in all three cultural narratives shows a significant and positive relationship 
between hero affect and a willingness to regulate GHG’s. 
 Three policy preference variables and their relationship to character affect are 
analyzed in Table 5.1: cap-and-trade, nuclear energy, and renewable energy.  The 
individualist narrative advocates cap-and-trade, the hierarch narrative advocates 
nuclear energy, and the egalitarian narrative advocates renewable energy.  Each of the 
cultural narratives maligns the favored solution of the other cultural types.  Each 
preference is measured on a scale from zero to ten, where zero is completely disagree 
and ten is completely agree.   
 Increase in respondent affect for each hero in every cultural narrative 
corresponds with an increase in preference for the policy solution offered in each 
cultural narrative.  H26 states that as positive affect for the villain character increases, 
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that positions supported by the hero will decrease.  Therefore, we would expect that 
support for the villain will reduce support for the advocated policy solution of a given 
cultural narrative.  Two culturally narrative preferred policy variables demonstrate a 
significant relationship with villain affect.29
 H
  Positive affect for the Club of Rome in the 
individualist narrative corresponds to increased preferences for cap-and-trade; 
increased affect for the Cato Institute in the hierarch narrative results in more support 
for nuclear energy.  Hero coefficients move in directions hypothesized while villain 
coefficients (where significance is found) do not.  
25 and H26
                                                          
29 Partial regression coefficients and significance for all policy preferences are reported 
in Table 5.1.  However, only coefficients related to hypotheses H26 are discussed in this 
analysis.  Interesting findings not discussed at length do draw attention back to 
congruence and incongruence and cultural content.  For example, affect for the villain 
Ecodefense corresponds to increased preferences for renewable energy in both the 
individualist and hierarch cultural narratives.  In both of these narratives, renewable 
energy is maligned specifically for its egalitarian values.   
 are tested by regressing character independent variables and 
controls on each climate change dependent variable examined in the previous 
chapters of this research to discern to what extent narrative characters help to shape 
respondent opinion about climate change. In total thirty-three OLS regressions are 
presented in Table 5.1’s summary of findings.  In every case, positive affect for the 
hero character corresponds with an increase in measures designed to capture the 
assumptions and arguments presented in the cultural narrative experimental 
treatments.  Affect for villain characters is only intermittently significant with eight of a 
possible thirty-three partial regression coefficients demonstrating significance.  Of 
those eight, three move in the opposite direction hypothesized.  Most importantly, 
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eight of the nine coefficients demonstrating significance are found in the hierarch 
narrative.  In all cases where coefficients move in the direction hypothesized, those 
cases occur in the hierarch narrative.  The importance of this point is to recognize that 
there may be something specific to the hierarch narrative’s focus on nuclear energy 
that brings mediating factors yet unspecified in the modeling that influence responses.  
In any case, there is more than enough evidence to accept H25, while the evidence for 
H26 is underwhelming and largely only applicable to the hierarch narrative.  H25 is 
accepted; H26
 
 is rejected.   
5.2 CNM Reconsidered: Narrative Implications for Climate Change Opinion 
This dissertation research set out to explain why there is a difference between 
scientific and public opinion about facts, arguments, assumptions, and policy 
preferences related to climate change.  Two dominant social scientific models have 
been previously deployed to address this question.  The knowledge-deficit model finds 
that the gap can be addressed by providing the correct scientific findings to the public; 
the sensational media model finds that media are primarily responsible for transferring 
both incorrect information and climate change foci that draw the public’s attention to 
issues such as scientific uncertainty, which the lay person is thought to improperly 
understand.  In both cases, the assumption is that objectively sanitized information will 
steer the public in right direction—that being toward the opinions held by scientists.  
However, the review of this previous research presented in chapter one finds that 
neither model pays sufficient attention to the likely interactions taking place between 
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messages about climate change and the values people filter those messages through.   
To address the difference between the public and the scientific community while 
attempting to capture these interactions, the Cultural Narrative Model (CNM) was 
offered.   
 The intent of CNM was to draw upon two of the most encompassing (and 
therefore compelling) theories of human behavior: Cultural Theory (CT) and narrative.  
The review of the literature in chapter two demonstrated that CT is empirically shown 
to explain a large array of preferences and opinions.  Narrative, while rarely empirically 
verified, has long been claimed to have similar explanatory power, albeit by largely 
qualitative or analytic scholarship.  Indeed, Wildavsky (1987) observed that one’s 
culture is always at hand, providing valuable information shortcuts that facilitate 
decision-making and information processing; Hayden White (1987), a prominent 
narrative scholar, makes a similar observation about narrative, noting that narratives 
are ubiquitous if not omnipresent. It would seem, then, that CT and narrative have a 
natural synergy, which previous scholarship had confirmed (e.g., Verweij et al. 2006).   
If White and Wildavsky’s daring assertions were correct, then these two theories 
merged into a single model (CNM) should explain considerable variation in public 
opinion about climate change and demonstrate portability to other policy domains—
or at least that was the hope. 
 On this front, this research has largely failed.  The CNM does not appear to 
capture the interactions that spawned its construction.  Rather, the analyses of 
chapters three and four show that in only a few instances do the interactions between 
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cultural priors and the cultural content of narratively structured messages appear to 
matter.  However, as is often the case with any truly deductive research endeavor, 
meaningful and unexpected findings did emerge.   
Narrative structure was shown to play a prominent role in shaping many of the 
climate change opinion related dependent variables examined in this research.  
Comparing cultural narrative survey responses to survey responses in the control, 
chapter three demonstrated that narrative structure, in a general sense, shapes 
narrator trust, narrator risk, character affect, and policy preferences.   
Chapter four compared survey responses across cultural narrative treatments.  
Again, and perhaps more convincingly than the findings of chapter three, the 
interactions between respondent cultural priors and cultural narrative content failed 
to manifest.  However, in the non-findings of chapter four emerged a pronounced 
pattern of differences in means that looked to be directed by the narrative structural 
treatments of the content identified in chapter three.  Specifically, this pattern was 
most pronounced in the character affective assessments provided by respondents.  In 
short, heroes were clearly liked and villains were clearly disliked.  The numerical 
movement on character affect variables was observed to be large and undeniable.  It is 
important to note that the decision to include characters in the CNM was driven by 
narrative theory and initially thought only to be a necessary structural component of 
narrative that help tie the various structural components together.  That is, characters 
were theoretically conceived to play a contributing part to narrative persuasion when 
aggregated with other structural elements such as plot or setting.  However, given the 
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strength and direction of character affective assessments, a new question and set of 
hypothesis emerged: what role might these characters play directly in shaping opinion 
about climate change?     
In unorthodox fashion, this chapter, the concluding chapter, deployed a set of 
empirical analyses intended to isolate the driver of narrative persuasion:  character 
affect.  Reexamining every climate change opinion related dependent variable 
analyzed in the previous chapters, character affect was moved from the dependent 
variable side of the equation to the independent variable side of the equation. While 
findings for villain characters were scattered and in many cases moving in the opposite 
direction hypothesized, the results for hero characters were surprisingly consistent 
and robust.   
In each and every case, regardless of group or cultural content, more positive 
affect for the hero means higher respondent scores on measures of narrator threat, 
narrator trust, affect, personal risk, sociotropic risk, climate change belief, 
anthropogenic cause, GHG regulation, and the preferred policy solution.  This is an 
especially powerful set of findings when one considers other character related findings 
presented in this research.  First, recall that being exposed to the cultural narrative 
dramatically lowered the number of “don’t know” responses for character affect 
relative to the control group.  Respondents, when exposed to a cultural narrative, 
were better able to draw emotional conclusions about a group portrayed as either a 
villain or hero than respondents lacking a narrative stimulus in the control group.   
Second, the analysis of chapter three shows that when exposed to a cultural narrative, 
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respondents show higher levels of affect for the hero and lower levels of affect for the 
villain.  In short, this research shows that narrative structures help respondents form 
affective judgments for characters, provide direction for those judgments, and then 
once in place, those affective assignments play a powerful role in convincing 
respondents to support the arguments and assumptions of the story.   At least in the 
case of opinions about climate change, narrative structure matters.  The portability of 
these findings will be determined by their applicability to other policy areas. 
Situating these findings in previous scholarship is a relatively straightforward 
endeavor.  The control group in this research received a simple list of facts taken from 
the IPCC 2007 report.  The list lacked the narrative structure of the experimental 
treatments and was scrubbed of overt value statements and the cultural symbolism 
and content deliberately placed in the cultural narrative stimuli.  These facts were 
designed to be a much more “objective” source of information for the respondents.  
Respondents clearly show a positive reaction to the narrative treatments in the sense 
they are more persuaded by them to align themselves with scientific opinion.  
Specifically, respondents are persuaded through the vehicle of the hero.   
Importantly then, we can conclude that any climate change message is likely to 
be more effective if portrayed in narrative form.  In terms of previous research, this 
means that the media is very likely to play a critical role in shaping opinion as the 
media is more likely to use narration and the media is also a primary source of the 
public’s information on all things climate change.  This also means that it is likely that 
attempts at objective information dissemination are likely to be ineffective.  The 
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reason for the posited ineffectiveness is that any group that is able to put out its 
arguments in narrative format is also more likely to be more influential in shaping 
opinions than those that do not.   
What this research does not speak to is the longevity of the narrative’s 
influence over a respondent’s preferences.  The analyses conducted here is a cross 
section of the population at one moment in time.  It is an open question as to whether 
or not the persuasion effect sticks with the respondents.  Despite the uncertainty of 
the long term influence of narrative persuasion, it does seem likely that individuals 
exposed to the same narrative again and again are likely to comply with the 
assumptions and arguments of that narrative more stridently than not.  Again, this 
draws attention to the media.  Individuals who selectively expose themselves to 
specific media outlets (e.g., Fox News or MSNBC) are likely to encounter reoccurring 
narrative themes that direct their opinions. 
While this research fails in its attempts to model and capture interactions 
between individual priors and message structure, it does demonstrate the important 
role of narrative in human communication.  Most importantly, this research shows 
that heroes, by helping people make sense of the world, are a core component of 
narrative persuasion.  In my estimation, this finding has a high degree of face validity.  
Anecdotally at least, my experience tells me that everyone seems to need a hero; 
maybe now we are one step closer to knowing why this is the case.   
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APPENDIX A: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE SURVEY, 2009 
 
My name is Michael D. Jones and I am a doctoral candidate in the Political Science 
Department at the University of Oklahoma.  I am requesting that you volunteer to 
participate in a research study titled the Global Climate Change Survey 2010.  You 
were selected as a participant because you volunteered to participate in online surveys 
through Survey Sampling Inc.  
 
The purpose of this study is to measure the opinions and preferences of Americans 
regarding climate change.  If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
respond to an internet survey that takes an average of 15 minutes to complete.  There 
are no risks or benefits associated with participation in this study.  
 
The study will ask questions about climate change.  In the unlikely event that any of 
these questions make you uncomfortable, you may skip that question and continue 
with the survey.  You may also quit the survey at any time, should you desire to do so.  
Should you complete the survey, you will receive three Paypal dollars in compensation.   
 
The records of this study will be kept private.  In published reports, there will be no 
information included that will make it possible to identify you as a research 
participant.  Research records will be stored securely.  The data will not include any 
information that would make it possible to identify you.  Only approved researchers 
will have access to the records.   
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research, I am the primary 
investigator conducting this study and I can be contacted at the Center for Applied 
Social Research at the University of Oklahoma, at 405-325-3084, or at 
jonemic1@gmail.com.  In the event of a research-related injury, contact the 
researcher.  You are encouraged to contact the researcher if you have any questions.  
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research and wish to talk 
to someone other than the researcher, or if you cannot reach the researcher, you may 
contact the University of Oklahoma—Norman Campus Institutional Review Board (OU-
NC IRB) at (405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu. 
 
Please print this information sheet for your records.  By completing and submitting this 
questionnaire, you are agreeing to participate in this study.   
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Q1_Age Screening:  Are you 18 years or older? 
1. Yes [Go to Q2_Age] 
2. No [Exit: Thank you for participating]   
 
Q2_Age: How old are you? [Verbatim] 
 
Q3_Education: What is your highest level of education? 
1. Elementary or some high school 
2. High School Graduate/GED 
3. Some college/vocational school 
4. College graduate 
5. Some graduate work 
6. Master’s degree 
7. Doctorate (of any type) 
8. Other degree (please specify) [verbatim] 
 
Q4_Gender: Are you male or female? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
Q5_party: With which political party do you most identify with? 
1. Democratic Party [skip Q7_lean] 
2. Republican Party [skip Q7_ lean] 
3. Independent  [skip Q6_iden and go to Q7_lean] 
4. Other (Please Specify) [go to Q6_iden and then go to Q7_lean] 
 
Q6_iden: Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party? 
1. Completely 
2. Somewhat 
3. Slightly 
 
Q7_lean: If you had to choose, would you place yourself closer to either the 
Republican or Democratic Party? 
1. Democratic Party 
2. Republican Party 
3. Neither Party represents my views in any way. 
 
Q8_Ideology: On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from 
strongly liberal to strongly conservative.  Which of the following categories best 
describes your view? 
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1. Strongly liberal 
2. Liberal 
3. Slightly liberal 
4. Middle of the road 
5. Slightly conservative 
6. Conservative 
7. Strongly Conservative 
 
 
Lead-in: Now I would like to ask you some multiple-choice questions about the 
political process.  Please answer to the best of your knowledge, and feel free to guess 
even if you aren’t completely sure of your answer. 
 
Q9_House: Which party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives? 
1. Republican 
2. Democrat  
3. Neither, there are equal numbers of both Republicans and Democrats in the House 
of Representatives. 
 
Q10_Veto: How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to 
override a presidential veto? 
1. Two-Thirds 
2. Three-fourths  
3. Four- fifths  
4. Simple Majority 
 
Q10_judge: Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts? 
1. The House of Representatives 
2. The President 
3. The Speaker of the House 
4. The Governor from the state where the judge resides. 
 
Q11_Senate: How long is the term of office for a United States Senator? 
1. 2 years 
2. 4 years 
3. 6 years  
4. 8 years 
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Lead-in: Scientists who specialize in the study of earth’s climate have debated the 
possible effects of climate change.  To the best of your knowledge, do most scientists 
expect any of the following changes in the global climate to take place? 
[Random order: expt1--expt5] 
 
Q12_expt1: Do most scientists expect temperature to rise?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
 
Q13_expt2: Do most scientists expect ocean levels to drop?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q14_expt3: Do most scientists expect more frequent droughts? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q15_expt4: Do most scientists expect fewer floods? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q16_expt5: Do most scientists expect more severe weather storms, like hurricanes 
and tornadoes? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
 
Lead-in:  A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the causes of global 
climate change.  To the best of your knowledge: 
 
[Random order: cause1—cause5] 
 
Q17_cause1: Do scientists believe exhausts from cars and trucks cause global 
temperatures to rise?  
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q18_cause2: Do scientists believe radiation from nuclear power plants causes global 
temperatures to rise?   
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1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q19_cause3: Do scientists believe disposal of toxic chemicals in landfills causes global 
temperatures to rise? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q20_cause4: Do scientists believe coal powered electricity plants cause global 
temperatures to rise? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q21_cause5: Do scientists believe the destruction of jungles and forests causes global 
temperatures to rise? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q22_avgtemp: To the best of your knowledge, how much do scientists think the 
average global temperature will increase over the next 50 to 70 years? 
1. Average global temperature will not increase at all over the next 50 to 70 years. 
2. Slight increase to one degree Fahrenheit 
3. Two to five degrees Fahrenheit  
4. Six to nine degrees Fahrenheit 
5. Ten or more degrees Fahrenheit  
 
 
Lead-in: Now I want to understand more about how you feel about American society.  
On a scale from one to seven, where one means you strongly disagree, and seven 
means you strongly agree, please respond to each of the following statements. 
 
[CULTURE random order: Q23—Q34] 
 
Q23_hier1_ahead: The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
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 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q24_hier2_authority: Our society is in trouble, because we don’t obey those in 
authority. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q25_hier3_rules:  Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift 
punishment on those that break the rules. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q26_ind1_fail: Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let 
people succeed or fail on their own. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q27_ind2_disadvantaged: Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own 
way in the world. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
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 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q28_ind3_indv: We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q29_egal1_Fair: What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the 
distribution of goods more equal. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q30_egal2_Power: Society works best if power is shared equally. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q31_egal3_Income: It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income 
between the rich and the poor. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
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 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q32_fat1_random: Most of the important things that take place in life happen by 
random chance. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q33_fat2_fate: No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely 
determined by forces outside our control. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
 
Q34_fat3_plans: It would be pointless to make serious plans in such an uncertain 
world. 
1 - Strongly disagree 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 - Strongly agree 
_________________________________________ 
 
[Random Track Assignment: Each respondent is randomly assigned to one of four 
tracks] 
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• Track 1: Individualist (a) 
• Track 2: Hierarchy (b) 
• Track 3: Egalitarian (c) 
• Track 4 : Control List (d) 
 
(Text and following questions should be on different pages) 
 
Track 1: Individualist Cultural Narrative (a) 
 
Narrative Lead-in: Now I would like to get your opinion on a recent opinion article 
dealing with climate change.  The article is divided into sections followed by questions 
seeking your opinion on the content.  Due to the nature of the survey, you will not be 
able to return to a section once you have selected next.   
 
Lead-in: The issue of global climate change has been the subject of debate over the 
last few decades.  Recently, a large group of scientists analyzed all of the existing 
studies on climate change and summarized these findings in a way that most involved 
in the debate agree with.  
 
Most agree that the Earth is warming and that over the past one hundred years the 
average temperature has increased by one to two degrees. During this same time 
period, human beings have increased the amount of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere.  The release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels like coal 
and oil are the main contributors to these increased greenhouse gasses.  The summary 
of findings also confirmed that increases in greenhouse gasses tend to warm the 
planet.  Few contest these findings.  
 
Q35a_Standardized Fact Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
not surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised 
you were by the facts presented above. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
 
The summary report by the scientists also made several predictions about what could 
happen in the United States.  Although a bit technical, it is worth looking at some of 
these predictions:  
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed to 
coastal erosion.  
• In Polar Regions such as Alaska, infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and native 
ways of life are 80% likely to suffer significant harm from the effects of climate 
change. There is an 80% certainty that migratory birds, mammals and higher 
predators will suffer significant harm from reductions in glaciers, ice sheets, 
and sea ice.  
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in number, 
intensity, and duration during the course of the century.  
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe summer 
droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime flooding will damage 
crop yields.    
• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to 
decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, which 
would increase competition for water in many western states.  
 
Q36a_ US Scenario Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the potential consequences of climate change in the United States.  
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
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As you can see, climate change is real and the potential consequences here in the 
United States are unsettling. It is also apparent that a reduction in green house gasses 
is necessary. However, despite these potential consequences, real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has been made nearly impossible by the efforts of 
destructive interests.  
 
Government interests, represented by groups like bureaucratic unions and the 
infamous Club of Rome, are attempting to use climate change to promote their own 
agenda. They push for programs that solidify bureaucratic control and increase the size 
and cost of government.  These programs include reliance on unsustainable nuclear 
energy, restrictive international treaties, and some of the more frightening positions 
even advocate across the board population control.  They argue that due to the size of 
the problem, only centralized authority can be trusted to solve the problem.   
 
Environmental advocates, represented by organizations like Ecodefense and the 
radical Earthfirst!, are attempting to use climate change to destroy our capitalist 
system.  These groups demand radical policies that destroy free competition and 
reduce our individual quality of life. These groups put faith in socialized community-
owned energy, invasive consumer laws, and the more dangerous positions advocate 
isolated “eco-communities,” where authority rests in environmental councils.   They 
argue that due to the failure of free markets, only planned communities can be trusted 
to handle climate change.  
 
 
Lead-in: The author mentioned several groups in the previous text.  Using a scale from 
zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, 
please indicate your reaction to these groups. 
 
[Random Q37a—Q39a] 
 
Q37a_Enemy_Egal1: Earthfirst!: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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5—Neutral  
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q38a_Enemy_Egal2: Ecodefense:  
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q39a_Enemy_Hier1: The Club of Rome:   
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
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It is clear that both big government and radical environmental types are using the facts 
about climate change to push a destructive agenda that obstructs any meaningful 
solutions to the problem. To solve this problem we must invoke the value that has 
always served humans the best; that value is our historical reliance on free 
competition.  The innovative cap-and-trade solution relies on this value by taking 
advantage of free competition to generate the cleanest substitutes for coal and oil. 
Thankfully organizations like the Cato Institute have been tirelessly advocating for this 
solution.   
 
The cap-and-trade energy solution drastically reduces the overall amount of 
greenhouse gasses, as businesses are limited by how much they can produce. Each 
business can buy or trade permits within these emissions limits.  So, if a company 
releases greenhouse gasses below what its permits would allow, it may sell or trade its 
permits to a business that produces more.   This solution lets companies that have 
traditionally produced more greenhouse gasses buy from those that produce less.  The 
benefit of the cap-and-trade solution is businesses will have time to adapt to a more 
climate conscious economy while also competing with companies that find creative 
ways to cut costs and emissions.  
 
The problem of climate change reminds us all that the world is rapidly changing. When 
change turns for the worse, it can only get better if we are free to adapt. The cap-and-
trade solution provides a clear path for corporations to freely adapt, provide 
innovative solutions, and solve the problem of global climate change.  Radical ideology 
and more big government are not the answer.  
 
Q42a_Argument Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the arguments made by the author. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
Q43a_ Ally_Ind1: The author mentions the Cato Institute.  Using a scale from zero to 
ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, please 
indicate your reaction to this group.   
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 
Track 2: Hierarchical Cultural Narrative (b) 
 
Narrative Lead-in: Now I would like to get your opinion on a recent opinion article 
dealing with climate change.  The article is divided into sections followed by questions 
seeking your opinion on the content.  Due to the nature of the survey, you will not be 
able to return to a section once you have selected next.   
 
The issue of global climate change has been the subject of debate over the last few 
decades.  Recently, a large group of scientists analyzed all of the existing studies on 
climate change and summarized these findings in a way that most involved in the 
debate agree with.  
 
Most agree that the Earth is warming and that over the past one hundred years the 
average temperature has increased by one to two degrees. During this same time 
period, human beings have increased the amount of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere.  The release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels like coal 
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and oil are the main contributors to these increased greenhouse gasses.  The summary 
of findings also confirmed that increases in greenhouse gasses tend to warm the 
planet.  Few contest these findings.  
 
Q35b_Standardized Fact Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
not surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised 
you were by the facts presented above. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
 
The summary report by the scientists also made several predictions about what could 
happen in the United States.  Although a bit technical, it is worth looking at some of 
these predictions:  
 
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed to 
coastal erosion.  
• In Polar Regions such as Alaska, infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and native 
ways of life are 80% likely to suffer significant harm from the effects of climate 
change. There is an 80% certainty that migratory birds, mammals and higher 
predators will suffer significant harm from reductions in glaciers, ice sheets, 
and sea ice.  
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in number, 
intensity, and duration during the course of the century.  
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe summer 
droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime flooding will damage 
crop yields.    
• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to 
decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, which 
would increase competition for water in many western states.  
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Q36b_ US Scenario Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the potential consequences of climate change in the United States.  
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
 
As you can see, climate change is real and the potential consequences here in the 
United States are alarming. It is also evident that a reduction in green house gasses is 
necessary. However, despite these likely consequences, real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has been made nearly impossible by the efforts of 
destructive interests.   
 
Environmental interests, represented by groups like Ecodefense and the infamous 
Earthfirst!, are attempting to use climate change to promote their own agenda. They 
push for programs that ignore scientific evidence and dismiss how truly complex 
climate change is. These programs include reliance on unproven community-owned 
energy, ineffective consumer laws, and the more radical stances advocate isolated 
“eco-communities,” where authority rests in environmental councils. They argue that 
due to the nature of the problem, only isolated communities can be trusted to solve 
the problem.  
 
Corporate advocates, represented by organizations like the Wall Street Journal and the 
radical Cato Institute, are attempting to use climate change to help generate larger 
profits. These groups demand radical policies that ignore societal responsibility and 
push pollution and costs onto citizens. They put faith in unregulated corporations, 
misinformed consumers, and the more dangerous positions advocate cap-and-trade 
policies that allow industry to sell the right to pollute. They argue that due to the 
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failure of government regulations, only competitive markets can be trusted to handle 
climate change.   
 
 
Lead-in: The author mentioned several groups in the previous text.  Using a scale from 
zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, 
please indicate your reaction to these groups. 
[Random Q37b—Q41b] 
 
Q37b_Enemy_Egal1: Earthfirst!: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 Q38b_Enemy_Egal2: Ecodefense:  
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
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Q40b_Enemy_Ind1: the Cato Institute: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q41b_Enemy_Ind2: the Wall Street Journal:  
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 
It is clear that both radical environmentalists and free market types are using the facts 
about climate change to push a destructive agenda that obstructs any meaningful 
solutions to the problem.  To solve this problem we must invoke the value that has 
always served Americans the best; that value is our historical reliance on scientific 
expertise. The nuclear power solution relies on this value by taking advantage of 
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scientific expertise to use the cleanest substitute for coal and oil. Thankfully groups 
like the Club of Rome have been tirelessly advocating for this solution.   
 
The Nuclear energy solution drastically reduces the overall amount of greenhouse 
gasses, as nuclear energy produces none.   Nuclear power costs less than coal, wind, or 
solar.  It doesn’t need the sun to shine or the wind blowing, so it is also more reliable 
than wind or solar. Nuclear power plants are also safer than coal for those that both 
work and live near them. The one drawback to nuclear power is waste, which is easily 
dealt with by close monitoring and reprocessing waste into more nuclear energy. The 
benefits of the nuclear solution are a clean, plentiful, and inexpensive energy source 
that takes advantage of our greatest scientific accomplishments.   
 
The problem of global climate change reminds us that the world is delicately balanced.  
When mankind disturbs this balance, we must rely on our expertise to bring things 
back into order.  The nuclear energy solution provides a clear path for governments to 
reestablish control through expert management and solve the problem of climate 
change. Radical ideology and more corporate greed are not the answer.   
 
Q42b_Argument Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and 10 means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the arguments made by the author. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
Q43b_ Ally_Hier1: The author mentions the Club of Rome. Using a scale from zero to 
ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, please 
indicate your reaction to this group.  
0 – completely negative 
1 
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2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
 
Track 3: Egalitarian Cultural Narrative (c) 
 
Narrative Lead-in: Now I would like to get your opinion on a recent opinion article 
dealing with climate change.  The article is divided into sections followed by questions 
seeking your opinion on the content.  Due to the nature of the survey, you will not be 
able to return to a section once you have selected next.   
 
The issue of global climate change has been the subject of debate over the last few 
decades.  Recently, a large group of scientists analyzed all of the existing studies on 
climate change and summarized these findings in a way that most involved in the 
debate agree with.  
 
Most agree that the Earth is warming and that over the past one hundred years the 
average temperature has increased by one to two degrees. During this same time 
period, human beings have increased the amount of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere.  The release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels like coal 
and oil are the main contributors to these increased greenhouse gasses.  The summary 
of findings also confirmed that increases in greenhouse gasses tend to warm the 
planet.  Few contest these findings.  
 
Q35c_Standardized Fact Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
not surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised 
you were by the facts presented above. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely agree 
 
 
The summary report by the scientists also made several predictions about what could 
happen in the United States.  Although a bit technical, it is worth looking at some of 
these predictions:  
 
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed to 
coastal erosion.  
• In Polar Regions such as Alaska, infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and native 
ways of life are 80% likely to suffer significant harm from the effects of climate 
change. There is an 80% certainty that migratory birds, mammals and higher 
predators will suffer significant harm from reductions in glaciers, ice sheets, 
and sea ice.  
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in number, 
intensity, and duration during the course of the century.  
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe summer 
droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime flooding will damage 
crop yields.    
• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to 
decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, which 
would increase competition for water in many western states.  
 
Q36c_ US Scenario Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the potential  consequences of climate change in the United States.  
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
 
As you can see, climate change is real and the potential consequences here in the 
United States are terrifying.  It is also obvious that a reduction in green house gasses is 
necessary.  However, despite these terrifying consequences, real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has been made nearly impossible by the efforts of 
destructive interests.  
 
Government interests, represented by groups like the infamous Club of Rome and 
selfish politicians, are attempting to use climate change to promote their own agenda.  
They push for programs that reinforce existing inequalities and increase the wealth 
and power of politicians.  These programs include reliance on unsafe nuclear energy, 
indulgent international treaties, and some of the more frightening positions even 
advocate population control for the poor. They argue that due to the complexity of the 
problem, only specialized experts can be trusted to solve the problem.  
 
Corporate advocates, represented by organizations like the Wall Street Journal and the 
radical Cato Institute, are attempting to use climate change to exploit people for profit. 
These groups demand radical policies that destroy local communities and dramatically 
increase inequality around the globe. They put faith in greedy corporations, ill-
informed consumers, and the more dangerous positions advocate cap-and-trade 
policies that allow industry to sell the right to pollute. They argue that due to the 
failure of community-level efforts only competitive markets can be trusted to handle 
climate change.   
 
 
Lead-in: The author mentioned several groups in the previous text.  Using a scale from 
zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, 
please indicate your reaction to these groups. 
 
[Random 39c-41c] 
 
Q39c_Enemy_Hier1: The Club of Rome: 
0 – completely negative 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q40c_Enemy Ind1: The Cato Institute: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 Q41c_Enemy_Ind2: The Wall Street Journal.  
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
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9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 
It is clear that both big government and free market types are using the facts about 
climate change to push a destructive agenda that obstructs any meaningful solutions 
to the problem.  To solve this problem we must invoke the value that has always 
served humanity the best; that value is our historical reliance on equal participation.  
The community-owned renewables solution relies on this value by taking advantage of 
equal participation to decentralize the cleanest substitutes for coal and oil. Thankfully 
groups like Ecodefense have been tirelessly advocating for this solution.  
 
The community-owned renewable energy solution drastically reduces the overall 
amount of greenhouse gasses, as wind and solar energy produce none.  This plan 
involves local communities purchasing and maintaining their own renewable power.  
In cooperatively purchasing wind and solar farms, communities seize ownership from 
the cause of climate change: government and corporate greed. Community-owned 
renewables have demonstrated three times the job creation and four times the 
property value increases of their corporate counterparts.  Local ownership also 
strengthens communal bonds as people work together to maintain something in which 
they all have a stake. The benefits of community-owned renewable energy are clean, 
plentiful, and inexpensive energy sources that help strengthen communities.   
 
The problem of global climate change reminds us all that the world is fragile.  When 
humanity loses sight of our relationship with nature, the environment will always 
retaliate for our carelessness.  The community-owned renewable energy solution 
provides a clear path for humanity to correct our reckless behavior and solve the 
problem of global climate change.  Governmental excesses and bottomless corporate 
greed are not the answer. 
   
Q39c_Argument Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the arguments made by the author. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
 
Q43c_Ally_Egal2: The author mentions Ecodefense. Using a scale from zero to ten, 
where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, please 
indicate your reaction to this group.   
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Track 4: Control (d) 
 
Lead-in: Now I would like to get your opinion on a recent summary article dealing with 
climate change.  The article is divided into sections followed by question seeking your 
opinion on the content.  Due to the nature of the survey, you will not be able to return 
to a section once you have selected next.   
 
Lead in: The issue of global climate change has been the subject of debate over the 
last few decades.  Recently, a large group of scientists analyzed all of the existing 
studies on climate change and summarized these findings:  
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• Most agree that the Earth is warming and that over the past one hundred years 
the average temperature has increased by one to two degrees.  
• During this same time period, human beings have increased the amount of 
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.   
• The release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels like coal and oil 
are the main contributors to these increased greenhouse gasses.   
• The summary of findings also confirmed that increases in greenhouse gasses 
tend to warm the planet.   
Q35d_ Standardized Fact Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
not surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised 
you were by the list of facts presented above. 
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
Lead in: The summary report by the scientists also made several predictions about 
what could happen in the United States:  
 
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed to 
coastal erosion.  
• In Polar Regions such as Alaska, infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and native 
ways of life are 80% likely to suffer significant harm from the effects of climate 
change. There is an 80% certainty that migratory birds, mammals and higher 
predators will suffer significant harm from reductions in glaciers, ice sheets, 
and sea ice.  
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in number, 
intensity, and duration during the course of the century.  
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe summer 
droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime flooding will damage 
crop yields.    
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• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to 
decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, which 
would increase competition for water in many western states.  
 
Q36d_ US Scenario Surprise: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not 
surprised at all and ten means completely surprised, please indicate how surprised you 
were by the potential consequences of climate change in the United States.  
0 – not surprised at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely surprised 
 
Lead-in: Now we would like to ask your opinion about a few groups commonly 
associated with debates about climate change.  Using a scale from zero to ten, where 
zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, please indicate 
your reaction to these groups.   
 
[Random 37d-41d] 
 
Q37d_Egal1: Earth First!: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
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11—Don’t Know 
 
Q38d_Egal2: Ecodefense:  
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q39d_Hierar1: The Club of Rome:   
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q40d_Ind1: The Cato Institute: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
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4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q41d_Ind2: The Wall Street Journal: 
0 – completely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5--Neutral 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely positive 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 
Q44_Narrator _threat:  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at all 
and ten is extreme threat, how much of a threat do you feel the author of the previous 
article believes climate change to be?   
 0 – no threat at all 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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9 
10 –extreme threat 
 
Q45_Author_trust: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no trust and ten 
means complete trust, how much do you trust that the facts and arguments presented 
in the previous article are accurate? 
0 – no trust 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –complete trust 
 
Q46 _ Affect: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means extremely negative and 
ten means extremely positive, what is your overall reaction to the previous article you 
just read?    
0 – extremely negative 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –extremely positive 
 
Q47_Respondent Risk:  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at all 
and ten is extreme threat, in your considered assessment, how much of a threat do 
you believe climate change poses to you personally in the next 50 years?   
0 – no threat at all 
1 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –extreme threat 
 
Q48_CC_ Action: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important 
and ten means extremely important, how important do you think it is for the U.S. to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
0 - Not at all important 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 – Extremely important 
 
Lead-in: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely disagree and ten 
means completely agree, please indicate how much you agree with the accuracy of the 
following statements: 
 
Q49_CC_Belief: The Earth is warming and over the past one hundred years the 
average temperature has increased by one to two degrees.  
0 – completely disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely agree  
Q50_Human GHG Cause: Human produced greenhouse gasses, such as those resulting 
from the combustion of coal, oil, natural gas, and others are the cause of average 
global temperature increases. 
0 – completely disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely agree 
 
Q51_US _Scenario Assessment: The author indicated that global climate change posed 
some risk to the United States.  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no 
problem whatsoever and ten means devastating, how much of a problem do you 
believe climate change will be for the United States in the next 50 years? 
0 – no problem whatsoever 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely devastating 
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Lead-in: Now, I would like to assess your opinion on several proposals that many argue 
will reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero 
means completely disagree and ten means completely agree, please indicate how 
much you support each of the following proposals: 
 
[Random Order: Pref1—Pref3] 
 
Q52_Pref1_Hier: Many argue that the problem of excessive greenhouse gas emissions 
should be solved by relying more on nuclear energy.  How much do you agree or 
disagree with the nuclear energy approach to reducing greenhouse gases?  
0 – completely disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely agree 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q53_Pref2_Ind: One proposal to deal with greenhouse gas emissions is to use a cap-
and-trade system (also called tradable emissions).  This solution places an overall limit 
on company and industry emissions.  Permits are issued and companies that emit less 
greenhouse gasses can trade or sell their permits to companies that produce more.  
How much do you agree or disagree with the cap-and-trade approach to reducing 
greenhouse gases? 
 0 – completely disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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8 
9 
10 –completely agree   
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
 Q54_Pref3_Egal:  Many argue that excessive greenhouse gas emissions are best 
handled at the community level.  The community based approach contends that it is 
through communities taking direct ownership of renewable energy, such as wind and 
solar farms, that greenhouse gas emissions are best reduced (as opposed to 
corporations or government).  How much do you agree or disagree with the 
community approach to reducing greenhouse gases? 
0 – completely disagree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 –completely agree 
 
11—Don’t Know 
 
Q55 _Race:  Which of the following do you most associate with your own ethnicity or 
race? 
1. American Indian 
2. Asian 
3. Black or African American 
4. Hispanic 
5. White Non-Hispanic 
6. Other: Please Specify 
 
Q56_Income:  Which of the following income categories approximates the total 
estimated annual income from your household for the previous year?   
1. Less than $50,000 [Go to Q56i_Income] 
2. At least $50,000 but less than $100,000 [Go to Q56ii_Income] 
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3. At least $100,000 but less than $150,000 [Go to Q56iii_Income] 
4. $150,000 or more? [Go to Q56iv_Income] 
 
Q56i_Income: Was the estimated annual income for your household last year: 
1. Less than $10,000. 
2. $10,000 to less than $20,000 
3. $20,000 to less than $30,000 
4. $30,000 to less than $40,000 
5. $40,000 to less than $50,000 
 
Q56ii_Income: Was the estimated annual income for your household last year: 
1. $50,000 to less than $60,000 
2. $60,000 to less than $70,000 
3. $70,000 to less than $80,000 
4. $80,000 to less than $90,000 
5. $90,000 to less than $100,000 
 
Q56iii_Income: Was the estimated annual income for your household last year: 
1. $100,000 to less than $110,000 
2. $110,000 to less than $120,000 
3. $120,000 to less than $130,000 
4. $130,000 to less than $140,000 
5. $140,000 to less than $150,000 
 
Q56iv_Income: Was the estimated annual income for your household last year: 
1. $150,000 to less than $160,000 
2. $160,000 to less than $170,000 
3. $170,000 to less than $180,000 
4. $180,000 to less than $190,000 
5. $190,000 to less than $200,000 
6. $200,000 or more 
 
Q57_zip: What is the five digit zip code at your residence? (This information will only 
be used to compare grouped regional differences, not to identify you.)  [verbatim] 
 
Q58_nsort: The text you just read provided a specific perspective on climate change.  I 
am interested in your perspective as well.  Listed below are terms and phrases related 
to popular debates about climate change.  Please group these words into categories 
that you think they belong in based upon whether or not you believe the terms or 
phrases to be related in some way.  There is no right or wrong answer and you should 
organize the terms and phrases in ways that you think they are linked. For example, 
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one person may see no relationship between a freezer and a gas can, while another 
would view them as linked because they are found in their garage. Both responses are 
perfectly valid. Using as many or as few of the six boxes below, please drag and drop 
the term or phrase into one of the boxes below.   You do not have to use all of the 
boxes or all of the words or phrases.   
[Random Ordering 1-27] 
 
1. Club of Rome 
2. Bureaucracy 
3. Government 
4. Nuclear energy 
5. Population control 
6. Scientific expertise 
7. Environmentalists 
8. Earthfirst! 
9. Ecodefense 
10. Community-owned energy 
11. Eco-communities 
12. Equal participation 
13. Cato Institute 
14. The Wall Street Journal 
15. Free Markets 
16. Cap-and-trade 
17. Industry 
18. Competition 
19. Radical 
20. Terrifying 
21. Alarming  
22. Unsettling 
23. Unproven 
24. Unsafe 
25. Balance 
26. Fragile 
27. Changing 
 
Survey Closing Message 
Thank you for participating in The University of Oklahoma’s 2009 Global Climate 
Change Survey.
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APPENDIX B: CULUTRAL NARRATIVE SENTENTIAL CONTENT COMPARISON 
 
The Setting: Standardized Facts (100% Agreement across Conditions: 372 
words)30
The issue of global climate change has been the subject of debate over the last 
few decades.  Recently, a large group of scientists analyzed all of the existing 
studies on climate change and summarized these findings in a way that most 
involved in the debate agree with. (47) 
 
Most agree that the Earth is warming and that over the past one hundred years 
the average temperature has increased by one to two degrees. During this same 
time period, human beings have increased the amount of greenhouse gasses in 
the atmosphere.  The release of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels 
like coal and oil are the main contributors to these increased greenhouse gasses.  
The summary of findings also confirmed that increases in greenhouse gasses 
tend to warm the planet.  Few contest these findings. (86). 
 
The Setting: US Scenario 
 
The summary report by the scientists also made several predictions about what 
could happen in the United States.  Although a bit technical, it is worth looking at 
some of these predictions: (31) 
• In the Northeast, there is 90% likelihood that coastlines will be exposed 
to coastal erosion. (15) 
• In Polar Regions such as Alaska, infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) and 
native ways of life are 80% likely to suffer significant harm from the 
effects of climate change. There is an 80% certainty that migratory birds, 
mammals and higher predators will suffer significant harm from 
reductions in glaciers, ice sheets, and sea ice. (53) 
• It is 80% likely that heat waves in cities like Chicago will increase in 
number, intensity, and duration during the course of the century. (24) 
• It is 66% likely that the Great Plains area will experience more severe 
summer droughts and a 90% likelihood that increased springtime 
flooding will damage crop yields.   (27) 
• There is 80% certainty that warming in western mountains will lead to 
decreased snowpack, more winter flooding and reduced summer flows, 
which would increase competition for water in many western states. (31)   
                                                          
30 See page XX for a comparison of the cultural narrative setting structures and the control list.   
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• Global average sea level rose at an average rate of 1.8 millimeters per 
year over 1961 to 2003 and at an average rate of about 3.1 millimeters 
per year from 1993 to 2003.  (33) 
• The magnitude and timing of the effects of all predictions and estimates 
listed above will ultimately depend upon the amount and rate of climate 
change.  (25).  
 
Transition to Enemy 
 
Egalitarian: (52/55: 94.54%) 
 
Hierarch: (52/55: 94.54%) Individualist: (52/55: 94.54%) 
 
1. As you can see, climate 
change is real and the 
potential consequences 
here in the United States 
are terrifying.  (18/19) 
2. It is also obvious that a 
reduction in green house 
gasses is necessary.  
(12/13) 
3. However, despite these 
terrifying consequences, 
real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 
has been made nearly 
impossible by the efforts 
of destructive interests. 
(22/23)  
 
1. As you can see, climate 
change is real and the 
potential consequences 
here in the United States 
are alarming. (18/19) 
2. It is also evident that a 
reduction in green house 
gasses is necessary. 
(12/13) 
3. However, despite these 
likely consequences, real 
progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 
has been made nearly 
impossible by the efforts 
of destructive interests.  
(22/23). 
 
1. As you can see, climate 
change is real and the 
potential consequences 
here in the United States 
are unsettling. (18/19) 
2. It is also apparent that a 
reduction in green house 
gasses is necessary. 
(12/13) 
3. However, despite these 
potential consequences, 
real progress in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions 
has been made nearly 
impossible by the efforts 
of destructive interests. 
(22/23)   
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The Enemy: Number One 
 
Individualist 
 
Egalitarian Hierarch 
The Enemy: The Hierarch  
 
1. Government interests, 
represented by groups 
like {bureaucratic unions} 
and the infamous {Club of 
Rome}, are attempting to 
use climate change to 
promote their own 
agenda. (20/22)  
 
2. They push for programs 
that solidify bureaucratic 
control and increase the 
size and cost of 
government.  (6/16) 
 
3. These programs include 
reliance on unsustainable 
nuclear energy, restrictive 
international treaties, and 
some of the more 
frightening positions even 
advocate across the 
board population control.   
 
(20/25: Egalitarian)(5/25: 
Hierarch) 
 
4. They argue that due to 
the size of the problem, 
only centralized authority 
can be trusted to solve 
the problem.  (17/20) 
 
Egalitarian Agreement: 63/83 75.9% 
 
Hierarch Agreement: 48/83  57.83% 
Purple text indicates agreement 
between two (not three) sets of 
text.   
The Enemy: The Hierarch  
 
1. Government interests, 
represented by groups like 
the infamous {Club of 
Rome} and {selfish 
politicians}, are 
attempting to use climate 
change to promote their 
own agenda.  (20/22) 
 
2. They push for programs 
that reinforce existing 
inequalities and increase 
the wealth and power of 
politicians.  (6/16) 
 
3. These programs include 
reliance on unsafe nuclear 
energy, indulgent 
international treaties, and 
some of the more 
frightening positions even 
advocate population 
control for the poor.  
 
(20/25: Individualist)(5/25: 
Hierarch) 
 
4. They argue that due to the 
complexity of the 
problem, only specialized 
experts can be trusted to 
solve the problem. (17/20) 
 
Individualist Agreement: 63/83  
75.9% 
 
Hierarch Agreement: 48/83  57.83% 
 
Purple text indicates agreement 
between two (not three) sets of 
text.   
 
The Enemy: The Egalitarian 
 
1. Environmental interests, 
represented by groups 
like {Ecodefense} and the 
infamous {Earthfirst!}, 
are attempting to use 
climate change to 
promote their own 
agenda (20/22). 
2. They push for programs 
that ignore scientific 
evidence and dismiss 
how truly complex 
climate change is. (6/16) 
3. These programs include 
reliance on unproven 
community-owned 
energy, ineffective 
consumer laws, and the 
more radical stances 
advocate isolated “eco-
communities,” where 
authority rests in 
environmental councils. 
(5/25) 
4. They argue that due to 
the nature of the 
problem, only isolated 
communities can be 
trusted to solve the 
problem.  (17/20) 
 
 
 
 
Individualist Agreement: 48/83  
57.83% 
 
Egalitarian Agreement: 48/83  
57.83% 
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Egalitarian ComparativeTreatment: Enemy 1 v. Enemy 2 
 
Individualist: (49/83: 59.04%) 
 
Hierarch: (49/83: 59.04%)  
 
The Enemy (2) 
 
The Egalitarian 
1. Environmental advocates, 
represented by organizations 
like {Ecodefense} and the 
radical {Earthfirst!}, are 
attempting to use climate 
change to destroy our 
capitalist system.  (15/22) 
2. These groups demand 
radical policies that destroy 
free competition and reduce 
our individual quality of life. 
(2/16) 
3. These groups put faith in 
socialized community-owned 
energy, invasive consumer 
laws, and the more 
dangerous positions 
advocate isolated “eco-
communities,” where 
authority rests in 
environmental councils.   
(17/25) 
4. They argue that due to the 
failure of free markets, only 
planned communities can be 
trusted to handle climate 
change. (15/20).  
 
 
The Enemy (1) 
 
The Egalitarian 
1. Environmental interests, 
represented by groups 
like{Ecodefense} and the 
infamous {Earthfirst!}, are 
attempting to use climate 
change to promote their own 
agenda. (15/22) 
2. They push for programs that 
ignore scientific evidence and 
dismiss how truly complex 
climate change is. (2/16) 
3. These programs include 
reliance on unproven 
community-owned energy, 
ineffective consumer laws, and 
the more radical stances 
advocate isolated “eco-
communities,” where authority 
rests in environmental 
councils. (17/25) 
4. They argue that due to the 
nature of the problem, only 
isolated communities can be 
trusted to solve the problem.  
(15/20) 
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The Enemy: Number Two 
 
Egalitarian 
 
Hierarch Individualist 
The Individualist 
 
1. Corporate advocates, 
represented by 
organizations like {the 
Wall Street Journal} and 
the radical {Cato 
Institute}, are attempting 
to use climate change to 
exploit people for profit. 
(18/22: Hierarch) (16/22: 
Individualist) 
2. These groups demand 
radical policies that 
destroy local 
communities and 
dramatically increase 
inequality around the 
globe. (7/16: 
Hierarch)(8/16: 
Individualist) 
1. They put faith in greedy 
corporations, ill-informed 
consumers, and the more 
dangerous positions 
advocate cap-and-trade 
policies that allow 
industry to sell the right 
to pollute. (23/25: 
Hierarch) (8/25: 
Individualist) 
3. They argue that due to 
the failure of community-
level efforts only 
competitive markets can 
be trusted to handle 
climate change.  (16/20)   
Hierarch Agreement: 64/83  77.11% 
Individualist Agreement: 47/83  
56.62% 
Purple text indicates agreement 
between two (not three) sets of 
text.   
 
 
The Individualist 
 
1. Corporate advocates, 
represented by 
organizations like {the 
Wall Street Journal} and 
the radical {Cato 
Institute}, are attempting 
to use climate change to 
help generate larger 
profits. (18/22: Egalitarian) 
(15/22: Individualist) 
2. These groups demand 
radical policies that 
ignore societal 
responsibility and push 
pollution and costs onto 
citizens. (7/16: Egalitarian 
and Individualist) 
3. They put faith in 
unregulated 
corporations, 
misinformed consumers, 
and the more dangerous 
positions advocate cap-
and-trade policies that 
allow industry to sell the 
right to pollute. (23/25: 
Egalitarian) (8/25: 
Individualist) 
4. They argue that due to 
the failure of government 
regulations, only 
competitive markets can 
be trusted to handle 
climate change.  (16/20)   
 
Egalitarian Agreement: 64/83  
77.11% 
Individualist Agreement: 46/83  
55.42% 
Purple text indicates agreement 
between two (not three) sets of 
text.   
The Egalitarian 
 
1. Environmental advocates, 
represented by 
organizations like 
{Ecodefense} and the 
radical {Earthfirst!}, are 
attempting to use climate 
change to destroy our 
capitalist system.  (15/22: 
Hierarch and Egalitarian) 
2. These groups demand 
radical policies that 
destroy free competition 
and reduce our individual 
quality of life. (8/16: 
Egalitarian)(7/16: Hierarch) 
3. These groups put faith in 
socialized community-
owned energy, invasive 
consumer laws, and the 
more dangerous positions 
advocate isolated “eco-
communities,” where 
authority rests in 
environmental councils.   
(8/25: Hierarch and 
Egalitarian) 
4. They argue that due to the 
failure of free markets, 
only planned communities 
can be trusted to handle 
climate change. (16/20).  
 
 
Egalitarian Agreement: 47/83  56.62% 
 
Hierarch  Agreement: 46/83 55.42% 
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Cultural Transition: Introducing the Heroes 
 
Egalitarian: (77/90: 85.55%) 
 
Hierarch: (77/90: 85.55%) Individualist: (77/90: 85.55%) 
 
1. It is clear that both big 
government and free 
market types are using 
the facts about climate 
change to push a 
destructive agenda that 
obstructs any meaningful 
solutions to the problem.  
(27/31) 
2. To solve this problem we 
must invoke the value 
that has always served 
humanity the best; that 
value is our historical 
reliance on equal 
participation.  (22/25) 
3. The community-owned 
renewables solution 
relies on this value by 
taking advantage of equal 
participation to 
decentralize the cleanest 
substitutes for coal and 
oil. (18/23) 
4. Thankfully groups like 
{Ecodefense} have been 
tirelessly advocating for 
this solution. (10/11) 
 
 
1. It is clear that both radical 
environmentalists and 
free market types are 
using the facts about 
climate change to push a 
destructive agenda that 
obstructs any meaningful 
solutions to the problem.  
(27/31) 
2. To solve this problem we 
must invoke the value that 
has always served 
Americans the best; that 
value is our historical 
reliance on scientific 
expertise. (22/25) 
3. The nuclear power 
solution relies on this 
value by taking advantage 
of scientific expertise to 
use the cleanest substitute 
for coal and oil. (18/23)  
4. Thankfully groups like {the 
Club of Rome} have been 
tirelessly advocating for 
this solution.  (10/11) 
   
 
 
1. It is clear that both big 
government and radical 
environmental types are 
using the facts about 
climate change to push a 
destructive agenda that 
obstructs any meaningful 
solutions to the problem. 
(27/31)  
2. To solve this problem we 
must invoke the value 
that has always served 
humans the best; that 
value is our historical 
reliance on free 
competition.  (22/25) 
3. The innovative cap- and-
trade solution relies on 
this value by taking 
advantage of free 
competition to generate 
the cleanest substitutes 
for coal and oil. (18/23) 
4. Thankfully organizations 
like {the Cato Institute} 
have been tirelessly 
advocating for this 
solution.  (10/11) 
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The Moral of the Story 
Egalitarian (15/109:12.96%) 
 
Hierarch (15/109:12.96%) Individualist (15/109:12.96%) 
 
1. The community-owned 
renewable energy 
solution drastically 
reduces the overall 
amount of greenhouse 
gasses, as wind and solar 
energy produce none.  
(20) 
2. This plan involves local 
communities purchasing 
and maintaining their own 
renewable power.  (12) 
3. In cooperatively 
purchasing wind and solar 
farms, communities seize 
ownership from the cause 
of climate change: 
government and 
corporate greed. (20)  
4. Community-owned 
renewables have 
demonstrated three times 
the job creation and four 
times the property value 
increases of their 
corporate counterparts.  
(20) 
5. Local ownership also 
strengthens communal 
bonds as people work 
together to maintain 
something in which they 
all have a stake. (20) 
6. The benefits of 
community-owned 
renewable energy are 
clean, plentiful, and 
inexpensive energy 
sources that help 
strengthen communities.  
(17) 
 
 
1. The Nuclear energy 
solution drastically 
reduces the overall 
amount of greenhouse 
gasses, as nuclear energy 
produces none. (17)  
2. Nuclear power costs less 
than coal, wind, or solar.  
(9) 
3. It doesn’t need the sun to 
shine or the wind blowing, 
so it is also more reliable 
than wind or solar. (21)  
4. Nuclear power plants are 
also safer than coal for 
those that both work and 
live near them. (17) 
5. The one drawback to 
nuclear power is waste, 
which is easily dealt with 
by close monitoring and 
reprocessing waste into 
more nuclear energy. (23) 
6. The benefits of the 
nuclear solution are a 
clean, plentiful, and 
inexpensive energy source 
that takes advantage of 
our greatest scientific 
accomplishments.  (22) 
 
 
 
  
 
1. The cap-and-trade 
energy solution 
drastically reduces the 
overall amount of 
greenhouse gasses, as 
businesses are limited by 
how much they can 
produce. (22) 
2. Each business can buy or 
trade permits within 
these emissions limits.  
(11) 
3. So, if a company releases 
greenhouse gasses below 
what its permits would 
allow, it may sell or trade 
its permits to a business 
that produces more. (26)   
4. This solution lets 
companies that have 
traditionally produced 
more greenhouse gasses 
buy from those that 
produce less.  (17) 
5. The benefit of the cap-
and-trade solution is 
businesses will have time 
to adapt to a more 
climate conscious 
economy while also 
competing with 
companies that find 
creative ways to cut 
costs and emissions.  (34) 
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The Moral of the Story: Policy Solution 
Egalitarian (33/64:51.56% ) 
 
Hierarch (36/64:51.56% ) Individualist (36/64:51.56% ) 
 
1. The problem of global 
climate change reminds us 
all that the world is fragile.  
(12/14) 
2. When humanity loses sight 
of our relationship with 
nature, the environment 
will always retaliate for our 
carelessness.  (1/17) 
3. The community-owned 
renewable energy solution 
provides a clear path for 
humanity to correct our 
reckless behavior and 
solve the problem of 
global climate change.  
(15/23) 
4. Governmental excesses 
and bottomless corporate 
greed are not the answer.  
(5/10) 
 
 
1. The problem of global 
climate change reminds 
us that the world is 
delicately balanced.  
(12/14) 
2. When mankind disturbs 
this balance, we must 
rely on our expertise to 
bring things back into 
order.  (1/17). 
3. The nuclear energy 
solution provides a clear 
path for governments to 
reestablish control 
through expert 
management and solve 
the problem of climate 
change. (15/23) 
4. Radical ideology and 
more corporate greed 
are not the answer.  
(5/10) 
 
1. The problem of climate 
change reminds us all 
that the world is rapidly 
changing. (12/14). 
2. When change turns for 
the worse, it can only get 
better if we are free to 
adapt. (1/17) 
3. The cap-and-trade 
solution provides a clear 
path for corporations to 
freely adapt, provide 
innovative solutions, and 
solve the problem of 
global climate change.  
(15/23) 
4. Radical ideology and 
more big government are 
not the answer. (5/10) 
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APPENDIX C: CONTROL VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTISTICS 
Q2_Age: How old are you? [Verbatim] 
 
n Minimum Maximum Mean 
1586 18 88 46.01 
 
Q3_Education: What is your highest level of education? 
 
Category Frequency 
1: Elementary or some high school 42 
2: High School Graduate/GED 358 
3: Some college/vocational school 577 
4: College Graduate 379 
5: Some graduate work 90 
6: Master’s Degree 101 
7: Doctorate of any type 17 
Other Degree (specify) 16 
Total 1580 
 
Q4_Gender: Are you male or female? 
 
Category Frequency 
Male 893 
Female 688 
Total 1581 
 
Income (Q56-Q56iv): Which of the following income categories approximates 
the total estimated annual income from your household in the previous year? 
Category Frequency 
Less than 10,000 149 
10,000 to 19,999 180 
20,000 to 29,999 215 
30,000 to 39,999 224 
40,000 to 49,999 149 
50,000 to 59,999 181 
60,000 to 69,999 131 
70,000 to 79,999 98 
80,000 to 89,999 61 
90,000 to 99,999 38 
100,000 to 109,999 29 
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110,000 to 119,999 21 
120,000 to 129,999 16 
130,000 to 139,999 19 
140,000 to 149,999 15 
150,000 to 159,999 13 
160,000 to 169,999 3 
170,000 to 179,999 1 
180,000 to 189,999 0 
190,000 to 199,999 4 
200,000 or more 3 
Total 1550 
 
Q55_Race: Which of the following do you most associate with your own 
ethnicity or race? 
Category Frequency 
American Indian 14 
Asian 28 
Black 256 
Hispanic 176 
White 1075 
Other (Specify) 30 
Total 1579 
 
Q8_Ideology: On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from 
strongly liberal to strongly conservative.  Which of the following categories best 
describes your view? 
 
Category Frequency 
Strongly Liberal 103 
Liberal 233 
Slightly Liberal 174 
Middle of the Road 551 
Slightly Conservative 163 
Conservative 240 
Strongly Conservative 109 
Total 1573 
 
Climate Change Knowledge (composite measure: q12-q22) 
Minimum  Maximum Mean N 
2 11 7.7447 1508 
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Q12_Tempcorrect: Do most scientists expect temperatures to rise? 
Correct (Yes) 1395 
Incorrect 180 
Total 1575 
 
Q13_Ocean Correct: Do most scientists expect ocean levels to drop? 
Correct (No) 1001 
Incorrect 574 
Total 1575 
 
Q14_Drought correct: Do most scientists expect more frequent droughts? 
Correct (Yes) 1281 
Incorrect 297 
Total 1578 
 
Q15_Flood Correct: Do most scientists expect fewer floods? 
Correct (No) 1334 
Incorrect 237 
Total 1571 
 
Q16_Weather Correct: Do most scientists expect more severe weather storms, 
like hurricanes and tornados? 
Correct (Yes) 1371 
Incorrect 205 
Total 1576 
 
Q17_Auto Correct: Do most scientists believe exhausts from cars and trucks 
cause global temperatures to rise? 
Correct (Yes) 1392 
Incorrect 179 
Total 1571 
 
Q18_Nuclear Correct: Do most scientists believe radiation from nuclear power 
plants causes global temperatures to rise? 
Correct (No) 644 
Incorrect 922 
Total 1566 
 
Q19_Chemical Correct: Do most scientists believe disposal of toxic chemicals in 
landfills causes global temperatures to rise? 
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Correct (No) 499 
Incorrect 1072 
Total 1571 
 
Q20_Coal Correct: Do scientists believe coal powered electricity plants cause 
global temperatures to rise?  
Correct (Yes) 1167 
Incorrect 402 
Total 1586 
 
Q21_Deforest Correct: Do most scientists believe the destruction of jungles and 
forests causes global temperatures to rise? 
Correct (No) 1360 
Incorrect 211 
Total 1571 
 
Q22_Avgtempcorrect: To the best of your knowledge, how much do scientists 
think the average temperature will increase over the next 50 to 70 years? 
Correct 716 
Incorrect 858 
Total 1586 
 
Cultural Totals 
 Minimum Maximum Mean N 
Individualism 3 21 12.333 1557 
Hierarchism 3 21 11.6100 1559 
Egalitarianism 3 21 12.3201 1559 
Fatalism 3 21 9.8544 1566 
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APPENDIX D: DEPENDNET VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVES 
Q44_Narrator _threat:  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at 
all and ten is extreme threat, how much of a threat do you feel the author of the 
previous article believes climate change to be?   
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 6.9492 7.2060 6.6068 6.7541 7.2265 
n 1574 403 412 366 393 
 
Q45_Author_trust: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no trust 
and ten means complete trust, how much do you trust that the facts and 
arguments presented in the previous article are accurate? 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 5.2405 5.5608 5.0583 5.0707 5.2621 
n 1576 403 412 368 393 
 
Q46 _ Affect: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means extremely 
negative and ten means extremely positive, what is your overall reaction to the 
previous article you just read?    
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 5.3442 5.2975 5.2597 5.3351 5.4897 
n 1569 400 412 367 390 
 
Q47_Respondent Risk:  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero is no threat at 
all and ten is extreme threat, in your considered assessment, how much of a 
threat do you believe climate change poses to you personally in the next 50 
years?  
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 5.7513 5.6965 5.5461 5.8529 5.9284 
n 1572 402 412 367 391 
 
Q51_Sociotropic Risk: The author indicated that global climate change posed 
some risk to the United States.  Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
no problem whatsoever and ten means devastating, how much of a problem do 
you believe climate change will be for the United States in the next 50 years? 
 Total Control Individualist Hierarch Egalitarian 
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Sample Narrative Narrative Narrative 
Mean 6.2705 6.2918 6.2203 6.3651 6.2128 
n 1571 401 413 367 390 
 
Q49_CC_Belief: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely 
disagree and ten means completely agree, please indicate how much you agree 
with the accuracy of the following statements: The Earth is warming and over 
the past one hundred years the average temperature has increased by one to 
two degrees.  
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 7.2738 7.4119 7.1235 7.3770 7.1939 
n 1574 403 413 366 392 
 
Q50_Antrhopogenic Cause: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means 
completely disagree and ten means completely agree, please indicate how much 
you agree with the accuracy of the following statements: Human produced 
greenhouse gasses, such as those resulting from the combustion of coal, oil, 
natural gas, and others are the cause of average global temperature increases. 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 6.5334 6.6244 6.2944 6.7575 6.4809 
n 1573 402 411 367 393 
 
Q48_GHG Regulation: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at 
all important and ten means extremely important, how important do you think it 
is for the U.S. to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 7.3416 7.4020 7.1732 7.5452 7.2665 
n 1572 403 410 365 394 
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The Cast of Characters 
Control: Now we would like to ask your opinion about a few groups commonly 
associated with debates about climate change.  Using a scale from zero to ten, 
where zero means completely negative and ten means completely positive, 
please indicate your reaction to these groups.   
Narrative Experimental Tracks: The author mentions {INSERT GROUP NAME}. 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means completely negative and ten 
means completely positive, please indicate your reaction to this group.   
EarthFirst (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 4.490 5.8253 3.8259 4.0725 na 
n 1002 292 379 331 na 
 
Ecodefense (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 4.5668 5.2520 3.5771 3.7430 5.9162 
n 1295 250 376 323 346 
 
The Club of Rome (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 3.9705 4.5288 3.2127 5.6849 2.9102 
n 1185 208 362 292 323 
 
The Cato Institute (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 4.2352 4.9017 5.6429 3.3889 3.1272 
n 1246 234 350 324 338 
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The Wall Street Journal (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 4.2203 5.2844 na 3.6140 3.8078 
n 1035 334 na 342 359 
 
Policy Preferences 
 
Now, I would like to assess your opinion on several proposals that many argue 
will reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Using a scale from zero to ten, where 
zero means completely disagree and ten means completely agree, please 
indicate how much you support each of the following proposals: 
 
Q52_Pref1_Hier: Many argue that the problem of excessive greenhouse gas 
emissions should be solved by relying more on nuclear energy.  How much do 
you agree or disagree with the nuclear energy approach to reducing greenhouse 
gases?  
 
Nuclear Energy (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 5.2740 5.5847 5.2310 5.2759 4.9943 
n 1445 366 381 348 350 
 
Q53_Pref2_Ind: One proposal to deal with greenhouse gas emissions is to use a 
cap-and-trade system (also called tradable emissions).  This solution places an 
overall limit on company and industry emissions.  Permits are issued and 
companies that emit less greenhouse gasses can trade or sell their permits to 
companies that produce more.  How much do you agree or disagree with the 
cap-and-trade approach to reducing greenhouse gases? 
Cap-and-Trade (No DK) 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 4.8018 4.8247 5.5187 4.5549 4.2368 
n 1418 365 374 337 342 
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 Q54_Pref3_Egal:  Many argue that excessive greenhouse gas emissions are best 
handled at the community level.  The community based approach contends that 
it is through communities taking direct ownership of renewable energy, such as 
wind and solar farms, that greenhouse gas emissions are best reduced (as 
opposed to corporations or government).  How much do you agree or disagree 
with the community approach to reducing greenhouse gases? 
 
Renewable Energy 
 Total 
Sample 
Control Individualist 
Narrative 
Hierarch 
Narrative 
Egalitarian 
Narrative 
Mean 5.8862 6.0187 5.8661 5.3481 6.2809 
n 1450 374 381 339 356 
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APPENDIX E: NARRATIVE STRUCUTRAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES: AUTHOR 
TRUST AND NARRATIVE AFFECT 
Variable 
 
Author 
Trust 
Affect Narrator 
Threat 
 
Constant 5.085** 
(.547) 
4.329** 
(.520) 
4.666** 
(.551) 
 
Age -.009 
(.005) 
.002 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.005) 
 
Education -.056 
(.059) 
-.053 
(.056) 
.061 
(.060) 
 
Gender -.415* 
(.137) 
-.095 
(.129) 
-.420** 
(.138) 
 
Income .003 
(.021) 
-.003 
(.020) 
.038 
(.021) 
 
White/Asian -.245 
(.151) 
-.482** 
(.143) 
-.040 
(.152) 
 
Ideology -.225** 
(.045) 
-.142** 
(.043) 
.040 
(.045) 
 
Climate Change Knowledge .127** 
(.038) 
.122** 
(.036) 
.292** 
(.038) 
 
Individualism -.039* 
(.018) 
-.035* 
(.017) 
.016 
(.018) 
 
Hierarchy .066** 
(.020) 
.059* 
(.019) 
.011 
(.020) 
 
Egalitarianism .099** 
(.017) 
.072** 
(.016) 
.049** 
(.017) 
 
Fatalism -.017 
(.019) 
-.012 
(.018) 
-.085** 
(.019) 
 
Individualist Narrative -.456* 
(.182) 
.032 
(.173) 
-.562** 
(.184) 
 
Hierarchical Narrative -.474* 
(.187) 
.138 
(.177) 
-.376* 
(.189) 
 
Egalitarian Narrative .303 
(.185) 
.247 
(.175) 
.117 
(.187) 
 
Adjusted R .106 2 .063 .081  
F Statistic 12.725 7.645 9.665  
N 1384 1380 1382  
* p < .05; ** p <.001 
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APPENDIX F: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND PERCEPTIONS OF RISK ABOUT 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
Variable 
 
Personal Risk Sociotropic Risk 
Constant 4.787** 
(.579) 
4.937** 
(.495) 
Age -.018** 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.004) 
Education .002 
(.062) 
-.023 
(.054) 
Gender -.625** 
(.144) 
-.597** 
(.124) 
Income .003 
(.022) 
-.024 
(.019) 
White/Asian -.346* 
(.159) 
-.535** 
(.137) 
Ideology -.180** 
(.047) 
-.283** 
(.041) 
Climate Change Knowledge .261** 
(.040) 
.284** 
(.034) 
Individualism -.099** 
(.019) 
-.088** 
(.016) 
Hierarchy .027 
(.021) 
.044 
(.018) 
Egalitarianism .171** 
(.018) 
.164** 
(.015) 
Fatalism -.029 
(.020) 
-.019 
(.017) 
Individualist Narrative .005 
(.192) 
.157 
(.165) 
Hierarchical Narrative .243 
(.197) 
.262 
(.169) 
Egalitarian Narrative .322* 
(.195) 
-.015 
(.168) 
Adjusted R .197 2 .265 
F Statistic 25.161 36.461 
N 1382 1380 
* p < .05; ** p <.001 
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APPENDDIX G: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, CLIMATE CHANGE OPINION, NAD 
WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE GHG’S 
Variable 
 
Climate 
Change Belief 
Anthropogenic 
Cause 
US GHG 
Reductions  
Constant 4.550** 
(.549) 
4.439** 
(.553) 
5.277** 
(.555) 
Age .008 
(.005) 
-.008 
(.005) 
.005 
(.005) 
Education -.045 
(.059) 
-.098 
(.060) 
-.052 
(.060) 
Gender -.545** 
(.137) 
-.498** 
(.139) 
-.557** 
(.138) 
Income .011 
(.021) 
.028 
(.021) 
.005 
(.021) 
White/Asian .168 
(.151) 
-.326* 
(.153) 
-.105 
(.153) 
Ideology -.284** 
(.045) 
-.319** 
(.045) 
-.291** 
(.045) 
Climate Change Knowledge .388** 
(.038) 
.396** 
(.039) 
.354** 
(.039) 
Individualism -.043* 
(.018) 
-.094** 
(.018) 
-.085** 
(.018) 
Hierarchy .044* 
(.020) 
.083** 
(.020) 
.034 
(.020) 
Egalitarianism .106** 
(.017) 
.168** 
(.017) 
.160** 
(.017) 
Fatalism -.054* 
(.019) 
-.051* 
(.019) 
-.060* 
.019 
Individualist Narrative -.105 
(.183) 
-.196 
(.185) 
-.120 
(.185) 
Hierarchical Narrative .063 
(.188) 
.177 
(.189) 
.241 
(.189) 
Egalitarian Narrative -.165 
(.186) 
-.102 
(.187) 
-.063 
(-.187) 
Adjusted R .171 2 .251 .220 
F Statistic 21.366 34.088 28.728 
N 1382 1382 1380 
* p < .05; ** p <.001 
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APPENDIX H: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND GROUP AFFECT 
Variable 
 
The Cato 
Institute 
The Club of 
Rome 
Ecodefense 
Constant 4.011** 
(.613) 
3.443** 
(.614) 
6.019** 
(.607) 
Age -.011* 
(.005) 
-.012* 
(.005) 
-.021** 
(.005) 
Education .063 
(.066) 
.081 
(.067) 
-.008 
(.066) 
Gender .285 
(.154) 
.047 
(.154) 
.180 
(.152) 
Income -.019 
(.023) 
-.020 
(.023) 
-.009 
(.023) 
White/Asian -.063 
(.168) 
-.194 
(.168) 
-.278 
(.166) 
Ideology .003 
(.051) 
-.038 
(.051) 
-.204** 
(.050) 
Climate Change 
Knowledge 
-.028 
(.042) 
-.069 
(.042) 
-.025 
(.042) 
Individualism .038 
(.020) 
.012 
(.020) 
-.098** 
(.020) 
Hierarchy .056* 
(.022) 
.067* 
(.022) 
.114** 
(.022) 
Egalitarianism -.003 
(.019) 
.060** 
(.019) 
.095** 
(.019) 
Fatalism .039 
(.022) 
.056* 
(.021) 
.014 
(.021) 
Individualist Narrative .718** 
(.220) 
-1.281** 
(.222) 
-1.614** 
(.214) 
Hierarchical Narrative -1.530** 
(.223) 
1.214** 
(.230) 
-1.509** 
(.220) 
Egalitarian Narrative -1.754** 
(.222) 
-1.553** 
(.226) 
.641** 
(.218) 
Adjusted R .182 2 .231 .258 
F Statistic 18.413 23.483 29.181 
N 1092 1045 1135 
* p < .05; ** p <.001 
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APPENDIX I: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND THE MORAL OF THE STORY 
Variable 
 
Cap-and-
Trade 
Nuclear 
Energy 
Community 
Renewable Energy 
Constant 3.389** 
(.696) 
.164 
(.688) 
4.522** 
(.640) 
Age -.020** 
(.006) 
.014* 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.005) 
Education .072 
(.074) 
.190* 
(.073) 
-.229** 
(.068) 
Gender -.140 
(.173) 
.559** 
(.171) 
-.494* 
(.160) 
Income -.013 
(.026) 
.039 
(.026) 
.034 
(.024) 
White/Asian -.111 
(.192) 
.231 
(.190) 
.235 
(.176) 
Ideology -.145* 
(.057) 
.166* 
(.056) 
-.032 
(.052) 
Climate Change 
Knowledge 
-.021 
(.048) 
.044 
(.048) 
.065 
(.045) 
Individualism -.024 
(.023) 
.102** 
(.022) 
.011 
(.021) 
Hierarchy .092* 
(.025) 
.081** 
(.024) 
.025 
(.023) 
Egalitarianism .140** 
(.021) 
.007 
(.021) 
.114** 
(.019) 
Fatalism .056* 
(.024) 
.024 
(.024) 
-.008 
(.022) 
Individualist Narrative .776** 
(.229) 
-.355 
(.227) 
-.056 
(.211) 
Hierarchical Narrative -.124 
(.234) 
-.211 
(.232) 
-.546* 
(.216) 
Egalitarian Narrative -.535* 
(.235) 
-.539** 
(.233) 
.366* 
(.215) 
Adjusted R .128 2 .090 .057 
F Statistic 14.119 10.026 6.465 
N 1248 1273 1275  
* p < .05; ** p <.001 
 
 
 
 







